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This thesis enquires into the significance of monstrosity in literary modernism. It argues that an 
analysis of monstrosity in the work of Wyndham Lewis (1882-1957), Mina Loy (1882-1966) 
and Samuel Beckett (1906-1989) provides new ways of situating the modernist body in relation 
to contemporary preoccupations with biopolitics, animality, media technologies and the 
posthuman. The aim of this thesis is to show that theories of posthumanism which emerged 
from postmodern or poststructuralist thought cannot provide a persuasive account of the 
modernist fascination with the monstrous. On one hand, the writers I analyse prefigured the 
canonical strains of posthumanist thought by imagining bodies which disrupt the categorical 
divisions between humans and animals, organisms and machines, the living and the nonliving. 
On the other hand, they repeatedly evoke the monstrous by drawing on narratives of atavistic 
regression and tropes of contamination, horror, degeneration and pathology. Literary and 
artistic modernism coincided with a period in which anxieties about the ‘species body’ 
(Foucault) of humanity were intensely debated among scientists, eugenicists, politicians, artists, 
writers and cultural critics. By positioning avant-garde and modernist writers and artists in the 
context of biopolitical modernity, this thesis argues that critics have often neglected the 
contested and politically ambiguous origins of modernist posthumanism. In seeking to 
understand the connection between historical forces and cultural production, ‘Making 
Modernism’s Monsters’ contributes to current debates about the emergent cultures of literary 
posthumanism, the cultural logic of modern biopolitics and representations of the body in 
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There is one affect that adheres to the body of the monster more than any other: horror.  The 
horrific, according to Noël Carroll, begins with an affectively charged reaction to the monster. 
There are two conditions that must be in place for the monster to horrify: the monster must 
fascinate because it is ‘repulsive’;1 and the monster must be an ‘impure’ mixture of bodies, 
‘categorically contradictory’.2 While monsters often lack vital body parts, it is the incompletion 
of humanity’s conceptual categories and discourses that is at the root of the horrific. Horror 
strips bare the conceptual clothing of the Real to expose the rawness and ‘barbarism’ of 
inhuman life. It shows us that the Real is too much for our humanising discourses and concepts 
to bear. This unbearable surplus is nowhere more evident than in horror genre’s mixing of the 
human with different orders of being: ‘Just as Deleuze-Spinoza say that we do not yet know 
what a body can do, so in horror we are shown the many ways a human body can be mutated 
into non-human forms’.3 The loss of human distinction, in other words, lies at the heart of the 
horrific, because ‘[w]hat horror (or the horrific) does is play with images in order to show 
continuities and discontinuities between human and nonhuman images’.4 In addition, being 
horrified often involves exposure to excessive violence. Adriana Cavarero, in her excellent 
study, Horrorism (2009), thus claims that horror springs from the ‘instinctive disgust for a 
violence that, not merely content to kill because killing would be too little, aims to destroy the 
uniqueness of the body, tearing at its constitutive vulnerability’.5 Horrific violence for Cavarero 
erases the divide between the human and the nonhuman, burying the individual person within 
the unmarked grave of impersonal materiality. ‘Horror’, as Marcel O’Gormon has pointed out 
with reference to Cavarero, ‘exceeds death; it represents not only the cessation of life but a 
challenge to the human form itself’.6 The horrific entails, then, the transformation of a form of 
life beyond recognition. As John Mullarkey puts it, horror ‘shows us the human and non-human, 
the living and inert, spliced together’.7 
For this reason, monstrosity and horror emerge above all as questions concerning the 
limits of the visible. Many scholars have noted that the word ‘monster’ shares its etymological 
ancestry with the English word ‘demonstrate’, both of which have their root in the Latin 
monstrare, meaning ‘to put on display’. Despite this etymological root, though, it is important 
to note that the monstrous involves disappearance as often as it involves something coming into 
                                                 
1 Nöel Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror: Or, the Paradoxes of the Heart (New York: Routledge, 
1990), p. 160.  
2 Ibid. p. 33.  
3 John Mullarkey, ‘The Tragedy of the Object’, Angelaki, 17.4 (2012), 39-59 (p. 20).  
4 Ibid, p. 21.  
5 Adriana Cavarero, Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence, trans. by William McCraig 
(Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 8.  
6 Marcel O’Gormon, Necromedia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,   2015), p. 178.  
7 John Mullarkey, ‘Animal Spirits: Philosomorphism and the Background Revolts of Cinema’, 
Angelaki, 18.1 (2013), 11-29 (p. 20).  
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the light. Or it might be more exact to say that hiddenness is one of the conditions of possibility 
for the appearance of the monster. This explains why narratives of the monstrous often unfold 
in a dialectical movement between visibility and invisibility: Peter Schmiel’s lost shadow in 
Chamisso’s tale, the role of optics and blindness in E.T.A Hoffmann’s The Sandman, the hidden 
portrait in Wilde’s Picture of Dorian Gray, and even poor Gregor Samsa’s confinement beyond 
the parental gaze. If the monstrous is an event that ruptures the ordinary relations between the 
seen and the unseen, then perhaps what the monster shows us above all is the limits of our 
perception. The genesis of the monster involves the misshaping and intermingling of existing 
forms and bodies. 
The identification of radical novelty with the misshaping of established forms is a 
signature of the modernist moment. Modernism not only incorporates the monstrous but 
transmutes it through radical experiments with literary and aesthetic form. In a recent article 
which explores the insurrectionary power of the monstrous in the poetry of Arthur Rimbaud, 
Susan Harrow writes: ‘Monstrosity is an integral part of the transformative project of 
modernism, across time and media, expanding the boundaries of what it is to know and to feel, 
and deepening our understanding of what it is to be human’.8 She continues: ‘Often monstrosity 
and aesthetic innovation have reciprocal agency: the modernist writer invokes monstrosity, and 
monstrosity (and related forms of horror) make possible the figurative pursuit of the non-
normative (or anti-normative) positions and protean values that define the modernist project’ .9 
While I agree with these eloquent remarks, I want to enlarge our understanding of the 
‘reciprocal agency’ of modernism and monstrosity by situating this relationship within the 
contexts of biopolitics and posthumanism. If something akin to a literature of despeciation (in 
which the human body mixes with other animals and objects or loses its ‘human’ 
characteristics) can be gleaned from the archives of modernism, then I want to negotiate the 
stakes of these endgames of the human. We might want to think, in this regard, about Samuel 
Beckett’s memorable phrase ‘loss of species’, which appears in both Watt (1953)10 and How It 
Is (1964).11 We could also consider the ‘anthropoid apes’ referred to in the ‘Circe’ episode of 
Joyce’s Ulysses (1922),12 Satters’ ‘proto-historic jowl’ in Lewis’s The Childermass (1928),13 
or the ‘the little whining beast / Whose longing / Is to slink back to antediluvian burrow’ in 
Mina Loy’s poem ‘Human Cylinders’ (1917).14 What these modernist examples of despeciation 
share in common is a satirical perversion of evolutionary jargon, as if by garbling the 
Enlightenment discourse of science — turning the language of knowledge and progress against 
                                                 
8 Susan Harrow, ‘Modernist Monstrosity in Rimbaud’s Verse and Prose Poetry’, Australian Journal 
of French Studies, 55.2 (2018), 138-153 (p. 138).  
9 Ibid, p. 141.  
10 Samuel Beckett, Watt (London,: John Calder, 1953), p. 82.  
11 Samuel Beckett, How It Is (London: Faber and Faber, 2009), p. 21. 
12 James Joyce, Ulysses (London: Pengiun, 2000), p. 637 
13 Wyndham Lewis, The Human Age. Book One: Childermass (London: Methuen, 1955), p. 56 
14 Mina Loy, ‘Human Cylinders’, in The Lost Lunar Baedeker, ed.by Roger Conover (Manchester: 
Carcanet, 1997), 40-41 (p. 41). 
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itself — they can gain some traction on the peculiar emptying out of the category of the human 
in the early twentieth century. In certain respects, modernists pioneered the concerns that 
continue to dominate contemporary reflections on the definition of human. If the human animal 
is growing ‘curiouser and curiouser’, what words or forms of representation can we find to help 
us understand this process? How can we begin to unravel the paradox that rising levels of 
‘species anxiety’ invariably lead to the perpetuation of our all-too-human fantasies of scientific 
mastery and biotechnological enhancement?15 Is it possible to move to a position beyond or a 
time after humanism in a culture saturated in its exhausted vocabularies? In any case, today 
there is certainly no shortage of words intended to illuminate the supposed twilight of this most 
cherished idol. Witness the proliferation of words that negate, invert, or at the very least, contest 
‘humanism’: not only the now-familiar terms antihumanism and posthumanism, but also less 
well-known coinages such as ‘ahumanism’ and ‘inhumanism’.16 Whether any of these 
particular labels will prove definitive is unknown, though their proliferation suggests we inhabit 
a time when humanism is over — yet it goes on. And is there any term for that? Here I am 
alluding to the strange temporality described by the eponymous character of Samuel Beckett’s 
Molloy : ‘My life, my life, now I speak of it as something over, now as a joke which still goes 
on, and it is neither, for at the same time it is over and it goes on, and is there any tense for 
that?’.17 Molloy’s remarks seem to me an apt description of the posthumous life of the humanist 
tradition in European modernism. In this introduction, I examine two related contexts for my 
study of monstrosity in the work of Lewis, Loy, and Beckett. First, I examine the biopolitical 
context that gave rise degeneration theory and the cultural fascination with monstrous hybrids 
of human and animal. Second, I reflect on the relations between posthumanism and the 
modernist body. 
Atavism and Biopolitics 
Let me cite one of Michel Foucault’s most celebrated definitions of biopolitics: ‘what might be 
called a society’s “threshold of modernity” is reached when the life of the species is wagered 
on its own political strategies’.18 As Timothy Campbell and Adam Sitze have spelled out: 
‘Biopolitics, in this phrasing, involves a sort of “game” in which nothing less than the species 
                                                 
15 David Wheatley, ‘“Quite Exceptionally Anthropoid”: Species Anxiety and Metamorphosis in 
Beckett’s Humans and Other Animals’, in Beckett and Animals, ed. by Mary Bryden (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 59-70 (p. 59).  
16 I take the term “ahumanism” from Jessica Burstein, Cold Modernism: Literature, Fashion, Art 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), p. 2. For a recent discussion of 
inhumanism, see Julian Murphet, ‘A Modest Proposal for the Inhuman’, Modernism/modernity, 23.3 
(2016), 651-670 As Murphet notes, the term “inhumanism” originates in the work of the poet 
Robinson Jeffers, p. 652. For a more detailed discussion of terms derived from “humanism” see 
Sean Pryor, ‘Inhuman Words: Philology, Modernism, Poetry’, Modernsim/Modernity, 23.3 (Sept 
2006), 555-571 (p. 556).  
17 Samuel Beckett, Molloy ed. by Shane Weller (London: Faber and Faber, 2009), p. 34. 
18 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge, trans. by Robert Hurley 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998), p. 143.  
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itself, the species as a living entity, is “at play” or “at stake” [enjeu]’.19 According to Foucault, 
there was a shift from the classical politics of sovereignty to a biopolitics of populations at some 
point in the eighteenth century; this entailed, in turn, the entrance of life itself ‘into knowledge’s 
field of control and power’s sphere of intervention’.20 Once the life of the human species has 
moved ‘into the realm of explicit calculations’ politics becomes an activity with biological 
stakes: namely, securing and maximising the health of populations.21 At ‘the “threshold of 
modernity,”’ the life of the species enters into the trajectory of history, and the human animal 
becomes a species whose existence is at stake in political decisions. However, the fact that from 
the mid-nineteenth century on the defence of the life of the species took the form of biological 
racism, eugenics, and genocide suggests that the politics of life is apt to reverse into a politics 
of death. Roberto Esposito connects this reversal to the aporia he calls ‘the enigma of 
biopolitics’.22 He explains that biopolitics refers to political dominion over life on the one hand 
and the political force inherent in life on the other. ‘In the first case, biopolitics would be an 
absolute power over life; in the second, an absolute power of life’.23 Does biopolitics harm life 
or does it serve life? Esposito’s answer to this question is to interpret biopolitics according to 
‘the category of immunization’, which ‘runs between the two principle declinations of the 
biopolitical paradigm: one affirmative and productive, the other negative and lethal’.24 Esposito 
demonstrates that even the most deadly acts of biopolitical violence have the aim of protecting 
life in order maximise its flourishing. In Nazis biopolitics, for example, the Aryan body seeks 
to protect itself against contamination through a programme of extermination:  
What they want to kill in the Jew and in all human types like them isn’t life, but 
the presence in life of death: a life that is already dead because it is marked 
hereditarily by an original and irremediable deformation; the contagion of the 
German people by a part of life inhabited and oppressed by death.25  
Esposito’s ventriloquizing of the rhetoric of Nazism demonstrates that deformation and the 
living dead — both standard criteria of the monstrous — reside at the core of Nazi biopolitics. 
Without denying the generative force of the monstrous, I want to ask what it means for 
our understanding of modernism’s monstrosities that they emerged against the historical 
backdrop of eugenicism and degeneration theory. To appreciate this history it is necessary to 
return to the middle of the nineteenth century. In the 1860s, the Italian criminologist Cesare 
Lombroso devised a ground-breaking method of anthropometrical analysis for determining the 
                                                 
19 Timothy Campbell and Adam Sitze. ‘Introduction. Biopolitics: An Encounter’, Biopolitics: A 
Reader, ed. by Timothy Campbell and Adam Sitze (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 1-
40, (p. 11).  
20 Foucault, p. 142.  
21 Ibid, p. 143.  
22 Roberto Esposito, Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2008), pp. 13-14.  
23 Ibid, p. 43.  
24 Ibid, p. 46.   
25 Ibid, p. 137.  
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physical characteristics of criminal deviants. Compiling the visual and metrical data he 
collected from the bodies of criminals, he produced taxonomies of ‘defective’ types. ‘With the 
aid of statistics and photography,’ Daniel Pick explains, ‘Lombroso sought to “freeze” the 
process of evolution: to isolate in taxonomies and still-shots the features of a criminal 
subspecies’.26 On the one hand, Lombroso’s photographic catalogues of defective bodies typify 
the taxonomic drive to impose order on a disorderly reality, subsuming the multiplicity of 
unusual bodies under the sign of general characteristics: shining the lamp of Enlightenment into 
heretofore murky regions of nature. On the other hand, this taxonomic drive excludes the very 
bodies that it brings to light, debarring them from normalcy, health, and sexual reproduction, 
as if they literally embodied irrational forces hostile to the continuance of civilization. The key 
claim of Lombroso’s influential research was that the criminal type is ‘an atavistic being who 
reproduces in his person the ferocious instincts of primitive humanity and the inferior 
animals’.27 According to Roberto Esposito, Lombrosian atavism ‘is configured as a kind of 
biohistorical anachronism that reverses the line of human evolution until it has brought it back 
into contact with that of the animal’.28 Lombroso’s work was part of the larger apparatus of 
biological monitoring that expanded significantly during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. These decades witnessed the legitimisation of eugenic science by figures such as 
Francis Galton (1822-1911), the innovations in biometric police profiling devised by Alphonse 
Bertillon (1853-1914), and the programmes of sterilisation and racial extermination in Nazi 
Germany. This period of biopolitical consolidation historically overlaps with the period of 
literary modernism. Unsurprisingly, this ensemble of forces had a significant impact on the 
representation of non-normative bodies in modernist poetry and prose. Joseph Valente explains 
that ‘[t]he image of disability in modernist literature is a highly mediated effect of the 
development of the regime of biopower over the course of the nineteenth century’.29 The 
interaction between eugenics and modernism is not, however, restricted to the representation of 
nonstandard bodies. Many modernists actively campaigned on behalf of selective breeding.  As 
Donald Childs has shown, some of the most influential and accomplished writers of the 
modernist period were convinced of the political efficacy and scientific validity of eugenic 
theory.30 
Despite the crude biological determinism of Lombroso’s theory, atavism is in fact 
manifold and ambiguous in its implications. The insightful work of Dana Seitler charts out the 
                                                 
26 Daniel Pick, ‘The Faces of Anarchy: Lombroso and the Politics of Criminal Science in Post-
Unification Italy’, History Workshop Journal, 21 (Spring 1986), 60-86 (p. 62).  
27 Cesare Lombroso qtd in Dana Seitler, Atavistic Tendencies: The Culture of Science in American 
Modernity (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), p. 55. 
28 Esposito, Bios, p. 119. 
29 Joseph Valente, ‘Modernism and Cognitive Disability: A Genealogy’, in A Handbook of 
Modernism Studies, ed. by Jean-Michel Rabaté (Chicester: Wiley, 2013), 379-398 (p. 380).  
30 Donald J Childs, Modernism and Eugenics: Woolf, Eliot, Yeats, and the Culture and 
Degeneration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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multivalent temporalities of regression and return made possible by the theory of atavism. In 
her study Atavistic Tendencies (2008), Seitler argues that the idea of atavism ‘disallows the 
modern construction of time as a unity that can be distinguished from a stable, archaic past’.31 
She explains that atavistic regression ‘offers up a notion of time as multidirectional and of the 
body as polytemporal’.32 On the one hand, atavism denotes the persistence of traces of the 
animal within the human. On the other hand, it suggests a multispecies form of monstrosity that 
is incompatible with the autonomous human subject.33 While the backwards turn of atavism in 
one sense allows a self-satisfied humanity to face itself in the mirror, Seitler turns her back on 
the specular image of the human to embrace ‘the eternal recurrence of the animal’.34  
Lombroso’s theory identifies the existence of evolutionary throwbacks which obstruct the linear 
march of progress. But it also contests this idea of time moving in a straight line from past to 
present, primitive to civilized, animal to human. Max Nordau’s Degeneration (1892) extends 
Lombroso’s ideas about the ‘atavistic’ body of the degenerate individual into the sphere of 
culture. Nordau’s diagnostic gaze seizes on a raft of aesthetic innovations that he considers 
symptomatic of biological abnormality. Claiming to decode these fin de siècle works as if their 
stylistic features were akin to the so-called ‘stigmata’ of the degenerate body, he interprets them 
as evidence of evolutionary regression. Nordau’s conjoining of degeneration and aesthetics 
casts a long shadow: ‘It is impossible not to see that thread’, Esposito tells us, ‘that ties similar 
evaluations with future Nazi lucubrations with regard to degenerate art’.35 
Nazi biopolitics essentially put into practice the existing concepts of degeneration 
theory, in which the ‘abnormal’ type threatens the collective health of the race.36 For the Nazis, 
immunizing the national body meant safeguarding and enhancing Aryan life. Pathological anti-
life was to be isolated, and then eradicated. When immunized through violence, the German 
body would assume its sacred and immortal form. Nazism’s homicidal fantasy of a split 
between pure Aryan life and the living death embodied by the degenerate is visible in the 
distance between the aesthetics of the monstrous in their anti-Semitic propaganda and their 
championing of classical aesthetic form in representations of the German body.  While the flesh 
of Jewish degenerate is animalized, formless, and stripped of life, the German body is 
spiritualized, well-defined, overflowing with vital power.37 It is noteworthy that art and 
aesthetics turn up at significant moments in Esposito’s reflections of biopolitics. This study 
follows Esposito lead in taking aesthetic monstrosity and degeneration to be mutually 
constitutive categories. For example, Esposito argues that Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897) not 
                                                 
31 Seitler, Atavistic Tendencies: The Culture of Science in American Modernity (Minnesota: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008), p. 137.  
32 Ibid, p. 7. 
33 Ibid, p. 2.  
34 Ibid, p. 30.  
35 Esposito, Bios, p. 123.  
36 Roberto Esposito, Third Person, trans. by Zakiya Hanafi (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), p. 59.  
37 Esposito, Third Person, p. 57.  
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only cites the work of Nordau and Lombroso; it prefigures the Nazi fantasy of hunting and 
annihilating the contaminated life of the undead monster. For Esposito, Dracula ‘encapsulates 
the characteristics of the degenerate — he is no longer the other in man, but the other from man 
[del’l uomo]. Both wolf, bat, and bloodsucker, he is above all the principle of contamination’.38 
While Dracula engages with the Lombrosian motif of the animalized human, its singular 
importance as a cultural precursor to the Nazi politics of death lies in its portrayal of the 
vampire’s interspecies mutations together with his undeadness: 
Just like the degenerate, he is not a true man, but has human features. He doesn’t 
have an image, but continually changes appearance. He is not a type but a 
countertype. He belongs to the world of the “non” — no longer alive, he is still 
and above all else “undead,” repulse by life into an abyss that cannot be bridged. 
He is an already dead, a half dead, a living dead, just as some vampires some fifty 
years later will be designated with their yellow star on their arms’.39 
For Esposito, eugenics was intent on ‘translating these kinds of literary hallucination into 
reality’.40 
Atavism, degeneration, deformity. Far from disappearing at the close of the fin-de-
siècle these tropes persist in modernist writing, albeit in new forms. Of course the connection 
between monstrous births and futurity existed long before degeneration theory and eugenics 
emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century—for millennia monstrous births have been 
interpreted as omens ‘that presage future events’.41 But in the age of biopolitics, the future is 
less a matter of divine providence than the rationale for the exercise of State biopower. 
‘Biofuturity’ provides the temporal horizon for projects of state planning and social engineering 
based on statistical analysis, medical theories about population control, and eugenic practices 
such as forced sterilization.42 One of the essential differences between the traditional monster 
and the modernist monster is the latter’s imbrication in this network of institutions and public 
discourses which categorise living beings according to Social Darwinist notions of ‘fitness’. 
Not surprisingly, the issue of disability is linked to this strand of modernist monstrosity. As 
Alexa Wright observes, ‘monstrosity and disability are culturally encoded terms that often 
appear to overlap and are frequently confused’.43 Modernist writers, whether wittingly or not, 
sometimes replicate this confusion in their work; in fact, figuring ‘unfit’, ‘dysgenic’, or disabled 
bodies as monstrous is one of the ways in which eugenicist modernists—such as W.B. Yeats in 
‘The Second Coming’—engaged with contemporary notions of degeneration in their work. 
                                                 
38 Esposito, Bios, p. 126. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, p. 127. 
41
Geoffrey A. Johns, ‘A “Grievous Burthen”: Richard III and the Legacy of Monstrous Birth in 
Disability, Health and Happiness in the Shakespearean Body, ed. by Sujata Iyengar (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 41-57 (p. 46).  
42 Michael Davidson, ‘Pregnant Men: Modernism, Disability, and Biofuturity, Novel: A Forum on 
Fiction, 43.2 (2010) 207-226 (p. 219). 




These modernists use disability and monstrosity, often interchangeably, as tropes to register 
anxieties about the undoing of the boundaries between the normal and the abnormal. 
Happily, this eugenicist strain of modernism could not hold back the enduring creative 
power of the monstrous and the horrific. From Lautréamont’s Maldoror to Beckett’s The 
Unnamable, the presence of the monstrous in modern literature seems to imply a link between 
uncontainable verbal inventiveness and the hybridisation of living forms. According to Harrow, 
the strong affective responses provoked by literary monstrosities awaken the critical faculties 
and prompt us to question social and political principles: ‘The horror that has the power to 
scandalize (and fascinate) the reader is the necessary horror that nourishes critical lucidity and 
stimulates creativity as it challenges shibboleths, transforms degraded values, and renews poetic 
language’.44 If monstrosity and modernism couple to breed hybrids of aesthetic and political 
radicalism, the creative force of monstrosity is also worth exploring in the context of 
degeneration. In principle, degeneration was (and is) characterised as ‘abnormal’, as 
pathological, and even as the fatal dissolution of living form. Yet the modernist aesthetics of 
the monstrous enable us to appreciate the prodigious creative force of degeneration. 
Monstrosity’s generative aesthetic force can inspire aesthetic resistance to normative 
immunitary responses which seek to capture and expel the static image of the pathological type: 
the degenerate, the Jew, the homosexual, the criminal. In the second part of chapter 2, my focus 
is a reading of Mina Loy’s novel Insel that is attuned to the interrelations between creativity 
and biological decay in the context of 1930s Europe. Loy’s focus on the creative potential of 
Insel’s ‘degenerate’ body alerts us to the dynamic forces released by decay and death, 
awakening readers to the germinal potential of the ‘process of dissolution’.45  This is what 
Esposito (following Deleuze) appreciates about the work of Francis Bacon; namely, that it 
demonstrates ‘a different mode of understanding the relation between the phantasms of death 
and the power of life’.46 From this perspective, death is no longer a contagious threat embedded 
in the undead tissue of the biological other. On the contrary, death becomes a vital force of 
evolution that exceeds individual bodies in order to generate the continuous creation of new 
forms.  As Esposito has pointed out, the ‘aesthetic nervature’ of degeneracy is already present 
in the ‘category of “decadentism”’ and in Nordau’s claims about the association between the 
degenerate and the modern artist’.47 More importantly, he contends that a counter-current in 
degeneration theory ‘assumes and valorizes the different, the dissimilar, and the abnormal 
inasmuch as they are innovative and transformative aspects of reality’.48 Degeneration is not 
just the ruin of form. Rather, it is the name of the creative force of decay which animates 
morphological alteration and metamorphosis. A harbinger of creative destruction, the 
                                                 
44 Harrow, p. 146.  
45 Esposito, Bios, p. 118.  
46 Ibid, p. 169.  
47 Ibid, p. 123.  
48 Ibid, pp. 123-4.  
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degenerate is the biological double of the modernist artist devoted to renewing cultural forms. 
It should not, then, come as a surprise that Friedrich Nietzsche — the modernist philosopher 
par excellence — valued the innovative potential of biological decadence. Nietzsche’s trust in 
the transformational potency of degeneration is implicit in his opposition to the conservative 
stability and ‘normal’ health favoured by the majority.49 In a section of Human, All too Human 
entitled ‘Ennoblement through Degeneration’, Nietzsche makes this connection explicit by 
claiming that ‘[d]egenerate natures are of the highest significance wherever progress is to be 
effected. Every progress of the whole has to be proceeded by a partial weakening. The strongest 
natures preserve the type, the weaker help it to evolve’.50 ‘What Nietzsche admires’, according 
to Elizabeth Grosz, ‘is not so much a survival of the fittest, the norm, the well-adapted, the 
boring, as a survival of the noblest, of the exceptional, even the monstrous, the one who can 
bear to overcome, to become unrecognizably more’.51 
Like Nietzsche, Esposito affirms the transformational potency of forms of life that don’t 
seek to preserve themselves by measuring up to external norms. While the Nazis treated the 
‘degenerate’ as ‘dead life or death that lives, a flesh without a body’, Esposito reverses this 
evaluation by suggesting that ‘flesh that isn’t unified beforehand in organic form’ could form the 
basis for an ‘affirmative biopolitics’.52 This ‘flesh without a body’ suggests new paths for 
thinking about life, particularly life that passes across the immunity divides of nation, race, and 
species. Esposito claims that the most compelling aesthetic correlate for this new thought of the 
flesh is Francis Bacon’s paintings of warped meat. He detects a ‘journey to the limits of the body’ 
in Bacon’s singular vision of carcasses traversed by nonorganic forces of movement and 
transformation.53 In these paintings of ‘the disfigured figure of butchered flesh’, Esposito claims, 
we encounter the indistinction (what Deleuze calls the ‘common fact’) of human and animal.54 
Given the manifold images of deformed and twisted flesh in Bacon’s oeuvre, I think it’s safe to 
say that Bacon’s non-representational (i.e. ‘disfigured) carcasses are to Esposito’s ‘affirmative 
biopolitics’ what the representational monsters in Stevenson, Wilde, and Stoker are to the 
negative biopolitics of Lombroso and Nordau.55 While Bacon’s ‘disfigured’ figures imply ‘a 
different mode of understanding the relation between the phantasms of death and the power of 
life,56 the representational monster of fin-de-siècle Gothic demonstrates that the ‘autoimmunitary 
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dream’ of ‘killing […] death’ by murdering the degenerate other ‘can’t do anything except 
reverse itself in the death of the same killer’.57 
 
Technology and Inorganic Life 
In her pioneering study, The Modernist Corpse (2018), Erin E. Edwards ‘takes a vitalist approach 
to the corpse in order to challenge the liberal humanist subject who has traditionally defined itself 
against a world of inertly reified matter but who, in doing so, risks being conceptualized as “bare 
life” itself’.58 She disinters the buried connections between the posthumous and the posthuman 
in American modernist texts, early Hollywood horror movies, and the media technologies of the 
Machine Age. Edwards adopts the ‘flat ontology’ of Deleuze’s machinic vitalism, which enables 
her to attend to the liveliness of entities which from an anthropocentric standpoint appear to be 
nonliving. For this reason, she ‘examines the corpse not from the human perspective of loss and 
mourning but rather as a site of disassemblage from the human and reassemblage with larger 
organic and technological networks’.59 What this ‘neovitalist’ reading of the ‘lively’ corpse is 
missing is the fact that, as O’Gorman’s has pointed out, a ‘flat ontology is capable of provoking 
horror’.60 There is indeed something horrifying about a posthumanist ontology from the 
standpoint of the anthropocentric subject: a living corpse; animated objects; losing one’s sense 
of distinctness from nonhuman animals; or even wondering if humans have become more like 
things or if things have become more like humans. As Mullarkey suggests, these are hardly 
relaxing matters for subjects who are used to demoting nonhuman entities into the ‘background’ 
of their awareness: ‘The horror of encountering unexpected alterity — from animals no longer 
taken as mere objects (and perhaps from objects no longer regarded as mere “objects” either) — 
doubtless stems from fear — what will happen to us in a democracy of all the living?’.61 There 
has been some disagreement in literary posthumanist studies about the compatibility of flat 
ontologies with human flourishing. Edwards argues that a posthumanist critique of ‘humanism’s 
anthropocentric commitments’ is consistent with ‘the humanist aims of affirming the worth, 
dignity, and rights of all subjects’.62 Mathew C. Taylor, on the other hand, diverges from such 
empowering assessments of the posthumanist turn by suggesting that the belief that ‘we will 
benefit from “the collapse of ontological hierarchies” that separate us from the world betrays an 
incredible degree of optimism, even anthropocentrism, regarding our posthuman condition’.63 
The modernist bodies I study here remain monstrous to the extent that they do not fit into the 
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ready-made moulds of either humanist anthropocentrism or ‘our’ contemporary posthumanist 
theories. While recent posthumanist theories often assume that ‘affirmative self-world fusions’ 
will inevitably follow in the wake of the death of ‘Man’, the monstrous bodies studied here do 
enter into harmonious relations with their organic and technological environments.64 
My reflections on the technological body in Lewis and Loy contributes to the cultural 
genealogy of artificial life that includes Jacques de Vaucanson’s digesting duck, Heinrich von 
Kleist’s marionettes, and E.T.A Hoffmann’s automata. Any attempt to answer the question of 
what counts as ‘life’ in this context will involve the effacement of distinct categories of being; as 
David Wills wryly admits in the introduction to his study Inanimation: Theories of Inorganic Life 
(2016), the act of writing about extra-organic vitalities can engender ‘ontological oddities and 
monstrosities’.65 According to Carroll’s definition, monsters, or ‘contradictory’ beings, resist 
categorisation, and are therefore ‘interstitial’ — ‘in terms of being both living and dead: ghosts, 
zombies, vampires’; or ‘entities that conflate the animate and the inanimate’.66 A number of early 
twentieth-century thinkers and writers were fascinated by the interstitial zone between the 
animate and the inanimate, including Ernst Jentsch on the uncanny,67 Henri Bergson on the 
comic,68 and the aesthetic theorist Wilhelem Worringer on ‘the animation of the inorganic’.69 
Mullarkey has argued that ‘Bergson’s theory of the comical converges with the theory of horror 
[as defined by Carroll], namely that what is monstrous (or “horrific”) is an “anomalous being,” 
an abomination’.70 Carroll’s ‘philosophy of horror’ is indebted to Mary Douglas’s theory of the 
origin of ideas of contagion, pollution, and ‘impurity’.71 As Carroll notes, Douglas’s central thesis 
is that impurity arises from ‘the transgression or violation of schemes of cultural 
categorization’.72 The concept of the impure is above all the motivation for human fears about 
dirt or ‘matter out of place’.73 It provokes fascination and repulsion with the contagious or 
polluted, with the contamination of distinct categories, with the transgression of human orders of 
classification. Similarly, the varieties of mechanical or inorganic life that are present in the work 
of Jentsch, Bergson, and Worringer are instances of animation out of place. Bergson proposes 
that laughter is a response to humans failing to achieve or maintain the suppleness of life. For 
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this reason, the comic automaton does not remain fully living but contaminates the creativity of 
the organic with the dead repetition of the machine. As Mullarkey has put it: ‘For Bergson, the 
purest abomination is of life becoming a machine, such that being the object of humour is a result 
of having lost one’s vitality, of becoming a living machine, a ridiculous and monstrous hybrid’.74 
Regarded as humans who fail to match up to creativity of the élan vital, Bergson’s living 
machines blur the dichotomy of life and nonlife, and their inferior vitality is therefore an example 
of animation ‘out of place’. If Bergson’s comic laughter rebukes the scandal of human 
inanimation, Worringer finds himself drawn ‘joylessly’ towards the uncanny or animistic life of 
inorganic matter.75 According to Syros Papapetros, ‘the animation of the inorganic promoted by 
Worringer is essentially an act of transgression: it heralds the infusion of life in a domain to which 
the animate did not formerly belong’.76 Finally, Jentsch, in his theorisation of the uncanny, turns 
his attentions to the uncertainty or ‘doubt as to whether an apparently inanimate object really is 
alive and, conversely, whether a lifeless object might not in fact be animate’.77 
Lewis’s technological bodies register the erosion of human mastery and the ontological 
distinction between life and death. Their technologically endowed animation confirms their 
demotion to the level of objects rather than their kinship with human or organic life. The Lewisian 
puppet’s absence of ontological privilege often goes hand in hand with regression, which 
engenders an anachronistic fusing of the artificial body and the primordial body. As this study 
focuses on the retrogressive, backward-facing aspects of the modernist body, it is necessary to 
say a few words about Lewis’s sense of the conjunction of technology and atavism. In his critique 
of behaviourism in Time and Western Man (1928), for example, Lewis highlights the ascendency 
of ‘instinct, that is muscular inherited habit’ in behaviourist theory.78 Instead of making a linear 
connection between behaviourism and the proliferation of technology in the machine-age, Lewis  
focuses on the archaic biological inheritance of instinct in his critique of behaviourist notion that 
‘the human body is a machine’.79 It is this focus on the asynchronous conjunction of the 
primordial and the technological which generates much of the furious intensity of Lewis’s satiric 
vision of the Machine Age. The exhibition ‘Tyros and Portraits’ at the Leicester Galleries in 
London 1921 provided Lewis with the occasion to introduce these atavistic puppets to the public 
as ‘immense novices, brandishing their appetites in their faces’.80  With its mammoth teeth and 
snarling laugh, we encounter the Tyro as an archaic survival of antediluvian origin; nonetheless, 
these ‘barbarous’ cartoons are adapted to the mechanized wilderness of post-war metropolis. 
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Writing in the The Daily Express in 1921, Lewis promoted the ‘Tyro’ as an ‘animated, but 
artificial puppet, a “novice” of real life’.81 Lewis’s eagerness to conflate the ‘raw’ and the 
‘artificial’, despite the well-defined outlines of the monumental self-portrait, Mr. Wyndham Lewis 
as a Tyro, reveals the complexity of his critique of his age. Behind Lewis’s protracted antagonism 
against his epoch there is a vision of the machine-age as archaic, primordial, backward, and 
unformed. It is striking how often this pairing of animation with the artificial body occurs in his 
work. What is more, Lewis frames his engagement with the artificial body in Bergsonian terms 
by suggesting that the mechanical motion of machines produces human inertia. This dialectic of 
vitalization and devitalization is present in Enemy of the Stars (1914), in which the nonhuman 
landscape comes to life in order to denature the human form and hasten its mechanical demise. 
Lewis explores the mediating role of cinema in forging the relationship between animated things 
and inert humans in his 1918 novel Tarr, which also dramatizes the links between inorganic life 
and organic death. I will argue that Lewis’s fascination with the horror of life becoming inert is 
implicated with his representation of dead bodies coming back to life. Lewis’s afterlife narrative, 
The Childermass (1928), reanimates the corpses of soldiers killed in World War One, and aligns 
their horrific mutilation with the de-privileging of the human in the anti-Cartesian philosophies 
of the 1920s. Accordingly, if Lewis’s fiction contributes to the modernist genealogy of animated 
things and inanimate humans, then his automata oscillate between the genres of comedy and 
horror. In ‘The Tragedy of the Object’, John Mullarkey suggests that 
Bergson’s theory of the comic […] converges with Nöel Carroll’s theory of 
cinematic art-horror, namely that what is horrific is an “anomalous being,” a 
monstrous and repulsive combination of incompatible terms (life and death, for 
example, as in a zombie or a vampire. For Bergson, the purest such monster is life 
becoming mechanical, so that being the object of humour is a result of having lost 
one’s vitality, of becoming a living object, a ridiculous and potentially horrific 
hybrid.82 
This hybrid of comedy and horror applies to Lewis’s automata insofar as they contribute to the 
comic topos of Bergson’s mechanical humans and the uncanny topos of Jentsch’s animate dolls.  
In Snooty Baronet (1932), the eponymous narrator comes face to face with an automaton 
installed in a shop window. Snooty duly explains that ‘the springs that actuated [the 
automaton’s] lips, nose and cheeks were excellently thought out. It was impossible as one 
watched him not to feel that he was in some real sense alive’.83 However, the liveliness of this 
mechanical body is vitiated by its ‘enormous chin’ which is ‘non-mobile and lifeless’.84  Snooty 
feels ‘intense uneasiness’ and ‘dark astonishment’ during his ‘strange encounter’ with this 
in/animate body;85 if these affects invoke the genre of horror rather than comedy, then Lewis’s 
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reference to James Whale’s Frankenstein (1931) reinforces this underlying sense of fear. 
Snooty again: ‘I turned away from the Hatter’s window with a dense scowl settling upon my 
fact. As I looked up I saw, in great letters, posted across the façade of a Picture-theatre, the 
words — 
THE MAN-MADE MONSTER. 
Beneath this, in smaller letters, was the word Frankenstein’.86 Whale’s version of Frankenstein 
is the cinematic apotheosis of technological animation. In one of the most famous scenes in the 
history of film, Henry Frankenstein endows Karloff’s monster with life. But ‘he is not alive in 
the same way that the other characters in the film are. […] This creature is made alive by 
electricity’.87 In Snooty Baronet, Lewis reframes traditional conceptions of literary character to 
suggest that all humans are animated by technological forces in modernity. Secure distinctions 
between the human characters and their technological others break down. The result of 
mechanical animation in Lewis’s work is nothing less than the total annihilation of personhood 
and the de-privileging the human species. In Snooty’s meeting with the automaton we learn that 
such encounters between Lewis’s characters and animated things dramatize the reduction of the 
former to the latter. According to Mullarkey, ‘the origin of the comic is only the flip-side of the 
origin of horror: where the comical concerns what is alive making itself an inanimate object, 
horror relates to a subject being made into an object by the actions of another — even when 
that other is an object’.88 But what happens when the objects that make subjects into objects 
themselves are literary characters? ‘As the man beside me observed me putting on my hat’, 
Snooty tells us, ‘I was for the first time placed in the position of the dummy’.89 The fact that 
Snooty’s literary agent earlier refers to him as a ‘made man’ reinforces Snooty’s association 
with the artificial.90 Just as he lacks any sense of ‘absolute’ distinction between himself and the 
automaton,91 so he is ‘apt to go out at any moment, and turn up again in some other place — 
like a light turned on by accident, or a figure upon a cinematographic screen’.92 If ‘film versions 
of Frankenstein implicitly remind us that filmmaking itself is a Frankensteinian exercise in 
artificial reproduction’,93 then Snooty’s flickering presence anticipates Deborah Levitt’s claim 
that ‘[c]inematic bodies exist in the space of an ontological crisis: Present or absent? Here or 
there? Living or dead?’.94 While his lover and his literary agent both want him to ‘become their 
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Frankenstein’, Snooty seems to understand that he is already at one with the monster’s 
interstitial life/death.95  
 
Theorising the Monstrous 
The late nineteenth-century sociologist Gabriel Tarde once claimed that ‘the normal type is the 
degree zero of the monstrosity’.96 Tarde’s formula implies a sliding scale of the monstrous, 
according to which the sociological ‘normal type’ is the antithesis of monstrosity. In presenting 
the norm and the monster as mutually constitutive categories, Tarde prefigures two influential 
theorists of monstrosity active in twentieth-century France: Michel Foucault and Jacques 
Derrida. For these thinkers, monstrosity and normality are inextricably related. As Derrida has 
put it: 
monstrosity may reveal or make one aware of what the norm is and when this 
norm has a history—which is the case with discursive norms, philosophical 
norms, socio-cultural norms, they have a history—any appearance of monstrosity 
in this domain allows an analysis of the history of norms97 
As norms change, so do the monstrosities which deviate from them. The cultural archive of the 
monstrous is like a reference library of exceptional bodies, wherein the effaced history of norms 
becomes legible once again. Likewise, Foucault claims that each historical regime of 
knowledge produces its own versions of the monstrous: ‘there are monsters on the prowl’, he 
insists, ‘whose form changes with the history of knowledge’.98 The history of the monstrous is 
essentially a relational one. The ‘normal’ and the ‘abnormal’ are by no means distinct categories 
that exist in a vacuum, nor do they have any trans-historical consistency; instead, each 
constitutes the limits of the other—indeed, frequently encroaches on the other—in a shifting 
pattern of historical negotiations and transformations. In his lectures on the ‘abnormal’ 
delivered at the Collège de France (1974-1975) Foucault argues that ‘the monster is the 
transgression of natural limits, the transgression of classifications, of the table, and of the law 
as table’.99 These remarks point to the notion of monstrosity as an inherently transgressive form 
of being, which is one reason why late twentieth-century thinkers articulate monstrosity as a 
form of political resistance to the status quo. With reference to Foucault, Andrew Gibson has 
argued that ‘On the far side of the world of the acceptable or manageable body […] there is 
necessarily a realm of physical monstrosity to which belongs the inadmissibility, even the 
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horror or disaster of the aberrant body’100. In short, monstrosity is a figure of transgression that 
exists beyond the limits of acceptable being as defined by modern biopower. 
In contrast, pioneering scholars working in the field of disability studies have argued 
that the transgressive power of monstrosity diminished with the increased medicalisation of the 
modern body. As Rosemarie Garland Thomson puts it, ‘while prodigious or “monstrous” bodies 
have always been a focus of human interest, the normal/abnormal dichotomy of the modern 
mind limits the explanation of differences to pathology’.101 In the age of biopolitics, ‘monstrous 
difference becomes deviant—abnormal—rather than as wholly distinctive’.102 There has been 
a shift from a conception of monstrosity as ‘wholly other’ to a diversified field of pathological 
and deviant characteristics defined in relation to bodily norms. 
 Gibson’s analysis of the ‘aesthetics of monstrosity’ in Samuel Beckett’s Molloy (1951) 
is indicative of the poststructuralist perspective on the monstrous: 
Molloy is concerned with cripples, or the process of becoming crippled, and finds 
value in both. But if the cripple is marginalised by a given “anatamo-politics”, he 
or she is nonetheless defined by and apprehensible in its terms. More important, 
here, is the extent to which Beckett’s treatment of physical damage or 
deterioration is hyperbolic or “unreal”.103 
I want to think through what it might mean, in Gibson’s terms, that a ‘hyperbolic or “unreal”’ 
depiction of physical deterioration mounts a challenge to the anatamo-politics of modernity. 
Beckett’s hyperbolic depiction of corporeal impairment and deterioration is the basis for 
Gibson’s conception of Molloy’s ‘rebellious monstrosity’.104 While I agree with Gibson that 
‘excess is everywhere in the treatment of the body’ in Beckett’s novel, I would want to stress 
that it is as hyperbolic impairment and dysfunctionality (and hence lack) that this excess is 
mainly registered. 105 The transgressive potential of this reading rests upon Gibson’s contention 
that ‘Molloy is concerned with cripples, or the process of becoming crippled, and finds value in 
both’.106 He suggests two ways in which Molloy finds value in bodily impairment: first, the 
‘hyperbolic’ impairment of Molloy’s body is generative of the novel’s aporetic narrative form; 
second, Molloy’s hyperbolic impairments point to the gaps in the discursive construction of the 
human body. 
For Gibson, the monstrosity of Molloy’s body is a product of both excess and lack; or 
more accurately, an excess of lack. He explains that Beckett’s ‘hyperbolic’ presentation of 
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physical deformity provides a critique of modern ‘anatamo-politics’; yet underlying Gibson’s 
account of Molloy’s challenge to the disciplinary regime of modernity is the unspoken 
assumption that a resistance to biopower can be achieved by extending normative ideas about 
disability—in this instance, disability as ‘lack’—beyond the limits of the humanly conceivable. 
Molloy’s monstrosity ‘opens up a sense of the lack of all finality to discourses about the 
body.’107 The impairment of Molloy’s body is taken to such exaggerated and hyperbolic 
extremes in the novel that his humanity is called into question. On Gibson’s reading, Molloy’s 
excessive lack of bodily cohesion and control points to ‘the lack of all finality to discourses 
about the body’.108 This is the crux of postmodernist accounts of monstrosity: the ‘aberrant’ 
body exceeds all attempts to police the boundaries of the human. 
 A number of critics hostile to so-called French theory have claimed academic 
affirmations of the monstrous are emblematic of certain limitations inherent to postmodernist 
thought. The Marxist theorist David McNally, for instance, proposes that some self-appointed 
defenders of the monstrous reduce the complexity of social and biological being to the 
opposition between the normal and the abnormal.109 In the work of these thinkers, McNally 
tells us, there is an automatic glorification of whatever seems to exist outside the strictures of 
normativity, a proclivity which he views as symptomatic of ‘a kind of one-dimensional thought’ 
endemic to postmodernism.110 McNally insists that the way beyond this critical impasse is to 
treat ‘the arena of monstrosity as a site of contestation’111. To be sure, McNally’s dismissal of 
postmodernism is itself rather one-dimensional; yet his challenge to uncritical celebrations of 
monstrosity remains to some extent a valid one. In response, it is vital that we imagine new 
ways of writing about monstrosity that can attend in more nuanced ways to the anomalous body, 
and this would involve forgoing the tendency to celebrate monstrosity without reservation. We 
can begin to think in a more layered way about literary monstrosity by reviewing critical 
accounts of the representation of disability in modernist art and literature. 
Lennard Davis, for instance, claims that ‘One of the ways that visual images of the 
disabled have been appropriated into the modernist and postmodernist aesthetic is through the 
concept of the “grotesque”’.112 Davis’s critique of the modernist grotesque is threefold. First, 
modernists use the disabled body as an avatar for alterity or tragedy, obscuring the social reality 
of disability in the process. Second, the modernist fascination with the aesthetics of the ugly 
and the monstrous, both essential aspects of the grotesque, reinforces a negative image of 
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disability as abject.  And in spite of the pervasiveness of disability in modernist artworks and 
writing, such works don’t take into account the ‘subject position’ of disabled persons. For 
Davis, in short, it is difficult to distinguish between use and abuse when it comes to 
modernism’s grotesque depictions of disability. Michael Davidson, on the other hand, gives a 
less critical account of the place of disability in ‘the modernist obsession with the grotesque’.113 
According to Davidson, modernist artists and writers both validated the biopolitical ideology 
of their day and attempt to ‘overcome it by acknowledging difference’.114 These different 
readings of the significance of disability in the modernist grotesque indicate a schism in critical 
accounts of this important strain of modernism. 
Consider the following assertion by Jonathan Greenburg: ‘The grotesque can be seen 
as either a problem, a sign of a decadent and disordered world, or a solution, an aesthetic mode 
capable of representing the disorder to the world and presenting a reader or viewer with an 
authentic emotional experience’.115 Disability can be rather neatly mapped onto Greenburg’s 
distinction: on the one hand, ‘conservative’ modernists (Yeats, Eliot, Woolf, and so on) present 
the disabled body as a sign of degeneracy and disorder, measuring out their displeasure 
regarding the trajectory of modernity in broken limbs, diseased bodies, and circus ‘freaks’; on 
the other hand, ‘radical’ modernists (Kirchner, Dix, Grosz, and so on) present the disabled body 
as a surface upon which to inscribe the traumas of capitalist modernity, thereby registering the 
distresses of technological warfare or their resistance to the consolidation of state-sanctioned 
repression. But this binary account of the modernist grotesque is problematic for several 
reasons. Most obviously, this distinction does little to challenge the critical cliché that there are, 
on the one hand, ‘bad’ (anti-humanist, anti-democratic) modernists and, on the other hand, 
‘good’ (anti-authoritarian, politically subversive) modernists. In truth, the modernist grotesque 
is not simply a technique for ‘othering’ anomalous bodies, but nor can it be said to celebrate 
the variety of human bodily difference in a straightforward way. 
 But does monstrosity have any meaning in a world where ‘[i]dentity and difference, 
norm and monster become indistinguishable in a proliferation of differentiations and 
hybrids’?116 Here, the scholar of Gothic literature Fred Botting argues that the erosion of 
ontological distinctions in postmodernity neutralizes the monstrous: ‘Monsters of modernity, 
once the exceptions giving shape, difference and substance to the systems that excluded them, 
become normal’.117 The monstrous renounces its horror along with its ‘dissident’ political 
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agency. ‘Monsters no longer render norms visible; they are the norm’.118 If ‘we have never been 
human’, then they have never been monstrous.119 Is monstrosity even possible in a world 
without secure ontological distinctions? 
 Despite the compelling work of neo-materialists and other pioneers of the posthuman 
turn, it would of course be overstating matters to say that we live in a world free from the 
political effects of ontological hierarchies. The work of Lewis, Loy, and Beckett I examine here 
mark a distinctive moment in the cultural genealogy of posthumanism, not because they register 
the succession of ‘wounds’ dealt out to Anthropos by the end of the nineteenth century (though 
each of them does),120 but because their work registers the de-privileging of ‘Man’ together 
with the ‘perpetual, insistent and demonic return of anthropocentrism’.121 Claire Colebrook’s 
telling allusion to the ‘demonic return’ of anthropocentrism is a reminder that the monstrous 
does not always belong on the side of difference. The tension between the stubborn persistence 
of human exceptionalism and the horror that attends the loss of ontological privilege is a 
recurrent presence in the texts I study. 
Chapter Summaries 
My first chapter proposes that Lewis’s work turns its back on linear ideas of technological 
development and posits that the connection between the primeval and the technological is 
fundamental to modernity. To that end, I examine the interrelations between automation and 
‘barbarous’ pre-historic forces in his work. A central focus of this chapter is the mutable 
relations between characters and things as they stir into life or, conversely, lose their dynamism 
and become ossified and inert. I begin with a brief analysis of Lewis’s fascinating relation to 
vitalism and the ‘primitive’, exploring his rewriting of the non-modern body as a machine body. 
I follow this with a reading of Lewis 1914 closet-drama Enemy of the Stars, which poses the 
mechanical human against the remote inhuman agencies from distant times and spaces. 
Characters become lifeless mechanisms, whilst the nonhuman landscape surges with violent 
energies and forces that deprive the human of its aspirations for transcendence. I continue my 
exploration of the atavistic automaton in a reading of The Childermass that studies the links 
between Lewis’s critique of the mechanization of life and his reading of modernity as an 
atavistic epoch. I read Lewis’s depiction of the metamorphoses of the soldier’s fragmented 
corpse as satires of Bergsonian philosophy of ceaseless change and becoming. Next I study the 
role of cinema in Lewis’s Tarr, showing that for Lewis is was the very dynamism of early 
cinema that makes it an atavistic technology. While Lewis denounces Bergson’s vitalism, his 
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disapproval of technological animation of the body recalls Bergson’s well-known critique of 
the cinematograph. Following Bergson’s anti-cinematic musings in Creative Evolution (1907), 
Lewis associates the technological life of the cinema and the modern city with atavism, 
degeneration, and mechanical death.  
 Chapter 2 examines monstrosity in Mina Loy’s poetry and prose in light of her 
engagement with discourses of degeneration and atavism. First, I ask if Loy’s representations 
of dysgenic bodies should give those critics pause who read her work in conjunction with the 
anti-normative projects of Gilles Deleuze and his intellectual successors. In particular, I think 
through the validity of reading Loy’s Bergsonism as evidence of her incipient posthumanism, 
taking issue with recent studies that read Loy’s work as a challenge to anthropocentric 
investments in human exceptionalism. While Loy’s vitalist poetry does challenge the racialized 
misogyny of Futurist biopolitics, I demonstrate that her Bergsonian investment in fluidity and 
becoming informs the eugenicist aspects of her own work. For this reason, I focus on poems 
where Loy links the atavistic (or dysgenic) body to immobility and mechanical repetition. Like 
F.T Marinetti, Loy temporalizes Bergson’s distinction between inert matter and the élan vital: 
the past is mechanical and dead; the future is open to the continuous creation of new forms. 
Also like Marinetti, Loy’s eugenicist attitudes map onto this temporal division between the 
living and the nonliving. The second part of this chapter argues that Loy’s novel Insel overturns 
her earlier attitudes to technology and degeneration. While Loy’s early poems convey her 
animus against inertia of the machine, Insel presents media technologies as agents of becoming 
and metamorphosis. Insel’s art is coterminous with his body. He is a degenerate artist whose 
monstrous creations are mirrors of their maker. While growth and decay are indistinguishable 
in his monstrous paintings, his body is an ‘animate cadaver’ which is decomposing and yet 
enlivened by the innovative forces of media technologies.122 Here atavism is not a return to 
fixed and superseded forms but a deformation of the present, not a revival of a static point in 
the past but a blurring of the distinction between past, present and future. As such, Insel’s 
multitemporal body is an example of what Norah Campbell and Mike Saren call proto-atavism: 
‘Proto-atavism is the argument that multiple paradigms of life exist on the peripheries of human 
life. Ancient and future evolutionary traits exist in the present — both in the aesthetic 
imagination and everyday life’.123  If Loy’s work enacts the futurist aspiration to ‘forget all 
form’ in order to ‘draw forth incipient form’, the images of monstrosity in Insel contribute to 
this aesthetic amnesia.124 Indeed, there is a complex negotiation in Loy’s work between 
forgetting and creation, which in turn expresses a destructive urge to negate the known and 
familiar, and to arrive at the future via an atavistic return to the inception of Bergson’s ‘germinal 
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life-force’.125Atavism may denote a kind of intergenerational recollection; but it can also 
suggest revisiting an inhuman past effaced from the archive of cultural and biological memory. 
By bringing us into contact with traits from the forgotten past that are reanimated in the present, 
atavism may in turn stir a desire to forget fixed and static ideas of the human form. In turn, this 
stirs the artist to reimagine the body’s ability to communicate with humans, animals, and 
technologies. 
 In Chapter 3 I want to study and theorise the relationship between Beckett’s anti-vitalism 
and his fascination with the monstrous. As in previous chapters, I address the relationship 
between the animalization of the human and the revivification of the corpse. First I consider 
Echo’s Bones as a parody of Joyce’s aessociation of physical degeneration with fecundity and 
aesthetic creativity. After discussing Joyce’s engagement with the aesthetics of degeneration, I 
read the decadent tropes in Echo’s Bones as a critique of modernist anti-Cartesian tropes of 
productive life. Drawing on the work of Claire Colebrook, I argue that the reanimation of the 
poet Belacqua is the occasion for a devitalization of sexual reproduction and the literary text. 
This leads me to sketch out some differences between Joyce’s and Beckett’s responses to 
positivist outrage against the ‘degeneracy’ of modernist form. What I will propose here is that 
Beckett’s parody of Joyce’s vitalization of decay can be read as an anticipatory critique of 
neovitalist affirmations of the zoë of the corpse. The second section of Chapter 3 deals with 
Beckett’s experience of the censorship of modernist art during his visit to Nazi Germany in 
1937. This section studies Beckett’s responses to censored artists and considers aspects of their 
work that are analogous to Beckett’s experiments with literary form. Here I shift my attention 
to The Unnamable’s presentation of flesh that exceeds the limits of the ‘carnal envelope’.126 
Refusing to position his art as a transcendent activity free from complicity, Beckett’s novel 
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CHAPTER ONE: WYNDHAM LEWIS AND REGRESSIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
Introduction: Living Machines and Atavistic Automata 
Puppets, automata, animated corpses. The bodies in Wyndham Lewis’s painting and writing 
inhabit a ‘nonorganic’ universe in which the divide between humans and things is often 
indistinct. Characters become de-animated and inert, whilst the energies or forces animating 
objects often outdo the circumscribed powers of human action. While these animated things 
underscore the lifelessness of characters, the sudden reanimation of a character’s body doesn’t 
deliver their return to personhood. Characters moved by actions, sensations, or affects lose 
possession of their trivial fund of will and agency. In this way, excessive displays of emotion 
result in the total dispossession of consciousness and personhood, so that his characters become 
mechanical or ‘inanimate’ when they are most active or impassioned. If this blurring of the 
distinction between the animate and the inanimate is essential to Lewis’s fiction, then it is most 
striking in his implacable reduction of humans to things. To be sure, the fact that Hugh Kenner 
refers to Lewis’s literary works prior to The Revenge for Love (1937) as ‘puppet-fiction’ 
indicates how pervasive reified characters are in his stories and novels.127 But what are these 
automata: things masquerading as literary characters; or characters made into mindless things? 
According to Alan Cholodenko, ‘[t]he automaton confuses the either/orism of either a living 
being turning into an inanimate thing or an inanimate thing turning into a living being’.128This 
confusion is at the heart of Lewis’s meditation on the entwinement of organic life and 
technology in early twentieth-century culture. For David F. Channell, circa 1900 momentous 
innovations in the scientific management of labour and industrial production ‘began to erase 
the boundary between technology and the organic’.129 Such linear histories of technology posit 
that the erosion of human/machine dichotomy occurred in response the entanglement of organic 
bodies and machines in modernity in general, and in the era of Fordism and Taylorism in 
particular.130 It is arguable that modernist scholarship has not sufficiently interrogated the 
assumed connection between technological development and the unidirectional time of linear 
historiography. 
The correlation between modernism, technology, and the new is at the heart of critical 
accounts of prosthetic bodies in modernist culture. Hal Foster has analysed the formative 
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significance of this correlation in his study Prosthetic Gods (2004). Regarding the duality of 
modernist attitudes to the machine at the beginning of the twentieth century, he argues that, ‘for 
the most part, modernists of this time could only hope to resist new technologies in the name 
of some given natural body, or to accelerate them in the search for some imagined postnatural 
body’.131 Modernist imaginings of the ‘postnatural body’ pointed toward a future that had yet 
to arrive; nonetheless, Foster’s recourse to the Futurist rhetoric of acceleration makes it clear 
that ‘the machinic imaginary of high modernism’ located the germinal potential of this new 
body in the technological proliferation of the Second Industrial Revolution.132 Foster implies 
that for Lewis and other modernists there was no root to the ‘postnatural body’ that did not first 
pass through the crucible of early twentieth-century machine technology. Further, Foster’s term 
‘postnatural’ implies that a linear conception of technological development is fundamental to 
modernist engagements with the prosthetic. The backward-facing stance of ‘resist[ing] new 
technologies in the name of some given natural body’ contrasts with the forward-facing ‘search 
for some imagined postnatural body’.133 With regards to the cultural history of technology, 
modernism marks a transitional moment in which the body is either a precarious vestige of the 
natural in an increasingly mechanized world, or a prototype for a future where nature is 
obsolete. That said, Foster is alert to Lewis’s affirmation of ‘a “primordialism” more radical 
than any primitivism’.134 Even so, his claim that Lewis was motivated ‘to embrace technology, 
to accelerate its transformation of bodies and psyches’ reinforces the association between 
modernity, technology and transformational dynamism.135 Jessica Burstein’s description of the 
prosthetic body as ‘the apotheosis of modernity’ is even more direct in claiming that modernists 
viewed the machine as a signifier of historical rupture with a pre-technological past.136 These 
critical accounts of prosthetic modernism rehearse a well-worn story about modernity and 
technology: namely, ‘that in the age of mechanical reproduction the artificial has become a 
determining condition of modernity’.137 As we will see, Lewis’s challenge to this linear 
conception of technology is already conspicuous in his early quasi-primitive stories about 
Breton peasants. 
Within normative framings of modernity, technology and the ‘primitive’ are frequently 
understood to be incompatible.138 It is not surprising, then, that critics considering the 
connections between Lewis’s work and posthumanism have emphasised the anticipatory 
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aspects of his work. While Burstein reads Lewis’s work as a founding example of ‘cold 
modernism’, which she argues is a strain of modernism that has all the characteristics that critics 
later attributed to postmodernism, John Whitter-Ferguson extends Burstein’s argument into the 
futuristic realm of artificial intelligence and human extinction: 
In our twenty-first-century moment, this ahumanist, “cold” Lewis is, I believe, on 
the cusp of a new (textual) life, or at least a new season of attention from the 
academy. The time is propitious. Our (Western, First World) carries us into the 
latest “post”: posthumanism. [….] Lewis’s comic, grotesque, incisive, deeply 
unsettling and sometimes objectionable art helps us to measure the importance 
and implications of books that might seem worlds apart from one another — like 
Sharon Cameron’s Impersonality, and William Mitchell’s Me++ — and more than 
half the movies and games we watch and play, and drones and web crawlers, and 
even, as Alan Weisman and many others have proposed, the environment we are 
busy making for life on earth (or Eaarth). […] We may just be catching up with 
an avant-garde that Lewis believed the First World War has destroyed forever. 
Studying Lewis and his critics will help us to understand what joining that 
company may mean, how it may looks and — if the verb is not outmoded — 
feel’.139 
Whittier-Fergusson sees the connection between Lewis and posthumanism as a matter of the 
present catching up with a modernist future that never came to pass.140  In contrast, this chapter 
proposes that for Lewis the technological body is bound up with the reappearance of earlier 
stages of ‘primitive’ or animal life. Amid a cacophony manifesto statements about the 
coalescence of machines, aesthetic innovation, and futurity, Lewis insisted on the assumed 
connection between the primordial and the technological. But Lewis’s resistance to the 
connection between the future and the machine is not reducible to his rivalry with Marinetti. As 
we will see, Lewis’s machine bodies expand the idea of atavism beyond its association with the 
animalization of the human. At the same time, he reimagines the technology as a primitive, 
antediluvian phenomenon that connects the instant of the present to the remote past. My 
proposal is that this has significant consequences for how we read the modernist techno-body 
and its relation to posthumanism. As a literary figure of technological modernity, the automaton 
is frequently seen as a figure which blurs the distinction between the organic and the machine. 
Instead of viewing the Lewisian body as a proto-cyborg, I will argue that his atavistic automata 
embody the temporal ambiguities of modernist culture. Atavism signals a return to the world 
before us rather the future-oriented after us anticipated by apocalyptic posthumanisms.141 What 
emerges from Lewis’s work is a posthumanism that is more oriented towards the past than the 
future. As Paul Sheehan suggests: ‘“post”, most often taken to mean subsequent to 
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(postpartum), can also denote behind or posterior to (postorbital)’.142  Being behind the human 
could signify ideas of inheritance, of genealogy, of the ancestral forces that came before the 
human, and thus in some degree made the emergence of the human possible. In contrast, Lewis 
imagines the reappearance of ‘earlier’ stages of human development, or even returning to 
periods of time which precede the human, as bound up with modernity’s unrelenting assaults 
on humanity’s aspirations for uniqueness. 
My reading of Lewis’s technological bodies parts ways with accounts that underplay 
or even take no notice of his opposition to mechanised life. As I’ve already mentioned, Foster 
argues that the prosthetic bodies in Lewis’s Vorticist paintings express ‘the desire to embrace 
technology, to accelerate its transformation of bodies and psyches’.143 The ascendency of 
machine technology alienates human beings from themselves and threatens the agency and 
integrity of the autonomous self; yet the monadic ego will only survive by reclaiming — 
increasing, escalating — its own self-estrangement. Foster explains that Lewis strives ‘to 
imagine a “new ego” that can withstand the shocks of the military-industrial, the modern-urban, 
and the mass-political, that can forge these stimuli into a new protective shield, convert them 
into a new hardened subject able to thrive on such shocks’.144 This means that Lewis conceives 
of prosthesis as above all a compensatory extension of the sovereign masculine self; a ‘form of 
ego armouring’.145 According to Foster, Lewis sacrifices the organicism of the human body in 
order to protect the male subject from the vulnerability inherent in organic life; and, for this 
reason, the ‘separation of the human […] from its own intrinsic frailties’ in Vorticist art is ‘gist 
of [Lewis’s] anti-humanism’.146 Burstein likewise contends that Lewis’s ‘cold modernism’ 
invests in the aesthetic potential of prosthesis. In Burstein’s view the prosthetic body does not 
secure the ego but rather expresses ‘a world without selves or psychology’.147 Lewis’s 
characters are bodies dispossessed of personhood; for Burstein, this means that ‘the body is 
taken as the start and the finish of all explanation’.148 Rather than shield the masculine ego from 
the depersonalizing forces of the Machine Age, the prosthetic body in ‘cold modernism offers 
an account of the human form in which the mind plays no role’.149 But this reading strips 
Lewis’s work of its polemical edge by effacing his critical stance towards the erosion of the 
mind/body distinction. There is nothing in Lewis’s work to support the idea that he was 
indifferent to the genesis of ‘a world without selves’. Until we understand Lewis’s 
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anthropocentric commitment to the value of human personhood, we won’t understand why his 
work reinscribes ‘human’ characters as inert things without agency. 
Both of these influential studies of the prosthetic body in Lewis’s work emphasise the 
importance of technology over questions of atavistic life and the animal. This chapter addresses 
these underexplored topics in Lewis’s work, and proposes that they are vital to his engagements 
with the body. Accordingly, the vitalism of Lewis’s early writings sheds light on the inception 
of Lewis’s lifelong resistance to the mechanization of life. In a sense, the years 1909-1916 form 
the first significant period of Lewis’s written engagement with the human body, both in literary 
and theoretical terms. In these years a number of developments informed or provoked his 
thinking about bodies. First, as Jamie Wood has suggested, Lewis’s 1910 essay ‘Our Wild 
Body’, his first publication in The New Age, responded to British anxieties about ‘national 
decline’ after the military humiliations of The Second Boer War (1899-1902) had placed the 
male physique at the centre of political discussion.150 ‘Our Wild Body’ takes aim at the 
fascination with exercise and body-building that was a notable feature of Edwardian culture. 
According to Wood, Lewis is ‘perhaps correctly diagnosing that the English physical culture 
movement owed at least part of its origin to debates associated with the physical deterioration 
of English soldiers during the South African War of 1899’.151 In 1904, parliament set up the 
Inter-departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration to investigate claims about the 
diminishing health of the national body.152 Around the turn of the century, then, securing the 
nation increasingly entailed fortifying the male body, and so-called ‘manly’ traits such as 
physical strength and willpower became an index of the country’s future prosperity and 
international standing.153 Partly in response to these historical pressures, the promotion of 
physical exercise and the cultivation of ‘manly’ bodies became increasingly widespread. 
Between 1900 and 1910 all-male societies promoting weightlifting and callisthenics began to 
appear throughout the country, offering new forums for the expression of masculine identity 
through bodily discipline.154 In addition, the rise of eugenics as a discourse of national 
regeneration around the turn of the century contributed to the ‘biologisation of national 
belonging’.155 It was in this context that the first recorded use of the term ‘bio-politics’ appeared 
in a 1911 article by G.W. Harris, also published in The New Age.156 Crucially, Harris’s brief 
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essay ‘Bio-Politics’ not only expresses anxiety about ‘[t]he present condition of the nations of 
Europe,’ but also promotes a lethal eugenicist programme for English national regeneration.157 
Recalling the contested status of the English body around 1910 helps to illuminate 
Lewis’s ambivalent perspective on the question of national regeneration. Writing as a critic of 
modernity, in ‘Our Wild Body’ he outlines his objections to the national attitude to the body in 
England, asserting that the English are disciplining and denaturing the body, and thereby taming 
the instincts of life. He contends that a ‘vast Anglo-Saxon conspiracy against the body’ reigns 
in England, putting the country at a disadvantage with respect to its more vital continental 
rivals.158 Just as Lewis blasts the ‘ham and conventional outlook towards the body’ adopted by 
the ‘callisthenic quack’, so he insists that the English passion for sport and exercise obscures 
the fact that Englishmen have lost touch with their bodies: 
We perpetuate in our games the primitive art of war — the triumph that, relying 
on mere skill, and physical strength and courage, one man or company of men 
may gain over another. But it is artificial and no longer a vital and fundamental 
part of life, this exercise of our strength. […] “[T]he famous warlike spirit of the 
race” is diminished by these score of substitutes for war. It need not be, but it is.159 
There is no suggestion of a eugenicist programme for improving the health of the national body 
in Lewis’s essay. ‘It is not…the body that is ailing,’ he argues, ‘but our idea of the body’. 160 
Thus, the English need a new way of thinking about the body, perhaps a new philosophy of the 
body — the examples of Bergson in France and Nietzsche in Germany were undoubtedly on 
Lewis’s mind.161 Nonetheless, contemporary anxieties about the condition of English bodies 
are not far from the surface. As Paul Peppis has argued, ‘Our Wild Body’ ‘diagnose[s] a national 
disease, suggest[s] a cure, and project[s] a renewed nation’.162 Lewis’s essay thus partakes in 
the quest for national regeneration through bodily reform central to modernist-era biopolitics. 
How, though, did Lewis think this renewal was to be achieved? 
Dismissing the nationalised body of early 1900s England, Lewis instead affirms the 
irrational core of ‘life’, echoing the vitalism of his European contemporaries.163 Given the 
astonishing cultural impact of Bergson’s vitalism and Nietzsche’s Lebensphilosophie, 
especially their respective assaults on the ‘anti-life’ values of European modernity, Lewis was 
by no means alone in promoting ‘life’ as a rallying cry against, in Nietzsche’s formulation, 
‘despisers of the body’.164 When Lewis argues that the exercise equipment that adorns the walls 
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of Edwardian households doesn’t enhance the body but rather serves to ‘indebt it to science and 
tame it’, he represents scientific rationalism as an antagonist of life.165 ‘Every natural and heroic 
gesture and energetic impulse,’ Lewis claims, ‘has had the life taken out of it’.166 Again, this is 
a post-Nietzschean rhetorical strategy. As Donna V. Jones has aptly put it: ‘From Nietzsche 
[…] it was learned that there was no more decisive technique than to paint one’s enemies as 
against life’.167 By casting the English as anti-life conspirators, Lewis’s critique co-opts the 
polemical tactics of life philosophy for the sake of reconnecting the English body with the 
foundations of its vitality. What is significant here is that Lewis advocates a renewal of the 
English body not through the prevailing scientific doxa or pseudo-medical fads of the period, 
but instead through reembracing the vital impulses that have been tamed by the ‘civilizing’ 
practices of modern English culture.168 Thus, ‘Our Wild Body’ departs from the two most 
prominent ideologies of bodily reform available in England in 1910. Not only is eugenics absent 
from Lewis’s essay but he is also dismissive of the fashion for physical culture or bodybuilding: 
‘The body of the contemporary man is the prey of mercenary “strong men,” he is lured with 
their muscle manufactories, or, to be more accurate, it is body that they almost suck in, by the 
mere brute magnetism of size’.169 In suggesting that the promotion of a strong masculine 
physique fails to connect the body with the ‘vital and fundamental part of life’,170 he identifies 
the technological measures intended to regenerate the nation as strategies for ‘daunting and 
taming the body’.171 Against the Edwardian orthodoxy that ‘the British “race” was suffering 
from a degeneration which only hard-nosed, coolly-implemented scientific measures could 
repair’,172 Lewis asserts that these rationalist methods for renewing the national body are, to 
use Herbert Schnäbelbach’s phrase, ‘hostile to life’. 173 
Life’s foundational significance in Lewis’s work remains underexplored and 
misunderstood. Vitalism — the philosophy of life that most critics claim Lewis rejected or 
overcame after his youthful investment in Bergson’s ideas — is a formative aspect of his mature 
work in that he opposes it and yet continues to carry out a critique of the mechanization of life 
informed by Bergson’s vitalist ‘reaction to mechanisms, mechanical laws, machines, and 
automatons’.174 Lewis’s residual vitalism is nowhere evident that in his life-long critical 
resistance to automatism or mechanical life. Even if vitalist thinkers often affirm the creative 
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and redeeming powers of the life force, the leitmotif that binds disparate vitalist projects is their 
resistance to the tyranny of the mechanical over the living. Georges Canguilhem, for example, 
argues that ‘[t]he rebirths of vitalism translate…life’s permanent distrust of the mechanization 
of life. In them we find life trying to put mechanism back in its place through life.’175 Modernist 
vitalism emerged as a response to industrialization and the dominance of mechanistic reasoning 
in post-Enlightenment thought. Jones explains that ‘doctrinal vitalism has […] remained a 
critical project, defined less affirmatively than as a negation and of its own negation — the 
mechanical, the machinic, and the mechanistic’.176 This ‘negative’ definition, based on a critical 
resistance to the machine rather than an affirmation of life, enables us to reassess the critical 
commonplace that Lewis rejected vitalism after his youthful apprenticeship in Bergson’s 
philosophy of life. Take Omri Moses claim that ‘Lewis repudiates his own early flirtation with 
vitalism and responds by forging a “cold modernism” (in Jessica Burstein’s phrase), renouncing 
feeling and embracing a line of evolution approximating the insect’s that indicates “the inertia 
of the élan vital”’.177 Conversely, I want to propose that ‘[t]he fear of “becoming automaton” 
[that] haunts Bergson’s thought from beginning to end’ informs Lewis’s sense of the 
coalescence of modernity and the pre-human.178 In Lewis’s work, the reappearance of 
‘superseded’ epochal forces is less an outcome of biological heredity than of the mechanization 
of life. 
Lewis conflates machine-production and evolution: every organism is a machine; 
every machine is an organism.179 This Vorticist insistence on the mechanization of life and the 
vitalization of the machine testifies to their mutual contamination. What is under consideration 
here is what David Wills has called ‘the originary mechanics at work in the evolution of the 
species’.180 This turn to the pre-human origins of the machine evokes a resistant attitude to the 
forward-facing momentum of technological development. It is impossible to miss the extent of 
this resistance in Lewis’s claim that ‘the artist is older than the fish’.181 Creativity as Lewis 
conceives it entails a reaching back beyond existing forms ‘to strike the fundamental slime of 
creation. And it is the condition, the very first gusto of creation in this scale of life in which we 
are set, that [the artist] must reach, before he [sic], in turn, can create’.182 With this call to re-
encounter ‘the fundamental slime of creation’, Lewis chides ‘primitivism’ for not being 
primitive enough. Only by reaching much further back in time will the artist be able create 
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genuinely new forms. I take these remarks to be a decisive rejection of the utopian investment 
in the connection between technology and the future. In The Caliph’s Design, technological 
innovations are reconfigured as archaic forms whose repetition ensures that the forward 
momentum of modernity remains in touch the remote evolutionary past. Technological novelty 
is, in this sense, not an advance in the sense of a break with the past, but a reminder of the 
continuity between the form-generating powers of evolution and the form-generating powers 
of human artifice. Art and the related domain of the technological neither precede life nor follow 
in its wake: ‘The creation of the work of art is an act of the same description as the evolution 
of wings on the sides of a fish, the feathering of its fins; or the invention of a weapon within the 
body of a hymenopter to meet the terrible needs of its life’.183 It is worth stressing that the 
mechanization of life, from the perspective of Vorticist art, is not a recent event: the industrial 
forces of the Machine Age are not to blame for reifying ‘life’ as organic form ‘is too material 
to be anything but a mechanism, and the seagull is not far removed from the hydroplane’.184 
But even though his work is crowded with figures of artificial life as puppets, dolls, automata, 
and marionettes, he is rather orthodox in his conception of the difference between humans and 
machines. 
Despite his views about the identity of technology and life, he insists that the ghost of 
personhood transcends the machine of the body. According to Lewis, the ‘body is, in a sense 
(in the things that happen to it, if that is possible, independently of the mind), as unimportant 
by itself as the materials by which it is surrounded — its clothes, tables and chairs, dust on the 
road, or bricks of the house. Disconnect it from the person, if that may be, and it is dead’. 185 
He further suggests that ‘human fallibility’ is implicated with the idea that ‘our consciousness 
is bound up with this non-mechanical phenomenon of life; that, although helpless in the face of 
the material world, we are in some way superior to and independent of it; and that our 
mechanical imperfection is the symbol of that’.186 As David Dwan astutely observes: “For all 
the talk of Lewis’s ‘antihumanism’, he was reluctant to retire a normative conception of 
humanity in which freedom was a fundamental value”.187 Ironically, the figure widely held to 
be one of modernism’s most controversial anti-humanists consistently promoted the free, 
rational, self-determined subject.188 For Lewis, bodies without consciousness belong to ‘same 
impersonal order as a bit of cloth, a lump of clay, a sponge, [or] a vegetable’.189 The affirmation 
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of human personhood in Lewis’s thinking illustrates the anthropocentric bias that, according to 
Arthur Bradley, is the unacknowledged kernel of the philosophical tradition of ‘originary 
technicity’, from Karl Marx’s materialism to Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction and Mark B. 
Hanson’s posthumanist media theory. For Bradley, ‘the theory of originary technicity claims to 
reveal the essential “technicity” of life itself’ […] but […] it conveniently privileges one form 
of life over all others’.190 He continues: ‘originary technicity […] still remains in the thrall of 
what Agamben calls the anthropological machine: it is a mechanism for producing and 
recognising the being that we ourselves are’.191 
Many scholars have noted that the Wild Body stories do not conform to standard 
definitions of primitivism. From the beginning of his career, Lewis dissociated his use of the 
‘primitive’ from the conception of a pre-technological age of human (or organic) innocence. 
He describes the Wild Body stories as ‘studies of rather primitive people’.192 Yet, these 
‘creaking men machines’ are suspended between atavism and modernity, a ‘uncivilized’ past 
and the technological present.193 Indeed, what makes Lewis’s early forays into primitivism so 
distinctive is that he is clearly fascinated by the anarchic energies of the ‘uncivilized’ body and 
yet he seems to deconstruct the very opposition between the modern and the premodern. Like 
Donna Haraway’s cyborg, the Wild Body is a figure of ‘anti-modern monstrosity’194 that thrives 
on the interpenetration of the organic and the machine, human and nonhuman, civilization and 
barbarism: ‘The Wild Body is this supreme survival that is us, the stark apparatus with its set 
of mysterious spasms: the most profound of which is laughter’.195 Its automatic laughter signals 
both its atavism and that it belongs among the technological bodies of Machine Age culture; 
and it thus runs counter to historiographical narratives which posit technology as a progressive 
and forward-facing force.196 The Wild Body’s laughter shares certain characteristics with the 
automatisms which Bergson sees as the root of the comic. Its ‘gigantic spasm of laughter’197 is 
an ex ample of mindless automatism or ‘automatic gesture’.198 Yet, for this reason, the Wild 
Body’s automatic mirth goes against the grain of Bergson’s conclusions about the nature of the 
comic. Laughter for Bergson is a corrective to the automatisms that make human beings 
resemble a living mechanism; for Lewis, by contrast, laughter is itself an automatic spasm that 
reveals the human’s fundamental proximity to animal instinct and the mindless repetition of 
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machines.199 What this automatic, mechanical hilarity foregrounds is not just the technicity of 
its ‘automatic unconscious life’ but the return of the animal prehistory of the human species.200 
As Gordon has pointed out, circa 1900 ‘automatisms signal[led] evolutionary regression and 
degeneration’.201 The description of the Bestre’s eyebrows functioning like a ‘monkey-on-a-
stick mechanical pull’ likewise forges a connection between mechanical gestures and 
evolutionary regression.  For Charles Darwin, as Gordon notes, laughter was primary evidence 
of the ‘origin’ of human emotions in the animal past.202 ‘We may confidently believe’, claimed 
Darwin in his 1872 study, ‘that laughter as a sign of pleasure or enjoyment, was practiced by 
our progenitors long before they deserved to be called human; for very many kinds of monkeys, 
when pleased, utter a reiterated sound, clearly analogous to laughter’.203 By the same token, the 
Wild Body announces its animality in spasms of laughter. ‘Laughter’, Lewis tells us, ‘is the 
bark of delight of a gregarious animal at the proximity of its kind’.204 Ker-Orr even boasts that 
after one of his comic skirmishes he ‘howled like an exultant wolf’.205 ‘Laughter does not 
progress. It is primitive, hard and unchangeable’.206 ‘The Wild Body’, according to Lewis’, is 
that small, primitive, literally antediluvian vessel in which we set out on our adventures’.207 Yet 
this atavistic body, primordial in origin, is artificial, constructed, and technological; it blurs the 
divide between life and mechanism. The revised version of the story ‘Bestre’ (1927) includes a 
grotesque description of the title character’s hybridised body: 
His very large eyeballs, the small saffron ocellation in their centre, the tiny spot 
through which light entered the obese wilderness of the body; his bronzed bovine 
arms, swollen handles for a variety indolent little ingenuities; his inflated 
digestive case, lent their combined expressiveness to say these things; with every 
tart and biting condiment that eye-fluid, flaunting of fatness (the well-filled), the 
insult of the comic, implications of indecency, could provide. Every variety of 
bottom-tapping resounded from his dumb bulk. His tongue stuck out, his lips 
eructated with the incredible indecorum that appears to be the monopoly of 
liquids, his brown arms were for the moment genitals, snakes in one massive twist 
beneath his mamillary slabs, gently riding on a pancreatic swell, each hair on his 
oil-bearing skin contributing its message of porcine affront’. 208 
The jagged rhythm of these sentences, which swell — like Bestre himself — in an excess of 
anatomical details, reflects the radical disjunction between the human, animal and machine 
parts of Bestre’s ‘wild body’. The direct literary precedent for this description is the satire of 
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Jonathon Swift, whose remarkable magnifications of the body in Gulliver’s Travels swell the 
flesh to monstrous proportions. Friedrich Kittler claims that Gulliver’s description of the maid’s 
monstrous breast suggests a ‘microscopy built into nature’.209 The description of Bestre’s 
exterior combines a Swiftian microscopy of the obscene body with the entomological discourse 
used by the French naturalist Jean-Henri Fabre (to whom Lewis further alludes in ‘Inferior 
Religions’210 and Snooty Baronet).211 The neologism ‘ocellation’ derives from ocellus, the Latin 
term for the basic ocular structures of many invertebrates. Ker-Orr’s magnifying gaze implies 
the artificial extension of his vision via an optical prosthesis: it denaturalises the narrator’s 
viewpoint and animalizes Bestre’s ‘wild body’. The ‘artificial’ eye reveals an ‘animal’ eye, 
which returns its gaze to form an assemblage of human/nonhuman perception. This composite 
of artificial and animal vision reflects the hybridisation of Bestre’s body. Erik M. Bachmann 
notes that ‘Bestre’s body is made up of a curious mixture of mechanical and his eyes a 
mechanical pull but rather a “mechanical monkey-on-a-stick pull”’.212 I would add that Bestre’s 
artificial-animal life is reminiscent of ‘Fabre’s insiste[nce] on the mechanistic nature of insects 
as machines of inner repetition, unchanging in their predetermined nature’.213 Lewis’s indirect 
allusions to Fabre’s account of the mechanical life of the insect testifies to his anxieties about 
the promotion of instinct above the intellect.214 We are told, for instance, that Bestre ‘has the 
anatomical instinct of the hymenopter for his prey’s most morbid spot’.215 For Lewis, 
philosophies which assert the pre-eminence of the corporeal over the mental are intent on 
manufacturing the ‘becoming-insect’ of the human.  In Time and Western Man, Lewis attacks 
Bergson and his followers for viewing the human body in terms that recall Fabre’s claims about 
the ‘inner repetition’ of the insect’s mechanical life: ‘Any human organism is essentially a 
repeating-machine, a habit-machine, a parrot of itself’.216 Both the presence of Bestre’s 
mechanical body and the optical device ‘built in’ to Ker-Orr’s perception imply the ascendance 
of a an inhuman vision of technological ‘life’ over the claims of a primitivist investment in pre-
technological purity. Indeed, Ker-Orr’s encounter with the primitivist ‘Other’ is, in Bradley’s 
phrase, ‘technical all the way down’.217 At the same time, however, Bestre’s technological body 
originates from a remote past that Lewis expresses in racial terms. According to Ker-Orr, Bestre 
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‘carries on his face the mark of an origin even more distant than Picardy’.218 While Bestre’s 
body blurs the distinction between nature and artifice which structures the ideology of 
modernist primitivism, his animal-artificial life is cast in terms of the animal body’s triumphant 
return to claim victory over consciousness. It seems that for Lewis the figure of the ‘primitive’ 
outlives its conditions of possibility. 
It is noteworthy that technological media are central to Lewis’s ambivalent foray into 
modernist primitivism. The anarchic excess of physiological details in Ker-Orr’s portrait of 
Bestre generates intense visual fascination. Thus, it should not be surprising that Lewis’s essay 
‘Inferior Religions’ (1917) asserts that photography a fitting analogue for his aesthetic vision 
of the ‘wild body’. Lewis contrasts the comic surface of life and social identity with the ‘the 
tragic corpse of Life underneath the world the Camera’.219  While he associates tragedy with 
the spectral x-ray image of bones under the skin, Lewis claims that the comic has its home in 
visible ‘world of the Camera’.220 Comic artists focus their energies on the surface of life in 
order to ‘photograph and fix’ its ephemeral patterns.221 As Lewis puts it: ‘This futile, grotesque 
and sometimes pretty spawn, is what in [The Wild Body] is Kodacked [sic] by the 
imagination’.222 The ‘world of the Camera’ that fixes the image of the body is distanced from 
the sensational immediacy of the body’s physical existence. In spite of Lewis’s focus on 
photography, however, the textual display of Bestre’s obscene and fleeting bodily presence 
seems to confirm Andrew Shail’s claim that the Wild Body stories are literary equivalents of 
the sensational forms of early cinema collectively known as the ‘cinema of attractions’.223 
According to Tom Gunning, cinematic ‘attractions have one basic temporality, that of the 
alteration of presence/absence that is embodied in the act of the display. In this intense form of 
present tense, the attraction is displayed with the immediacy of a “Here it is! Look at it”’.224 
Citing Lewis’s claim that his puppets are ‘only shadows of energy, and not living beings’,225 
Shail argues that ‘the attractionist aesthetics of comedy provided fond models for’ his 
depictions of Breton peasants.226 By bringing the cinematic parallels of the Wild Bodies to the 
fore, Shail’s comments let us see how technical media and atavistic bodies intertwine in these 
stories. I would add that the parallel between Ker-Orr’s prosthetic vision and Bestre’s multiform 
body showcases the non-representational image of cinema’s automatization of perception. Once 
again, I take the interplay between Bestre’s insect eye and Ker-Orr’s prosthetic vision to be 
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revealing. Lewis’s coinage ‘ocellation’ is a near-homophone of ‘oscillation’, which in this 
context could connote the fluctuating and ephemeral image of Bestre’s multiform body. 
Paradoxically, it’s hard to miss the absence/presence of the ephemeral in the metamorphoses of 
his monstrous carapace. Consider Ker-Orr’s impression that Bestre’s ‘brown arms were for the 
moment genitals’(my italics).227 If the term ‘ocellation’ connotes movement (oscillation) and a 
form of non-anthropocentric vision (ocellus), then perhaps we are seeing Bestre’s body as if 
from within an assemblage of insect and cinematic modes of perception. If so, then Lewis may 
be suggesting that there is something archaic about the inhuman perceptual worlds of cinema. 
As Steven Shaviro suggests, ‘[c]inematic perception is primordial to the extent that it is 
monstrously prosthetic’.228 Cinema ‘crosses the threshold of a new kind of perception, one that 
is below or above the human. This new perception is multiple and anarchic, nonintentional and 
asubjective; it is no longer subordinated to the requirements of representation and idealization, 
recognition and designation’.229 The nonhuman agency of the cinematic image lies in its ability 
to bypass cognition by ‘thrusting us into the mysterious life of the body’.230 If the portable 
Kodak camera of the imagination promises to fix the ephemeral in a permanent effigy of a 
single moment, the early cinematic apparatus turns the flux of the visible world into a 
transmitter of affective intensities and sensational forms of display. 
 
Atavistic Automata 
Atavistic automata also feature in Lewis’s closet drama Enemy of the Stars (1914), which stages 
‘repeated forced conjunctions of [the] archaic and [the] electric’.231  Lewis’s play conveys an 
image of the human body as a carnal machine animated by warring energies. When Lewis 
describes Arghol’s body as an ‘underworld of energy and rebellious muscles’232, or when he 
writes of ‘Hanp’s nerve of hatred, sending hysteria gyrating in top of diaphragm’, he expresses 
the total dominion of mindless corporeality over rational personhood.233 The implication of this 
triumph of automatic life over human agency is that the loss of self-mastery annuls individuality 
tout court. For Lewis, there can be no individuality worthy of the name without a clear-cut 
distinction between self and world. If Arghol’s ‘leaden inanimation’ precedes his violent attack 
on Hanp, then this is because his thing-like inertia enables his reanimation by external forces: 
‘Arghol did not hit hard. Like something inanimate, only striking as rebound and as attacked. 
He became soft, blunt paw of Nature, taken back to her bosom, mechanically; slowly and idly 
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winning. He became part of responsive landscape’.234 It seems that for Lewis automatisms 
activate the immersion of the human within its extra-human surroundings. This loss of 
individual boundaries announces a collapse of transcendence into immanence; it also implies a 
fall into a material flux, whereupon the orders of the human, the animal, the vegetal, and the 
inorganic become indistinct. 
This erosion of distinctions extends to the relationship between Lewis’s protagonists. 
As Arghol exclaims to Hanp: ‘I am amazed to find that you are like me’.235 In fact, the 
conventional, all-too-familiar antinomies of the doppelganger plot — the division between 
spirit and matter, the struggle of body and soul, the confrontation between self and other — 
provide the basis for the antagonisms of the play. These antinomies are embodied in the two 
protagonists: on the one hand, Arghol represents the human aspiration for spiritual 
transcendence of the corporeal drives; on the other hand, Hanp represents the bodily impulses 
that Arghol would repudiate. In Enemy, the double theme dramatizes not just the contamination 
of self and other, or mind and matter, but the destruction of the divide between conscious and 
unconscious actions. Rae Beth Gordon explains that Bergson’s Laughter draws on the 
psychiatric research of the philosopher’s day, particularly the idea of a ‘radical division between 
the higher and lower faculties: reason, judgement, choice, and will as opposed to sensation, 
motor response, automatisms, and instinct’.236 It should not be a surprise that Hanp exhibits all 
of these ‘low’ characteristics. It is noteworthy that his ‘bourgeois aspirations’ and resentment 
towards the intellectual Arghol align him with the urban masses.237 The fact that Lewis 
identifies him with the instinctive life of animals implies his evolutionary regression. His 
automatisms are not merely comic in Bergson’s sense but collectively emphasise the link 
between mechanical gestures and atavism. Hanp’s mechanical body underwrites his backward 
orientation insofar as his automatism signifies the reappearance of primordial instincts within 
the mass life of the crowd. Gordon explains how automatisms were linked to the animal pre-
history of the human species in the Darwinian context of late nineteenth-century medicine. 
Ernst Haeckel’s theory that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny claimed that the development of 
the individual repeats the evolution of the species.238 Since the lower faculties evolved earlier 
than rational thought, ‘automatisms signal[led] evolutionary regression and degeneration’.239 
For Gustave Le Bon, when the monadic individual loses its distinctness and fuses with the 
formless life of the crowd ‘[h]e is no longer himself [sic], but has become an automaton who 
has ceased to be guided by his will’.240 Lewis emphasizes not only the ‘savage’ violence that 
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springs from Hanp’s automatism but the abject lowness of his body. Arghol’s sense of 
‘contamination’ arises from his feeling that ‘[t]oo many things inhabited together in this spirit 
for cleanliness or health’.241 Lewis highlights the proximity of the urban crowd by comparing 
Arghol’s inauthentic self to ‘a doss-house’, adding that it is ‘impossible to organize on such a 
scale’.242 Enemy is a play in which disorganized, unformed matter is legion: the landscape is 
awash with ‘mire’243 and ‘filth’.244 The formless waste is a material analogue of the 
disorganized humanity of the crowd.  As Stefan Jonnson has put it: ‘To define the masses as 
undifferentiated matter implies that they lack formation and individuation, and it also suggests 
that these masses are commanded by parts of the psyche that are universal, that is, by 
unconscious instincts and passions’.245 Likewise, Lewis draws a connection between the 
shapelessness of non-individuated matter and the atavistic instincts of the crowd. 
Enemy charts out two distinct types of atavism. As we have seen, the first is the 
normative version of atavism signified by the predominance of the ‘lower faculties’ that both 
Le Bon and Lewis attributed to the collective body of the crowd. This fin-de-siecle 
understanding of human reversion is noticeable in Arghol’s description of Hanp as an ‘unclean 
little beast’.246 The second type of atavism is a more primeval or antediluvian form of 
retrogression which exceeds the degenerationist trope of bestialized humans. The play’s 
extension of the logic of atavism conforms to some extent with Claire Colebrook’s account of 
a radical atavism […] where humans intuit rhythms that are distinct, inhuman, and beyond the 
time of the present’.247 Such an atavism does not consist in ‘a nostalgic return but an explosive 
atavism that then allows for an inhuman future — not a post-human future, which would be 
man’s capacity to think beyond himself, but a thought of a world without man that is released 
from the orbit of evolving time’.248  
In Lewis’s play, the aggregation of the modern and the primordial creates a 
simultaneity of different times that are irreconcilable with linear evolving time.  Hints of past 
and future extinctions abound: the names of familiar extinct species (‘Mastodons’) are 
juxtaposed with alien forms of raw, protoplasmic life (‘immense bird-like amoeba’); the 
extinction of the human species is presaged as a ‘[c]atacylsm of premature decadence’ that 
would leave behind ‘no human’; and the geological movement of the ‘slowly-moving lines […] 
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of landscape’ imply a time both beyond and before human consciousness.249 Human identities 
recede behind a panorama of radically inhuman forms. Consider, for example, how Arghol 
becomes a craggy outcrop of the inorganic landscape: his ‘hands [are] a thick shell fitting [the] 
back of [his] head, and [his] face [is a] grey vegetable cave’.250 Neither human nor animal, 
Lewis’s ossified protagonist blends into the mineral environment. As an assemblage of of lithic 
and biological parts, Arghol is ‘CENTRAL AS STONE’ and ‘LIES LIKE HUMAN STRATA 
OF INFERNAL BIOLOGIES’.251 It is moreover significant that Arghol’s lithic body is first 
introduced as part of a nonhuman creation myth: ‘HE SITS LIKE A GOD BUILT BY AN 
ARCHITECTUAL STREAM, FECUNDED BY MAD BLASTS OF SUNLIGHT’.252 
Reversing the monotheistic notion of a divine creator god who fashions the material world, 
Arghol owes his origins to a confluence of nonhuman agencies. This mythic focus on creative 
primeval agencies finds its counterpart in the destructive animistic forces that erode stable 
identities. The landscape is alive with inhuman becomings: everything in it seems to be 
morphing, exceeding taxonomic categories, changing density, dissolving, shifting, or merging 
in flows of shapeless matter. 
It would be a mistake to ascribe Lewis’s negation of the organic and human form to a 
posthumanist affirmation of nonhuman agencies. Rather, Lewis’s emphasis falls on the 
‘barbarous’ energies released by the interrelation of the past and the present. In Enemy, his 
focus seems to be on the inhuman rather than the posthuman. As Colebrook and Weinstein have 
said, the inhuman does not come in the wake of the human but ‘pushes us to scales beyond the 
human — temporalities and spatialities both deep and astronomical’.253 At the same time, the 
inhuman can denote ‘a lack of ostensibly human qualities of compassion and mercy as well as 
“cruelty, savageness, and barbarism.”’.254 The correlation between Hanp’s atavistic ‘crowd’ 
behaviour and the ‘radical atavism’ of the landscape connects the human drama of the 
protagonists to the inhuman time of organic evolution and distant geological and astronomical 
forces. The modernity of the machine-age present denoted by Hanp’s automatic violence is 
interrelated with the panoply of hostile agencies that both came before the human and threaten 
its organic survival. The point I want to underline is that this coalescence of the primordial and 
the technological involves a complex accretion of different bodies and temporalities. Lewis 
achieves this polychronic juxtaposition of the modern and the archaic through an intricate 
layering of the vocabulary of mass media and advertising (‘THE BOX OFFICE RECEIPTS 
HAVE BEEN ENORMOUS’) with recurring allusions to the deep time of evolution and 
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geology.255 Amid the anti-modern, ‘presudo-rustic’ landscape of elemental forces that record 
the traces of a time before the human, Lewis’s references to the media ecology of the machine-
age produce a sense of radical temporal disjointedness.256 The photographic ‘Morris-lens’257 
and the ‘telegraph’ suggest the attempt to extend human perception and communication beyond 
its ‘natural’ limits. 258  Yet this extension of the human body does nothing to reassert human 
sovereignty over the hostile agencies of the inhuman landscape.  As we have seen, the stories 
later collected in The Wild Body demonstrate Lewis resistance to the primitivist idea of 
returning to a pristine or pure form of life uncontaminated by technology. What he foregrounds 
in Enemy of the Stars is that the emergence of machine-age technology does not extinguish 
‘savage’ or primordial agencies. Rather, the primordial and the technological emerge as 
mutually reinforcing agencies that contaminate the individual and threaten its extinction. In 
Lewis’s drama, technology ceases to represent futurity and progressive linear time; instead, the 
machine is bound up with the deep time of fossilized remains and astronomical distances: ‘The 
stars shone madly in the archaic blank wilderness of the universe, machines of prey. Mastodons, 
placid in electric atmosphere, white rivers of power’.259 This conflation of the machine with 
fossilized traces of pre-historic life (‘Mastodons’) and distant cosmic forces (‘stars’) diminishes 
the stature of the human. Indeed, within this nonhuman landscape, Arghol and Hanp appear to 
be ‘severe midgets, brain specks of the vertiginous, seismic, vertebrate, slowly-moving lines, 
of landscape’.260 A sense of vast and inhuman remoteness links the geological time of the 
‘slowly-moving […] landscape’ to the ‘immensely distant’ stars, both of which suggest spatial 
and temporal distances that exceed the scale of the human. But the estrangement and remoteness 
of the inhuman is interlaced with signifiers of the familiar and the near-at-hand, such as the 
‘English metropolis’261 or ‘THE CORRIDORS OF THE TUBE’.262 
Lewis continues his project of combining the metropolitan and the ‘barbarous’ in his 
novel Tarr (1918). Its opening passage self-consciously announces a distinction between its 
representation of the city and the milieu of the cinema: ‘We are not in a Selim of Vitagraph 
camp’.263 Many scholars have argued that cinema’s emergence as a popular medium forged a 
new relationship between technology and life, for its reanimation of bodies and things seem to 
imply the machine’s vitalization of the inanimate — both in terms of its animation of ‘living 
pictures’ and its powers to revivify the bodies of the dead. As Deborah Levitt has put it: 
In 1895, the first cinema cameras — the US Vitascope, the German Bioscope, and the 
EnglishAnimatograph — were produced and patented almost simultaneously. The 
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names of these new inventions made a powerful claim: the cinema will capture, or 
produce, life itself. But this cinematic mode of life is not confined to the movie theatre. 
The world of the twentieth century is shaped by the spectral-spectacular life/death of 
the cinematic image. 264 
The etymology of the word ‘Vitagraph’ pertains to Lewis’s fascination with the conflict 
between life (vita) and art/human making (graph). The fact that Lewis opposes the bohemian 
‘Knackfus Quarter’ to the ‘Vitagraph camp’ suggests a desire to uphold the partition between 
the traditional arts and the cinema. This implies in turn a resistance to the threat of the new 
posed by cinematic technology. Nevertheless, Lewis is quick to reincorporate what he makes a 
show of rejecting, because in the following paragraph we find ‘a Vitagraph group or two 
drinking or playing billiards’ in the ‘the Café Berne’: ‘These [i.e. ‘the Vitagraph group’] are the 
most permanent tableaux of this place, disheartening and admonitory as a Tussaud’s of the 
flood’.265 The comparison of cinematic spectators to the waxwork figures of Madame Tussaud’s 
introduces a central motif: the animate and the inanimate exchange properties, and even become 
indistinguishable. Indeed, this opening passage prefigures Lewis’s representation of Kreisler’s 
recurrent oscillations between life and nonlife. 
It is noteworthy that Lewis compares these ossified spectators to ‘a Tussaud’s of the 
flood’ (my italics). Their ossification signals a kind of stagnation or inactivity that exists in the 
metropolis and yet also signals a return of to a time before modernity. The fact that Lewis 
describes the atavistic Kreisler as ‘a living cinematograph’ speaks to Lewis’s engagement with 
cinema’s reframing of life and death in terms of regression.266 Len Platt has highlighted the 
narrative of racial decline that Lewis maps onto Kreisler’s physical deterioration.267 He notes 
Lewis’s comic portrayal of the ‘biologically inefficient’ German’s failed attempts to adapt to 
cosmopolitan milieu of pre-war Paris.268 In Platt’s view, the ‘mechanistic logic’ driving 
Kreisler’s ‘reduction’ to a primitive, anachronistic creature is ‘presumably the workings of a 
historical dynamic,’ and his bellicose eruptions are less displays of warlike masculinity than 
symptoms of racial degeneration.269 With this intersection of race and degeneration the 
narrative arc of Kreisler’s decline turns in a biopolitical direction: he not only seethes with 
‘racial menace’270 but is also the embodiment of ‘a clumsy and degenerate atavism’.271 In line 
with the fin-de-siècle theories of atavism expounded by Cesare Lombroso, Kreisler’s 
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degeneration seems to compel him to leave a trail of crime and destruction in his wake.272 As 
we’ve already seen, Lewis frames evolutionary regression as the dominance of instinct over 
intellect; cast into the vortex of Paris, Kreisler, the ‘effete machine,’ becomes an inert machine 
moved by external forces.273 
Lewis creates a temporal divide in which the modernity represented by the dynamism of 
the cinema and the metropolis is countered by a sense of reversion and a return to the inorganic. 
A possible source for Lewis’s sense that the dynamism of the modern reawakens remote 
primordial forces is Wilhelm Worringer’s influential dissertation Abstraction and Empathy 
(1907), which captured the modernist imagination with its argument that abstract art has its 
origin in humanity’s primordial fears about the chaotic flux of the external world. While Foster 
suggests that Lewis’s engagement with Worringer’s ‘primordialism’ provides the aesthetic 
basis for a grim affirmation of the inorganic and the death drive, I propose that Worringer’s 
study provides a clue to Lewis’s critique of the atavistic logic underpinning modernity’s cult of 
novelty.274 Worringer writes: 
A convinced evolutionist might, […] seek [geometric form] in the ultimate 
affinity between the morphological laws of organic and inorganic nature. He 
would then erect the ideal postulate that the morphological law of inorganic nature 
still echoes like a dim memory in our human organism. He would then perhaps 
also assert further that every differentiation of organised matter, every 
development of its most primitive form, is accompanied by a tension, by a longing 
to revert to this most primitive form.275 
The memory of the inorganic that persists in organic forms links the most recent organisms to 
the remote past before the emergence of organic life. More than this, Worringer claims that 
‘every development’ of life engenders ‘a longing to revert to this most primitive form’. And he 
thus extends the idea of atavism further back in time than the history of organic evolution. 
Lewis in turn extends the notion that the development of the new causes a reappearance of the 
most primordial, ossified forms to include the development of technology. The emergence of 
the most dynamic technologies foster an anachronistic yearning for stasis and fixity. This would 
suggest that Kreisler’s oscillation between animation and inanimation is an embodiment of the 
temporal divide between the dynamism of modern technology (including cinema) and the 
inertia of primordial inorganic forms. 
Kreisler embodies the striking fusion of inertia and animation characteristic of the 
Lewisian body: while his inert body represents ‘an unparalleled immobility in life’, his atavistic 
outbursts also signal the release of primordial energies that produce chaos and destruction — 
both in terms of his violent actions towards others and his own hysterical disintegration and 
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suicide.276 When he undergoes a ‘nervous attack’ that leaves him ‘trembling violently’, we learn 
of the disorder that agitates his unmanageable flesh.277 ‘He was almost annihilated,’ Lewis tells 
us, ‘by a terrific explosion’.278 Characters become animated corpses or vivified objects exposed 
to ‘the arbitrary decisions of force’.279 What is more, death exceeds its usual limits in order to 
contaminate life; we thus discover that Kreisler’s ‘nervous system was as quiescent as a 
corpse’s’ before his hapless duel with Louis Soltyk sets in motion the concatenation of events 
that result in his suicide.280 Further, the sense of estrangement Lewis evokes by immobilising 
the human parallels his depiction of the agency of objects. Things behave like characters: their 
sudden animation mirrors the convulsive gestures of Lewis’s puppets. And this riot of objects 
signals in turn the vitalization of the inanimate, as indicated by the spectacle of Tarr’s ‘brushes, 
photographs and books flying over to their respective places on dressing table, mantelpiece, 
shelf or bibliothèque ; [or his] boxes and parcels creeping dog-like under beds and into 
corners’.281 If the animation of objects suggests an anachronistic return of animistic modes of 
thought, then inert objects heighten the tensions between characters and animate their bodies 
with violent actions. Kreisler’s automatisms may render him thing-like but it is often objects in 
the ‘hostile external world’ which hasten his degeneration and awaken his bestial impulses. For 
example, the rustling of a woman’s skirt inflames his neurasthenic fear of outer sensations: ‘It 
seemed all around him, attacking him. The thin ordinary brushing of a skirt was like the low 
breathing of a hidden animal to a man in the forest. […] The nerves on the side of his head 
twitched as though shrinking from a touch’.282 In his inability to give order to his actions he 
becomes the textbook definition of the neurasthenic. As John Jervis explains: ‘The neurasthenic 
needs protection against the sensations and shocks of modernity. Above all, it reflected a 
weakness of will (‘aboulia’), which in turn testified to an inadequately strong ego, an inability 
to bind and direct energy towards clear goals’.283  Aboulia raises the spectre of the complete 
privation of human energy, volition, and action; it hints at a condition of total inertia, which in 
effect would reduce the human body to lifeless matter. Tarr’s characters approach this frozen 
and will-less state. When Kreisler comes across a waiter ‘with a pink, virile face, which, in a 
spirit of fun, he kept constantly wooden and solemn’, Kreisler turns wooden himself and ‘[h]is 
mind [stands] stock still for several minutes’.284 The waiter’s unmoving and affectless face 
induces Kreisler to become a mindless object: ‘This pink wooden face paralysed everything. 
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[…] The more wooden it became, the more paralysed became Kreisler’s intelligence’.285 
Without intelligence to guide his actions Kreisler becomes an inanimate object moved only by 
external forces.  As Tarr’s most thing-like character, Kreisler gives the impression of being a 
hostile nonhuman actant immersed in a field of violent forces. In a sense, his ‘deadness’ and 
‘mechanical obstinacy’ makes his movements seem like a kind of gothic animism — a 
reanimation of the nonliving.286 
Kreisler’s atavism and ‘deadness’ has political ramifications. If ‘Our Wild Body’ heaps 
scorn on the technological milieu that the young Lewis considered antagonistic to the vital 
impulses of the English body, Tarr expands this meditation of technology, life, and the national 
body to embrace the broader context of early twentieth-century Europe. In his study Fables of 
Aggression (1979), Fredric Jameson sets out his interpretation of Tarr as a ‘national 
allegory’.287 He proposes that the tensions between European nation-states preceding WWI 
‘constitute the very backdrop and organizational framework’ of Lewis’s narrative.288 And 
indeed it is only against this pre-war backdrop of competing national types that we can make 
sense of Tarr’s harlequinade of international bohemians. One of the most striking features of 
the novel’s crowd of dysfunctional characters is the significance of the body in their violent 
interactions. ‘The body,’ Tarr tells us, ‘is the main thing’.289 Just as Lewis inscribes his 
characters within a framework of national and racialized types, so he elaborates a 
symptomatology of the national body that makes use of the defining categories of modernist-
era biopolitics: eugenics, efficiency, degeneration, atavism, and nervous exhaustion. Early in 
the novel Tarr tells his fellow Englishman Hobson that he represents ‘the dregs of Anglo-Saxon 
civilization!’.290 Tarr’s scorn arises from his sense that Hobson’s ersatz bohemianism masks 
the waning energies of England’s cultural establishment. ‘Any efficient State,’ Tarr claims in 
mock-serious tones, ‘would confiscate your property, burn your wardrobe, that old hat and the 
rest, as “infecte” and insanitary, and prohibit you from propagating’.291 If Tarr’s account of 
Hobson’s lack of vitality conveys his animus towards England’s dandified elite, he expresses 
his sexual desire according to a similar logic of racial fitness. One need only recall his racialized 
description of his German fiancée Bertha: ‘She is a high standard Aryan female, in good 
condition, superbly made; of the succulent, obedient, clear peasant type’.292 To consider these 
eugenicist and racializing vocabularies in relation to the interpersonal dynamics portrayed in 
Tarr is to identify the extent to which these biopolitical concerns enter into the very fabric of 
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social interaction in the novel. In this regard, the most scathing portrait that Lewis sketches is 
of Kreisler’s racialized German body. It is impossible to miss the hyperbolic extent to which he 
stresses Kreisler’s ‘Germanness’. Not only is he a former ‘Korpsstudent’293 with a ’German 
nature that craved discipline,’294 but he even sees himself as an ‘old berserker warrior’.295 
I want to enquire into how the links between automata, atavism, and death that feature 
in Lewis’s engagement with biopolitical questions about racial decline and national bodies. 
Gordon explains that circa 1900 ‘marionettes [were] a mirror for the phenomenon of 
automatisms’.296 The figures of artificial life in modernist literature and early cinema 
represented pathological bodies: their jerky movements release wild surges of instinct or 
psychological disorders such as hysteria and epilepsy.297 The pathological body is the flipside 
of Hal Foster’s account of Lewis’s technologically armoured body. It is the nervous or 
hysterical body, the body overwhelmed by sensations, the body plugged into networks of force 
and electricity, unable to find equilibrium or shield itself from the shock of the new. It is 
noteworthy that the Lewis’s blurring of the distinction between life and death maps onto the 
conflicting symptoms of hysteria itself — which, according to John Jervis, include ‘excess, 
volatility, hyperactivity, [and] convulsions’, as well as ‘withdrawal, passivity, exhaustion, [and] 
muteness’.298 Nervous gestures dealt a blow to routine expectations about human agency. The 
fluid becoming of life fractured into discontinuous segments and the uncontrolled body exposed 
its mechanical reflexes. 
While his atavism suggests a return to the uncivilized past, Kreisler’s bestial behaviour 
seems to be a direct result of the twentieth-century mechanization of life. In striving for 
progress, technological modernity unwittingly engenders a new barbarism in the very heart of 
the metropolis. This association between technology and thanatos emerges in Tarr when 
artificial or mechanical motion impels Kreisler’s violence. He is ‘a machine, dead weight of old 
iron, that started, must go dashing on’.299 The loss of conscious control that accompanies his 
technological animation links his automatism to evolutionary regression. As Max Nordau once 
put it: “As long as automatisms exist, one hasn’t reached the ‘purely human’ [which] is 
judgement and will”.300There is no evidence that Kreisler is able to control his impulses using 
his will or assess his actions using his judgement. Machines foster the dominance of mindless 
external force over the agency and control of the intellect, which reawakens in turn the 
primordial energies of aggression and violence. The fact that Kreisler likens ‘himself to one of 
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those little steam toys that go straight ahead without stopping’301 directly relates to the fact that 
‘instinct guide[s] his steps’.302 Lewis employs the language of shock and neurasthenia in order 
to underscore Kreisler’s helplessness in the face of the city’s overwhelming sensations: his 
incorporation of the external forces of the metropolis becomes clear when we are told that 
‘[b]lood came to his head with a shock’.303 Further, while we learn that ‘his energy was giving 
out’ because of his ‘immense personal neurasthenia’, Kreisler’s ‘fatigue’ is compatible with 
hyperbolic emotionality and sexual violence.304 Gordon explains that that late nineteenth-
century psychiatry proposed that the degenerate’s ‘hyper-excitability uses up a great deal of 
energy and diminished the ability to think, while at the same time, erotic ideas predominate. 
One sees that this portrait of the degenerate is easily at home in the context of the music-hall’.305 
Likewise, Kreisler’s strained theatrics and ‘clown-like’ behaviour coalesce with his 
psychosexual mania.306 His slapstick encounter with Anastasya at the Bonnington Club causes 
him to seethe ‘in a hot riot of thoughts’.307 Uncertain about how to proceed towards her, Kreisler 
veers from room to room in a turbulent state, ‘foaming, fugitive, and confused’.308 His fanatical 
confusion bespeaks his failure to gain control over his burgeoning sensations of anger and 
resentment. 
Kreisler’s animation often gives way to inertia. To be an inert thing is to lack any 
creativity or ability to change without the intervention of external forces. Lewis treats external 
animation as a malign agency which has the capacity to reduce humans to such lifelessness. 
The death drive of Lewis’s most animated characters reveals the anti-vital threat of their 
‘automatic unconscious life’. This introduces us to the question of Lewis’s residual vitalism: 
on one side, he denounces Bergson’s influence on culture ad nauseam; on the other, his 
disapproval of technological animation is reminiscent of Bergson’s critique of the 
‘cinematographical mechanism’. In the closing chapter of his Creative Evolution, ‘The 
Cinematographical Mechanism of Thought and the Mechanistic Illusion’, Bergson writes: ‘In 
order that pictures may be animated, there must be movements somewhere. The movement does 
not exist here: it is in the apparatus’.309 For Tom Gunning, this brief statement captures ‘the 
core of Bergson’s concern about the cinema: an artificial mechanical motion achieved through 
technology’.310 Bergson’s complaint against cinema comes down to his assertion that the 
moving images projected by the cinematograph receive their movement from outside or beyond 
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themselves (i.e. ‘in the apparatus’). While the vital becoming of life is immanent, technological 
movement originates outside that which it sets into motion. As Gunning explains, ‘[c]entral to 
this critique is Bergson’s deep suspicion of the machine, which also forms the basis of his 
analysis of laughter’.311 This anti-technological perspective explains why Bergson derides the 
related categories of the artificial and the ready-made: ‘Consciousness’, he tells us ‘being in its 
turn formed on the intellect, sees clearly of the inner life only what is already made, and only 
feels confusedly the making’.312 Summarising his efforts to describe the real as consonant with 
the ceaseless emergence of new forms, Bergson explains that ‘reality has appeared to us as 
perpetual becoming. It makes itself or it unmakes itself, but it is never something made’.313 
Consciousness interposes between the real movement of perpetual becoming and the artificial 
movement reconstructed by the mechanical operations of the intellect. 
I want to consider Lewis’s engagement with the concepts of ‘life’ and ‘death’, and 
suggest that the distinction between these terms became uncertain in the context of the ‘parallel 
histories’ of literary modernism and early cinema.314 While I will reflect on Lewis’s 
engagement with particular aspects of early cinema, the main focus here is to consider how 
cinema’s ‘transvaluation of life’ manifests itself in his fiction.315 To that end, I chart how Lewis 
responds to the vexed entanglement of the living and the nonliving in the multimedia cultural 
field of the early twentieth-century. The technological life of the cinema also reframed the 
understanding of the human body.  As the cinematic capture of movement involves mobilising 
static images, cinematic bodies are composites of mobility and immobility. ‘Cinematic bodies’, 
Levitt continues, ‘exist in a state of ontological crisis: Present or absent? Here or there? Living 
or dead?’.316 
In her brilliant study, The Tenth Muse: Writing about Cinema in the Modernist Period  
(2007), Laura Marcus draws a connection between early cinema’s love affair with ‘marionettes, 
puppets, automata, and mechanical figures’ and ‘the modernist and avant-gardist preoccupation 
with automatic life’.317 Marcus notes that Lewis’s work ‘exhibited a fascination with 
“mechanical man”’.318 What Lewis called the ‘automatic unconscious life’ of his Tyros, Apes, 
and Wild Bodies is exemplary in this regard.319 While Marcus rightly pinpoints Lewis’s 
obsession with the mechanization of life, both of the senses of the word ‘automaton’ will be 
crucial to my discussion. Building on Marcus’s cogent remarks, I integrate my discussion of 
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Lewis’s engagement with automatic life with a detailed reading of his portrayal of animated 
things. My analysis enquires into Lewis’s response to the object-animation films produced by 
the Vitagraph Company between 1907 and 1910, and is in conversation with Brook Henkel’s 
work on ‘animated things in German modernist literature and film’.320 As Henkel explains: 
‘Increasingly popular after 1905 yet largely disappearing before World War I, short films 
featuring animated furniture, utensils, tools, drawings, puppets, and personal items emerged as 
a particular and rather late instance of the cinema of attractions’.321 Lewis’s framing of animated 
objects and inert humans is closely tied to his engagement with early cinema in general and, I 
will argue, object-animation films in particular. Michael North has rightly pointed out that 
Lewis ‘was a lifelong fan of movie cartoons’.322 To support this claim he cites Lewis’s 
testimony of his ‘boundless admiration for [Walt] Disney’323 in a latter composed in 1946 
together with Lewis’s description of anthropomorphic cabbages reading Flaubert in ‘The 
Meaning of the Wild Body’ (1928).324 But critics have not explored the relations between Tarr’s 
animated things and the Vitagraph trick-films he would have encountered in Paris or London 
between 1907 and 1910. The US Vitagraph Company ‘had established Paris as its principle 
foreign office as early as 1906-7’.325 It significant for our purposes that ‘The Haunted Hotel 
(1907) was the first to have some impact.326 
Tarr’s other scenes of in/animation testify to the importance of this initial juxtaposition 
between frozen waxworks and the moving image. In a striking reanimation of the Pygmalion 
myth, Kreisler witnesses the enlivening of a modern-day Galatea in a life drawing class: ‘the 
Model slowly and rhythmically abandoned her rigid attitude, coming to life as living statues do 
in ballets’.327 As Scott Bukatman reminds us, ‘some of the earliest films were of artists’ models 
coming miraculously (and harmlessly) to life’.328 But while the Pygmalion story puts the 
vivifying powers of the male artist centre stage, Kreisler is ‘just as torpid’ as this Parisian 
Galatea and the ‘mechanical students’ manufacturing mimetic reproductions of her body.329 If 
Pygmalionism allegorizes the erotic attachments provoked by mimetic art, Lewis proposes a 
counter-Pygmalionism that associates sudden animation with mechanistic repetition and the 
becoming-inert of the living body. 
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This returns us to a fundamental paradox: in Tarr, as in Enemy of the Stars, the 
animation of the body becomes indistinguishable from a deadening mechanical force. Tarr’s 
characters show intensified states of animation when they behave less like persons and more 
like machines. The violent animation of their mechanical bodies parallels Lewis’s portrayal of 
hostile objects imbued with uncanny powers. How fitting, then, that Kreisler’s assistant in his 
duel, Bitzenko, is ‘restored to silent and intense animation on hearing his “Browning” speak’.330 
On the morning of the fatal duel, Bitzenko’s frenzied activity derives from nothing but the 
levers and pulleys of an alarm clock: ‘the Russian, already on his feet, his white and hairy body 
had apparently risen energetically out of the scratch bed clothes simultaneously with the “going 
of” of his clock, as though it were a mechanism set for the same hour’.331 The ringing of this 
alarm leaves Kreisler ‘almost annihilated by a terrific explosion’.332 The external motion or 
animation produced by this fixed mechanism conspires against organic life. Kreisler’s 
capitulation to external forces strips him of his vitality and his ‘instinctive resistance to the idea 
of Death’.333 He is a living corpse ‘rendered empty by his premature insensitiveness’.334 His 
inelasticity, furthermore, moves him mechanically towards his predetermined goal of turning 
his rival into a ‘disintegrating mess, uglier than any vitriol or syphilis could make him’.335 
Kreisler’s body becomes a nonliving vessel possessed by mechanical animation, completely 
deprived of human agency. In the hilarious prelude to the duel that never takes place, Soltyk 
loses control of his animated body. We find him ‘writhing upright, a statue’s bronze softening, 
suddenly, with blood’.336 This sudden enlivening of his inanimate flesh sets in motion the events 
that result in his death. ‘His hands were electrified. Will was at last dashed all over him, an 
arctic douche. The hands flew at Kreisler’s throat. His nails made six holes in the flesh and cut 
into the tendons beneath. Kreisler was hurled about’.337 This uncontrolled attack and Soltyk’s 
subsequent retreat goads Kreisler into seizing the gun that will end Soltyk’s life. 
Lewis’s fiction does not petrify or de-vitalise human figures so much as turn characters 
into objects in order to animate them with inhuman forces, which explains why his characters 
repeatedly fall short of the categories of ‘subject’ or ‘person’. Without denying the thing-like 
condition of Tarr’s bodies, one might argue that the extent of their reification directly correlates 
with the intensity of their animation. On such a reading, then, it is the very thingness of Tarr’s 
bodies that produces their restless dynamism. Throughout the novel there is an overriding sense 
that inorganic matter is just as ‘alive’ as its organic counterpart. In her study Persons and 
Things, Barbara Johnson describes the ‘nightmare’ scenario in which ‘suddenly what was an 
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object becomes a subject whose gaze turns us into an object and who escapes our control’.338 
In Tarr, such exchanges between subjects and objects generate uncertainty as to whether affects 
originate ‘inside’ a character’s mind or traverse between humans and things: ‘Nausea glared at 
[Kreisler] from every object he met’.339 Is this nausea fully attributable to Kreisler’s phobic 
subjectivity? Or do the objects he encounters gaze back at him with disgust? I take it that this 
extension of affect to the inorganic world erases the divide between the enlivening passions of 
humans and the passionless materiality of things. After all, the fact that Tarr recoils from the 
excessive animation of both objects and subjects suggests that he does not draw a clear-cut 
distinction between humans and things. Lewis’s animus takes aim at mindless animation in 
general, whether it arises in persons or objects. Indeed, Tarr’s reasons for disliking his vivified 
possessions are identical to his reasons for disliking other characters. A self-described ‘panurgic 
pessimist’, he finds the ‘unwearied optimism of these inanimate objects [...] appalling’.340 It is 
surely no accident that his animus against objects recalls his contempt for Hobson’s optimistic 
liberal faith that ‘all’s well with the world!’.341 For the antagonistic Tarr, the banal optimism of 
both animated things and reified persons cannot go unchallenged. 
If Tarr’s objects can transgress the modern ban on lively or agential matter, the 
animation of the inanimate also serves to diminish Tarr’s charismatic individualism. For Tarr, 
the lawless forces that animate objects are a threat to his creative agency; after moving to a new 
studio, he frets and fusses about unpacking his belongings: ‘To undo and let loose upon the 
room his portmanteau’s squashed and dishevelled contents — like a flock of birds, brushes, 
photographs and books flying over to their respective places on dressing table, mantelpiece, 
shelf or bibliothèque ; boxes and parcels creeping dog-like under beds and into corners, taxed 
his character to breaking point’.342 This is a world of impersonal energies in which the inorganic 
pulses with a ‘life’ of its own, where objects disrupt human action and ‘tax’ the very idea of 
‘character’ to ‘breaking point’. Further, Tarr’s ‘breaking point’ refers not so much to psychic 
disintegration as to his own fragile objectness. It is wonderfully ironic that the tools of his 
creativity (‘brushes’) cause him ‘discomfort’ and ‘a bristling host of incertitudes’, since this 
emphasises the imposture underlying his sense of being a Nietzschean artist-superman.343 
Tarr’s ‘bristling’ anxiety makes him into a doppelganger of his animate brush. I want to suggest 
that this scene bears an uncanny resemblance to the object-animation films Lewis would have 
seen in Paris. One of the most striking of these films, Electric Hotel (1908), features a 
portmanteau opening autonomously to release its animated contents. Some brushes, a comb, 
and various items of clothing endowed with life remove themselves from the luggage and put 
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themselves away in the hotel room dresser. Insofar as these animate objects pose a challenge to 
Tarr’s ‘possession’ of the studio they allegorize the threat that cinematic life poses to the art of 
painting.344 This explains why he seeks to reassert his human agency over the inanimate by 
‘start[ing] work at once’.345 Yet Lewis hints at the failure of Tarr’s coping strategy; his hurried 
start is more of a false-start, for ‘half an hour after taking possession [of the studio], it already 
being time for his apéritif, he issued forth’ from his studio into the street.346 Outside his new 
room he encounters ‘a few clusters of men. The Spanish men dancers were coloured earth-
objects, full of basking and frisking instincts’.347 Needless to say, the implicit inertia suggested 
by their ‘basking’ instincts contrasts with uncanny mobility of Tarr’s belongings ‘flying to their 
respective places’ in his room. This clear disparity is no doubt a literary equivalent of ‘the 
respective lifelessness of humans in object-animation films’.348 And yet, their ‘frisking’ 
instincts (and the fact they are dancers) suggest they represent the presence of both animation 
and inertia. Indeed, presenting their bodies as ‘earth-objects’ containing ‘frisking’ and ‘basking’ 
instincts returns us to the aporia of cinematic animation in general and the object-animation 
film in particular. 
The Reversibility of ‘Man’ 
By the end of the 1920s, Lewis had reinforced his reputation as modernism’s most incendiary 
literary satirist. In Men Without Art (1934), he argues that satire aspires to depict the general 
rather than the particular in human existence, focussing its wide-angle lens on the human-as-
species: “It is with man, and not with manners, that what we have agreed to describe as ‘satire’ 
is called upon to deal”.349 According to Tyrus Miller, Lewis’s “new anthropological focus 
results from a disruption in the fundamental character of historicity, which has become fully 
planetary and hence a human condition and no longer a national or racial one”.350 As Lewis 
(somewhat portentously) puts it: “‘Period” will not be entirely ruled out, doubtless: only in the 
future it will be world-period. The habit of thought of this nation or that, at a given moment of 
its discrete history, will sink into the insignificance it deserves”.351 It was in this context that 
Lewis announced the emergence of a new world order that extends across national boundaries: 
“the Earth has become one place,” he claimed in 1929, “instead of a romantic tribal patchwork 
of places”.352 Following Miller’s remarks concerning Lewis’s sense of the “disruption” of 
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historicity in the post-war period, I want to suggest that we can detect this weakening of national 
periodicity in the shift from the international concerns of Tarr to his exploration of the human-
as-species in The Childermass. But if The Childermass constitutes an example of the “new 
anthropological focus” that Miller detects in Lewis’s “late modernist” project, it also challenges 
anthropological coherence by dismantling stable notions of human identity. As we will see, for 
Lewis the mass deadness unleashed by technological animation alters our conception of the 
human: in an age of mechanized life, the career of ‘Western Man’ reaches its historical 
terminus. 
In his wide-ranging polemic The Art of Being Ruled, Lewis argues — with barely 
concealed anxiety — that the political revolutions of the early twentieth century want to bring 
about a transformation of the human species: 
I can very briefly offer an interpretation of the great cluster of movements 
disrupting our time. The first thing to notice about this is its implacableness, 
inasmuch as no success will satisfy it. It is not any personality, nation, or even 
particular ruling class which is aimed at, but an entire human revaluation. That is, 
of course, why it is more like a religion than a rebellion. It is as though a mind 
had placed itself over against the world and formed the resolve to reconstitute the 
human idea itself. It is the whole of humanity this time that is at stake.353 
According to Miller, Lewis’s account of the political revaluation of the human ‘expresses his 
sense that nothing less than a species revolution, a fundamental change in human nature, was 
underway’ in the aftermath of WWI.354 The Childermass gives bodily form to this 
‘reconstitution’ of the human. Lewis’s text distorts human body beyond recognition, shaping it 
into forms that deviate from any identifiable ‘canon’ of the human.355 Thus, the body is the 
‘thing’ through which he conveys the historical endgame of the anthropocentric conception of 
‘Man’. For Lewis, the anthropocentric idea of the human subject is incompatible with the 
historical developments in science, technology, media, and politics associated with the rise of 
democratic modernity. While he wanted to commence a cultural revolution that would reinstate 
the sovereign thinking subject and create a new order for ‘Western Man’, Lewis’s fiction 
underlines the dissolution of this anthropocentric vision of the human for satirical purposes. 
What emerges from the pages of Lewis’s satire is a veritable onslaught of ridicule, invariably 
directed towards those categories and dispositions that have traditionally acted as placeholders 
of human exceptionalism: character, sentiment, interiority, desire. 
It is in The Childermass that Lewis most forcefully dramatizes the afterlife of the 
human subject. As Scott W. Klein has put it: ‘The Childermass […] questions whether the 
received Enlightenment idea of man is sufficient to explain social organisation in the age of 
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world wars’.356 I would add that The Childermass explores the comedic — and horrific — 
consequences of inhabiting a cosmos without ontological hierarchies while remaining invested 
in the privileged status of human subjectivity. It is in this novel’s fleshy yet curiously 
disembodied figures, I want to suggest, that Lewis most provocatively gives form to the 
reconstitution of the human form in a world without subjectivity. Set in the afterlife, Lewis’s 
‘theological science fiction’357 can be conceived in terms of a pun uttered by one of its principle 
characters, the demagogic Bailiff: ‘Heaven is […] a system of orthodox posthumous — if you 
will excuse the pun, post-human life’.358 In connecting the ‘posthumous’ and the ‘post-human,’ 
Lewis’s modernist fantasia creates a sense of human endings: an afterlife where narrative 
persists despite the dismantling of stable identities, the dislocation of bodies, the fragmentation 
of space, and above all the unmooring of time itself. The first half of the novel tracks the 
posthumous careers of two former school friends; a writer named Pullman (‘Pulley’) and an 
overgrown adolescent called Satterthwaite (‘Satters’). Initially, their struggle to adapt to the 
conditions of ‘post-human life’ is a matter of learning how to re-inhabit their bodies. The 
intellectual Pulley adapts to the hallucinatory flux of the afterlife with relative success, hence 
his body is characterised by self-discipline: ‘Its nerves are beneath its own orders’.359 
Conversely, spasms and other unintentional movements wrack the body of the infantile Satters: 
‘The usual typhonic symptoms continue. The front of the thick-set trunk is flung up and down 
in abrupt jumps, eructating with the fierce clockwork spasms of a dog with chorea’.360 It is 
important to note that these bodily convulsions not only express Satters’s physical 
discomposure; they also, and above all, situate the narrative in identifiable historical time. For 
whilst the strange autonomy of body parts in the novel contributes to a general condition of 
corporeal dislocation, the ‘shell-shock waggle’ of Satters’s precarious gait reminds us that this 
condition should be read with reference to World War One.361 Lewis situates the novel’s 
abstract world in historical time even as he withholds the mise-en-scène of a recognisable post-
war reality. Notice how fiercely he refuses any image of an entire, harmonious body when he 
reduces the corporeal frame to the ‘trunks and thighs of human figures’ or ‘torsos moving with 
bemused slowness’.362 Lewis’s satirical gaze thus dismembers and distorts the post-war male 
body: his is a sundering of corporeal unity that mirrors the breaking apart of coherent masculine 
selfhood.  
This ‘post-human’ fragmentation of the male body involves the reappearance of ‘pre-
human’ forms of life. As the pair embark on a journey towards the ‘Magnetic City’, their 
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progress is held back by an insistent and pervasive return of the animal in the form of bodily 
metamorphoses. At a certain point, Satters ‘crashes backwards: a prolonged mournful braying 
breaks out. Elbows and knees on high, he lies like a capsized quadruped, his face stamped out 
by his heavily planted paws’ (my italics).363 His backward falls signal not just falls into 
animality but the negation of well-defined form: he is ‘forced away backwards, sagging and 
open-mouthed’.364 Pulley and Satters frequently have no control over the form or composure of 
their bodies. Their animated corpses recurrently morph shape, size, gender, and species. As in 
Gustave Flaubert’s parade of monstrous beings in his Temptation of Saint Anthony (one of the 
main influences on Lewis’s text), chimerical figures fuse human and animal parts and thereby 
blur the distinction between fantasy and reality. The shape of their bodies responds to the 
animating forces of passion and desire, the uncontrolled feelings that convulse the flesh and 
discompose it. Pullman reflects upon the idea that excessive passion animalises the human 
body: ‘How dreadfully vulgar human beings can be made by all the passions […] They let 
themselves go, and presto they become the coarse animal girding away on the ground at our 
side’.365 In Lewis satirical takedown of Bergson, the ascendency of uncontrolled affects over 
self-restraint signifies the predominance of instinct over intelligence. As Jussi Parikka notes, 
‘Bergson insisted on seeing the mode of instinct not merely as an automated response a 
primitive animal (such as an insect) gives to a stimulus but in addition “discernment and 
attunement” to the animal’s environment’.366 In The Childermass, animal metamorphoses arise 
when Satters loses control of his passions: he becomes ‘an animal chaos, heaving and melting, 
restlessly adjusting himself to the tumpy uncompromising earth, thrusting up into him the sharp 
edges of its minerals’.367 Here, Satters collapse from the upright posture becomes a satirical 
dramatization of a Bergsonian ‘attunement’ to the contours of the environment. Bergsonian 
intuition is rewritten as a monstrous animalization of the human.  
The Childermass swarms with insect becomings: a ‘crawling energy’368 disturbs 
Satters’s body; his ‘[t]hick-tongued voice buzzes’ like a fly;369 and he also ‘contorts himself, 
establishing a vermiform rhythm between neck and waist’.370  As Parikka notes, 
‘metamorphosis marks for the majority of us a defining feature of “insect life”: transformation, 
development, and change’.371 Likewise, the protean fluidity of the pseudo-couple’s bodies — 
their switches between genders, their alterations in size and shape, their rapid shifts between 
youth and senescence — suggests a larval condition of metamorphosis. In marked contrast to 
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Bergson’s work, the transformational agencies that change the form of their larval bodies do 
not express the creative potential of life. If Bergson thought that ‘the past is the condition of 
every future’, then Lewis insisted that a future dependent on the past would inevitably be fixed 
and inert.372 For Bergson, ‘duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual 
elaboration of the absolutely new’.373 The metamorphoses of the ever-changing body performs 
the distortion of the human in a world that without moorings. Thus Pullman, ostensibly a more 
masculine figure than Satters, becomes “Miss Pullman”,374 “Nurse Pullman”,375 or even “a tart 
smart little governess”.376 This is perhaps a pastiche of Leopold Bloom’s gender switching in 
James Joyce’s Ulysses; but it is also possible to account for such appellations within the 
“masculinist” parameters of Lewis’s critical agenda in the 1920s, particularly his misogynistic, 
one-dimensional remarks concerning “feminisation”.377 In any case, Lewis’s most striking 
statement about gender is pertinent to the question of regressive technology. In The Art of Being 
Ruled, Lewis argues that masculine identity is contingent and always at risk of collapsing: 
Men were only made into “men” with great difficulty even in primitive society: 
the male is not naturally “a man” any more than the woman. He has to be propped 
up into that position with some ingenuity, and is always likely to collapse […] A 
man, then, is made, not born: and he is made, of course, with very great 
difficulty.378  
He goes on to write that as ‘active, erect, humane creatures [men] are in a constantly false 
position, and behaving in an abnormal way. They have to be pushed up to it […] and at the first 
real opportunity they collapse and are full length once more’.379 Masculinity, in this anti-
essentialist account, is no more than a regimen of bodily discipline and cultural habit As Victor 
Barac observes, the collapsibility of the male body Lewis describes in The Art of Being Ruled 
relates to debates about the “bio-cultural” determinants of bipedalism, “an important theme in 
the anthropological study of human evolution”.380 What is significant here is that Lewis 
attributes the upright gait of the species to cultural training rather than biological instinct; in 
doing so, he suggests that the vertical posture of the human is prey to the contingencies of social 
existence.381 The fact that Lewis presents masculinity as a technological contrivance that 
requires continuous effort to maintain seems to contradict his emphasis on technological 
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backwardness and ossification. However, the point I want to emphasis is that Lewis’s 
understanding of masculinity suggests that maintaining manhood requires continual exertion. 
Lewis phallic image of the ‘erect’ human suggests that uprightness is a product of forceful and 
strenuous activity. There is a masculinist vitalism underlying Lewis’s theory of gender which 
relegates femininity to the status of inert matter. As a result, his theory does not imply a linear 
movement from the horizontal to the vertical that remains stable and fixed; instead, he 
conceives of the rectitude of ‘Man’ as a reversible process. While the productive and energetic 
force required to ‘prop up’ the male suggests a form of gendered artifice, the threat of waning 
of productive and energetic life would entail an unmaking of male identity. In The Childermass, 
Lewis draws a connection between reversible masculinity and the reversibility of the machine. 
Notice for instance that Pulley makes a connection between their backward-facing orientation 
and mechanical reversibility: ‘Reversibility is the proof that the stage of perfection has been 
reached in machine-construction — it’s the same with us, in my opinion. Here we are going 
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CHAPTER TWO: MINA LOY: ATAVISM AND THE POSTHUMAN 
 
 
Introduction: Two Birth Scenes of the Modernist Body 
In this chapter I focus on the question of Mina Loy’s vitalism and how her treatment of life 
relates to contemporary posthumanist thought. I begin with an enquiry into Loy’s depictions of 
nonstandard bodies, and ask if they amount to a counter-normative critique of the regulated 
body of biopolitical modernity or, conversely, whether they are examples of the discourse of 
eugenic modernism. I consider how Loy’s ‘anarcho-maternalist’ feminism of the 1910s informs 
her presentation of the de-animated life of impaired bodies and how this in turn relates to her 
critique of Futurist biopolitics in general and the technological body in F. T. Marinetti’s futurist 
texts in particular.383 Next I evaluate the extent to which posthumanist theories of life are 
applicable to the work of modernist vitalists who engage with eugenicist aspirations for bodily 
improvement. This leads me to question the conclusions recently drawn by critics about the 
extent to which Loy’s modernism challenges retrograde attitudes to the anti-normative body. 
In addition, I address the limits of posthumanist theories of life that repeat the modernist 
inclination to present vitalism as a utopian democratic project that promises to perfect human 
life and achieve equality. My proposal is that we should be wary of this redemptive reading of 
life when examining modernist texts, especially when issues surrounding the representation of 
non-normative bodies are at stake.  As Joseph Valente has recently asserted, ‘[t]he image of 
disability in modernist literature is a highly mediated effect of the development of the regime 
of biopower over the course of the nineteenth century’.384 For this reason, modernist depictions 
of nonstandard bodies can work to undermine the democratic promise of political vitalism. The 
second section of this chapter studies Loy’s radical vision of the anomalous body in her novel 
Insel in order to consider her engagement with two different strains of the monstrous, and 
proposes that it contains a critique of the organicist affirmation of life found in her early work. 
I want to begin with two very different scenes of modernist parturition. The first occurs 
in Marinetti’s ‘The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism’ (1909), an inaugural document of the 
modernist avant-garde that holds a privileged place in influential scholarly accounts of 
modernism and the body. In Hal Foster’s Prosthetic Gods (2004)—his sweeping survey of the 
modernist body—the birthing of the futurist body occurs as a watershed moment in the history 
of modernism.385 Futurism’s founding statement declares the birth of the modernist body in all 
its hardened, ‘posthuman’ glory — at least this is the impression that emerges from Marinetti’s 
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programmatic claims in the manifesto. In order to sketch out an alternative history of the 
modernist body, however, I want to draw attention to another birth scene; it occurs in Mina 
Loy’s 1914 poem ‘Parturition’. Unlike the futurist manifesto this poem is not concerned with 
the coming to light of a new and invulnerable body. Rather, the focus of Loy’s poem is the 
maternal body: the processual, vulnerable body that exceeds its own boundaries and opens out 
towards birth, generation and life—but also towards otherness, decay and death. There is no 
mention in ‘Parturition’ of modern technology or the arrival of a posthuman future: nonetheless, 
in Loy’s poem the body of maternity is equally a body of modernity. Here, too, is a scene in 
which modernist self-making takes the form of fashioning a body in language.386 As we shall 
see, Marinetti and Loy also share a modernist investment in eugenicist notions of bodily 
improvement. Setting these two scenes of parturition besides one another allows for a 
reduplication of the birth of the modernist body that raises questions about origins and, more to 
the point, de-familiarises existing narratives about how modernism’s bodies took on their 
particular contours and dimensions. 
Futurism’s scene of parturition does not take place amidst doctors and swaddling bands, 
and there is strictly speaking neither father nor mother present at the birth; instead, it is 
technological modernity itself which delivers up the prosthetic body of modernism. As Peter 
Nicholls has put it: 
Where the decadents had been mesmerised by endings and by the miserable plight 
of the last scion, the Futurists know only those beginnings in which the self 
emerges new-born, without father, mother, past. The triumph of the mechanical 
over the natural thus encapsulates the capacity of the modern subject to experience 
himself as pure origin, as uncontaminated by tradition.387 
Responding to a moment when the relations of machine and organism, or the artificial and the 
natural, were undergoing radical transformation, Marinetti chose to affirm the mechanisation 
of biological life with zealous enthusiasm. In the Futurist manifesto, Marinetti narrates a scene 
of technological parturition in which the maternal body is presented as abject biological matter 
that is superseded by male parthenogenesis: 
O maternal ditch, almost full of muddy water! Fair factory drain! I gulped down 
your nourishing sludge; and I remembered the black breast of my Sudanese 
nurse… When I came up—torn, filthy, and stinking—from under the capsized 
car, I felt the white-hot iron of joy deliciously pass through my heart!388 
This scene of rebirth marks a transition from nature to culture, from biology to technology; the 
memory of the nurse’s breast is replaced in the present by the mechanical womb of the ‘capsized 
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car’, from which the new prosthetic body of modernism issues in a rapturous state of exaltation, 
‘the white-hot iron of joy’ as Marinetti puts it. 
Marinetti’s antipathy to female reproduction expresses itself most hyperbolically in his 
1909 novel, Mafarka the Futurist—a copy of which he promised to send to Loy at the outset of 
their affair.389 The climax of the narrative is Mafarka’s construction of his own son, a futurist 
rehashing of the myth of male autogenesis, connoting the usurpation of female reproduction by 
male artistry.390 Throughout Marinetti’s pre-war writing, he identifies the dichotomy of male 
and female with the Aristotelian distinction between form and matter.391 By usurping nature’s 
capacity for bestowing form, futurist techne reshapes feminised nature in its own masculine 
image. As Alex Goody has put it, the male futurist body is ‘technologically hardened’— once 
reinforced by technical prostheses, the stability of its masculine form is guaranteed.392 
Marinetti, on the other hand, debars women from the form-giving capacity of technics. Women 
are repeatedly depicted as formless matter: their shapeless bodies tending towards the decay of 
the rotting corpse, as indicated by the descriptuon of Mafarka’s brother’s fiancé as ‘scarlet 
pulp’.393 
Marinetti contended that the future of Italy depended on a renewal of the national 
body.394 The fantasy of the mechanical child is a pivotal element of the narrative of Mafarka 
the Futurist because it solves the ‘problem’ of imagining futurity in a world without women.395 
Technological birth not only excludes the female element from the body politic but makes 
biological inheritance obsolete. Mafarka weaves Futurist misogyny into the fabric of eugenics 
and Italian nationalism by proudly declaring that his ‘son’ Gazourmah is ‘handsome, and free 
of all the blemishes that come from the inefficient vulva and bias us to old age and death’.396 
Mafarka’s scion is a sui generis creation: Gazourmah’s constructed body, carved out of wood, 
definitively breaks with biological heredity. One of Marinetti’s intentions in Mafarka the 
Futurist—a polemical aim which it shares with ‘The Futurist Manifesto’ — is to construct an 
allegory of modernization in which fashioning a new body inaugurates a virile future. Thus, 
Mafarka’s monstrous child symbolises new vistas of modernity: the regeneration of the (Italian) 
body politic redistributes the limits of nature and technology. In short, Mafarka grafts together 
his posthuman son in order to create an invulnerable body. 
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Evan Mauro has sketched out the biopolitical significance of the Futurist myth of 
rebirth.397 Mafarka conducts a biopolitical project in narrative form, both in terms of Marinetti’s 
vision of the inviolable body of the mechanical son and his showcasing of the mass death of the 
depersonalized colonial other.398 With reference to Achille Mbembe’s notion of ‘necropolitics’, 
Mauro argues that the life of Futurist Man depends upon mass death in the colonial space of 
Marinetti’s orientalist version of Africa:  
At work in this contrast between Gazourmah’s regeneration and an omnipresent, 
environmental death, inscribed on both the landscape and the aggregated bodies 
that inhabit it, is the specific transformation that biopolitics takes in the colony: 
as Achille Mbembe has argued, the biopolitical project of managing and 
optimizing an aggregated concept of life is inverted when it encounters the 
colonial territory, where the European legal order is suspended. The result is a 
dynamic where European citizenship is defined and maintained against the 
disposability and “living death” of non-Europeans […].399  
In addition to the necropolitics of colonialism, Mafarka also exhibits the contradictions in the 
Futurist biopolitics of gender. I propose that the contradictory aspects Marinetti’s fantasies of 
rebirth re-inscribe the constitutive ambivalence of maternity and reproduction in the modern 
biopolitical State. To enquire into this gendered biopolitics it is necessary to raise several 
questions.  What were the Futurist politics of reproductive life? What was to be the role of the 
mother in proliferating the life of the population? Was Futurism’s politicization of reproductive 
life inclined towards a politics of death that we can identify as Fascist? According to Penelope 
Deutscher, ‘women can only be represented as the thanatopolitical threat to the future of the 
population or community insofar as their reproductive lives have come to count in new ways 
politically and biopolitically’.400 She explains that ‘[i]insofar as she has become principle of 
life (of both child and nation), the mother also becomes a potentially destructive figure’.401  
Marinetti’s biopolitics of national rebirth would not have made sense without the politicisation 
of maternity and reproductive life in the biopolitical State. Yet, Marinetti disavows the 
vitalizing role that maternity assumes in national palingenesis by associating biological 
reproduction with decadence and death. Indeed, his ‘Futurist Address’ confirms the centrality 
of ‘the thanatopoliticization of reproduction and maternity’402 in Futurist biopolitics when he 
denounces ‘all the blemishes that come from the inefficient vulva and bias us to old age and 
death!’.403 Maternity becomes synonymous with death, and women are therefore put to death 
to foster the health of Futurist Man. The mass killing of women in Mafarka indicates the 
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biopolitical framing of the potential threat posed by tainted reproduction to the life of the nation. 
As Deutscher puts it:  
Reproduction is, then, not just the principle of life against which perverse and race 
vilified subjects have been opposed, nor the interest to which they have been 
subordinated. Just as much is reproduction a principle of death and its protagonists 
those of antilife.404  
In the Futurist address at the beginning of Mafarka, Marinetti calls the offspring of these figures 
of ‘antilife’ the ‘miserable sons of the vulva’.405 And yet, the Futurist adoption of the trope of 
the ‘male mother’ reveals the flip-side of the politicisation of reproductive life. While his 
devitalization of women’s bodies is, I want to suggest, a representation of ‘the emergence of 
“woman” as a segment of harm, impeded growth (of child and of people), mortality, [and] 
death’,406 Marinetti’s recurrent use of the trope of the ‘male mother’ inscribes his attempts to 
annex the animating role assigned to maternity as the ‘principle of life (of both child and 
nation)’.407 This explains why Marinetti identifies Futurist Man with motherhood: 
In the name of human Pride that we adore, I tell you that the hour is near when 
men with broad foreheads and chins of steel will give birth prodigiously, by one 
effort of flaring will, to giants infallible in action…I tell you that the mind of man 
is an unpractised ovary…It is we who are the first to impregnate it.408 
Marinetti announces that Mafarka ‘is polyphonic. It is at once a lyric poem, an epic, an 
adventure novel and a play’.409 It is significant that, in this manifesto statement, Marinetti 
presents Mafarka as a chimerical mixture of literary forms, a monstrous transgression of generic 
boundaries. He further explains that this textual monster satisfies his ‘pride as creator’.410 
Animating the monster is a primal scene in Marinetti’s work because it entails overcoming the 
natural order of sexual reproduction and replacing the formlessness of the feminized body with 
sculpted forms that mix heterogeneous kinds of bodies. The manufacture of the child by the 
male will is not a form of reproduction that fits within the naturalized biopolitical order of 
maternity and reproduction. As Marinetti demonstrates in Mafarka, the Futurist trope of 
animating of the monster concerns the transfer of the principle of life from the organic realm 
(coded as female) to the realm of art and techne (coded as male): 
 Mafarka moved on into the darkness of the bridal chamber. All around, on the 
tops of pillars, strove unmoving granite sphinxes and chimeras, dangled in their 
braided beards. Mafarka thought he could hear an ominous grunting from their 
expanded lungs, for these sculpted monsters were heaving at the lever of their 
crooked paws, striving to wrench themselves free of their shackles in order to leap 
forward.411  
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This animation of the monstrous statue mirrors the animation of matter by Futurist ‘men with 
broad foreheads and chins of steel [who] will give birth prodigiously’.412 Marinetti lays down 
a simple formula: the animation of inorganic matter parallels the monstrous birth of Futurist 
‘Man’. Barbara Spackman has suggested that ‘the struggling of the statues’ signifies ‘the 
struggle of form to emerge from matter’.413 She argues that Marinetti’s ‘obsession’ with 
‘deanimating whatever is animate and gendered female, turning mother into matter, and with 
becoming a “male mother”’ follows a well-worn path that ‘is already internal to the project of 
idealism’.414 While I find Spackman’s account of the gender politics of Mafarka compelling, I 
disagree to some extent with her attribution of the gendered violence of the text to its rerunning 
of the tropes of philosophical idealism. For one thing, this interpretation underplays the explicit 
vitalism of Marinetti’s biopolitical project and the centrality of ‘life’ to his fantasies of male 
birth.415 Spackman’s claim that Mafarka mimics that misogynistic metaphysics of idealism in 
which ‘woman supplies matter, and man supplies form’ diminishes fundamental role of the élan 
vital or vital impulse in his masculinist biopolitics. I would argue that an alternative reading, 
one more attuned to the consanguineous relations of modernist vitalism and biopolitics, comes 
closer to the crux of Marinetti’s tropes of the monstrous child and the passive mother-as-matter. 
The major point to stress here is that idealism remains wedded to a fixed conception of ‘Man’, 
whilst Marinetti ties a biopolitical project invested in the renewal of life (gendered male) to the 
Bergsonian aspiration to move ‘beyond the human condition’.416 Indeed, the sexual violence of 
Mafarka can be said to operate as a hyperbolic re-scripting of the tacit gendered assumptions 
informing Bergson’s dichotomy between life and matter. Rebecca Hill has argued that 
Bergson’s élan vital is implicitly gendered as a ‘seminal’ male force that invades passive matter 
in order to endow it with movement and creativity.417 She explains that 
it is not just a case of exceeding the problematic elevation of “Man” in 
Bergsonism. The privilege conferred upon life as movement of ascent and 
creation and the simultaneous degradation of matter as an obstacle of the progress 
of life also needs to called into question. This violent hierarchy articulates a kind 
of phallic anthropomorphism, where matter is the stuff of dead weight that 
paternal life must impregnate or overcome in order to incarnate animate beings 
and introduce free acts into the world.418 
As Claire Colebrook (alluding to Hill) writes in The Death of the Posthuman, Bergson’s 
affirmation of life is ‘set against a static norm of man and yet would affirm all those masculine 
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figures of active, forceful, creative, incisive, penetrative, and productive life that have marked 
gendered thinking’.419 Images of the monstrous in Marinetti point to his Futurist desire to 
overcome the ‘static norm of man’. Yet, it is not possible to divorce this deterritorialization of 
‘Man’ from an expansion of the masculine subject beyond the limits of the human to include 
animals, machines, and even matter itself. The Über-misogynistic brand of posthumanism that 
emerges from Marinetti’s work nourishes itself on the fantasy of extending the borders of the 
forceful masculine subject indefinitely.420 In Marinetti’s hands, the injunction to ‘be matter’ 
voiced by the devil in Flaubert’s Temptation is reinscribed as the injunction to colonize matter. 
A pantheistic fusion of self and world becomes a grand project of cosmic narcissism: ‘Our will 
must come out of us so as to take hold of matter and change it to our fancy. So we can shape 
everything around us and endlessly renew the face of the earth’.421 Enthralled by the prospect 
of infinite power, Gazourmah enslaves the sun in a campaign of universal tyranny: ‘ “O Sun, I 
come to you as a ruler who cannot be assuaged by dominion over the world […] I want to 
follow you in your course, to enter the continents of fire where you go to bask in flame, O sun, 
my slave’.422 To ‘enter’ the sun and take possession of cosmic forces, Gazourmah must ascend 
above the inert corpses that merge into the feminised landscape of Marinetti’s Africa. Futurist 
monstrosity is a dynamic force that overcomes the human, but this dynamism depends on the 
degradation of women as formless matter. For Marinetti, the effacement of boundaries between 
different orders of being is the precondition for the universalization of male sovereignty. Statues 
of chimeras and animalized techno-bodies do not signify formlessness but an excess of form 
that springs from the form-giving capacity of Futurist life. Bergson’s eloquent paeans to the 
‘continuous creation of unforeseeable form’ become the war-cries of Gazourmah’s 
weaponisation of the vital impulse.423 
This brief sketch of Marinetti’s Über-misogynist birth scene allows us to recognise the 
satiric intent of Loy’s engagement with tropes of maternity and reproduction. A number of 
critics have argued that Loy fashioned the maternal body as a knowing affront to the Fascist 
body politics of Italian futurism. Tim Armstrong, for instance, suggests that her poem 
‘Parturition’ (1914) ‘inaugurates a poetics of self-abandonment, in contrast to the rigid 
protection of bodily integrity characteristic of Futurism’. 424 In Loy’s poem, the boundaries of 
the body are dissolved amidst the fluctuations of the maternal body in the process of childbirth: 
I am the centre 
Of a circle of pain 
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Exceeding its boundaries in all directions425 
But ‘Parturition’ is also a poem about the modernist body’s capacity to give form to itself—to 
transform itself in poetic figures—fashioning its own shape and substance. Whereas Marinetti 
explores the limits of the human in terms of the ‘body/machine complex’, Loy attends here to 
meeting points of the human and the animal: 
Rises from the subconscious 
Impression of a cat 
With blind kittens 
Among her legs 
Same undulating life-stir 
I am that cat 426 
There is something potentially transformative about the speaker’s identification with various 
forms of ‘low’ biological life—from a ‘small animal carcass’ to ‘insects’—at least insofar as 
such articulations of interspecies identity thwart the desire to erect ontological boundaries 
between different species.427 ‘Parturition’ challenges the anthropocentric tendency to exclude 
animality from personhood (here the lyric ‘I’ can refer to a cat), as well as the desire to expel 
abject animal matter in order to constitute the ‘clean and proper body’ of humanity:428 
Rises from the sub-conscious 
Impression of small animal carcass 
Covered with blue-bottles 
— Epicurean — 
And through the insects 
Waves the same undulation of living 
Death 
Life 
I am knowing 
All about 
Unfolding429 
Loy’s enjambed phrase ‘living/Death’ suggests that organic decay brings forth new forms of 
vitality. For Loy the promise of the new does not await the avant-garde artist who renounces 
the frailties of corporeality; instead, the potentiality of the modernist body is perhaps to be 
located in the embryonic, the unformed, in the undoing of those categorical distinctions which 
separate the developed from the undeveloped, the finished from the unfinished. 
The maternal body in ‘Parturition’ manifests its fluidity through its intimate relations with a 
host of animal others. Static forms give way to difference, species lose their morphological 
fixity: the stirring of ‘incipient life’ arises from the paradoxical extension and effacement of the 
                                                 
425 Mina Loy, ‘Parturition’ in The Lost Lunar Baedeker, ed. by Roger Conover (Manchester: 
Carcanet, 1997), 4-8 (p. 4). 
426Ibid, p. 7, 
427 Ibid. 
428 I take the phrase ‘clean and proper body’ from Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on 
Abjection, trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 72. 
429 Loy, ‘Parturition’, p. 7. 
69 
 
individual lyric persona. In this way, Loy’s speaker showcases how the maternal body meshes 
into the whole of ‘LIFE’ like a single tree whose roots form a subterranean web with an entire 
forest. Her Bergsonian notion of ‘incipient life’ undoes the idea that static forms of life 
transcend the incomplete process of evolution.430 What is more, Loy’s speaker affirms the 
continuity of the human and the nonhuman but not the hereditary continuity of filiation, so that 
the long dureé of evolutionary time has priority over the bounded time of human finitude and 
the mother-child relationship. Importantly, this undoing of both the monadic individual and the 
parent-child bond does not lead to impersonal formlessness. Instead, the poem’s various bodily 
forms remain open to creative deformation, to changing their co-ordinates and contours as they 
are traversed by flux. In accordance with Bergson’s élan vital, the continual metamorphoses of 
Loy’s bodily forms suggest the creativity of life itself.431 In ‘Aphorisms on Futurism’ (1914), 
Loy’s earliest known statement on aesthetics, she writes: ‘In pressing the material to derive its 
essence, matter becomes deformed’.432 This suggests that the artist’s involvement with matter 
is in akin to creative deformation, and these remarks bear on Loy’s modernist experimentation 
with poetic form. Carolyn Burke has aptly suggested that Loy’s manipulation of the poetic line 
in ‘Parturition’ mimics ‘the rhythmic contractions and expansions of labour’.433 Building on 
these insights, Joshua Schuster argues that ‘Loy’s poem is in effect a riposte to Bergson’s 
inability to imagine the specific tensions surrounding the role of women in the furtherance of 
any evolutionary agenda’.434 In order to restore the women to the centre of the process of 
evolution, then, Loy reclaims the idea of blurring the dichotomy between self and world for the 
maternal body, inverting the terms of Marinetti’s fantasies of the colonization of matter. 
Without denying Loy’s feminist affirmation of corporeal fluidity, I want to suggest that critics 
have overstressed the disparity between Marinetti and Loy’s respective articulations of the 
modernist body. Both Marinetti and Loy produced work invested in eugenicist notions of bodily 
improvement in the 1910s; Loy’s poetics of the maternal body is not simply an ‘oppositional’ 
aesthetic that critiques futurist body politics. Instead, Loy simultaneously ridicules Marinetti’s 
prosthetic modernism while remaining attached to a eugenicist desire for the parturition of an 
improved species body. 
It is not surprising that critics have focused on ‘Parturition’ when attempting to align 
Loy’s work with materialist strands of contemporary posthumanism. In many ways, Loy’s 
poem is emblematic of the modernist break with Cartesian subjectivity and the affirmation of 
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embodied subject enmeshed in a network of material relations with human and nonhuman 
entities. Alex Goody makes it plain that ‘Parturition’ anticipates currents of posthumanist 
thought by submitting the poem to a Spinozist-Bergsonian-Deleuzean reading: 
The embodied consciousness of the parturient woman, in the intensity of the 
experience, extends into the particles and flows of life. The words “extensity” and 
“intension” are key here: intension is both the intensity of the experience (content) 
and the intensional force (form) of the embodied consciousness, while the 
extensity is the spatial expansion of the experience (including that of the poetic 
line as its length fluctuates in the poem) and also the comprehensive dispersion of 
subjectivity as the One disintegrates into “sensation” and “forces”.435 
This Deleuze-inspired readings suggest that Loy’s speaker situates herself at the birth of a new 
ecological conception of the human subject derived from Bergson’s philosophy of life. In his 
recent Bergson: Thinking Beyond the Human Condition (2018), Keith Ansell-Pearson writes: 
Today, Bergson’s lesson contains a valuable ecological lesson. He articulates 
what we might call, with some hesitation, a ‘post-human’ mode of perception. 
This consists in the attempt to think from the perspective of life itself and to do so 
in a way which challenges anthropocentrism and necessitates what Rosi Braidotti 
has called an ‘eco-philosophy of becoming’. The posthuman has a number of 
senses and I intend it in the sense of denoting, as Braidotti puts it, a ‘sensibility 
that aims at overcoming anthropocentrism’.436 
In contrast to Marinetti’s anthropocentric vision of Futurist Man, the birth scene in Loy’s 
‘Parturition’ does not entail bringing about new relations with technology or the exclusion of 
zoē. According to Claire Colebrook, the ‘Bergsonsian appeal to life beyond the bounds of the 
already formed organism is in line with a broader modernist critique of the figure of man as a 
Cartesian subject. Anti-Cartesianism generally has proceeded by appealing affirmatively — 
against man — to qualities that had once been figured as feminine but that now seem to offer 
ways of thinking about the vital order as such’.437 The appeals to life in ‘Parturition’ perform 
an ecstatic affirmation of evolution conceived as an undifferentiated flux not confined within 
bounded organisms. Indeed, it would be hard to find a modernist poem that more vividly 
demonstrates this anti-Cartesian dynamic, whereby qualities formerly considered feminine 
within a patriarchal order of representation come to stand for creative becoming of life itself. 
The futurity of Loy’s work, on this reading, resides in its affirmation of the ascendency of life’s 
impersonal and material flows over the enclosed body of the individualised human subject. 
Appealing to animality, fluid matter, generation, decay, and female embodiment entails 
an abandonment of the transcendent (male) lyric subject. In many ways, ‘Parturition’ seems to 
anticipate Rosi Braidotti’s posthumanist call to accelerate ‘the displacement of 
anthropocentrism and the recognition of transspecies solidarity on the basis of our being in this 
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together — environmentally based, embodied, embedded, and in symbiosis’.438 Posthumanism 
not only denies the privilege of the human with regard to its animal others; it reframes linear 
models of evolution that relegate animality to the pre-history of the human species. ‘Parturition’ 
is Loy’s affirmation of an alternative temporality which inverts linear time in order to achieve 
the undoing of the human/animal divide. The erosion of a clear-cut distinction between the past 
and the present is one of Bergson’s primary contributions to philosophy, and one which had a 
profound influence on the anti-positivist temporalities that feature in the canonical works of 
modernist art and literature. As Donna V. Jones puts it: ‘For Bergson, […] the duration in which 
our consciousness exists freely has the past, present, and future interpenetrate in violation of 
the canons of logic’.439 In Loy’s ‘Parturition’, the present tense (‘I am that cat’) telescopes 
extensive models of linear time into an intensive becoming which defies the principle of non-
contradiction. This transspecies becoming, furthermore, enacts what Elizabeth Grosz, after 
Nietzsche, calls ‘the possibility of being untimely’, which entails nonlinear exchanges between 
past, present, and future.440 Indeed, for Grosz, the yet-to-be-animated life of the future receives 
its most vital impetus from the past: ‘The task’, she claims, ‘is to make elements of this past 
live again, to be reenergized through their untimely or anachronistic recall in the present’.441 
We find a similar call for the ‘untimely or anachronistic’ in Loy’s speaker’s identification with 
insect and feline forms of life. Indeed, one might say that the speaker’s ‘becoming-world’ — 
her ecological extension ‘beyond the human condition’, in Bergson’s terms—does not occur in 
a singular instant but rather activates the interpenetration of diverse temporalities.442 Life is 
creative because it is atavistic. Bergson underlined the continuity between the present and the 
origin of the vital impulse: 
Where, then, does the vital principle of the individual begin or end? Gradually we 
shall be carried further and further back up to the individual’s remotest ancestors: 
we shall find him solidary with that little mass of protoplasmic jelly which is 
probably at the root of the genealogical tree of life. Being, to a certain extent, one 
with this primitive ancestor, he is also solidary with all that descends from that 
ancestor in divergent directions.443 
Loy follows Bergson in her conviction that movement precedes (and exceeds) form. Creativity 
is about reactivating the initial generative force of life. Yet, if Loy sketches out a ‘biocentred 
egalitarianism’, in which ‘Zoe as a generative vitality is a major transversal force that cuts 
across and connects previously segmented domains’, then how does this affirmation of extra-
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human ‘Life’ as an impersonal, immanent, and ongoing process relate to her explicit investment 
in the biological improvement of the human?444 
Joshua Schuster has argued that Loy’s vitalism subverts the deterministic conceptions 
of the living body that enable biopolitical control over life. For Schuster, critics who read Loy’s 
engagement with life through the lens of biopolitics imply ‘that only power and control truly 
define the connection of biology to politics. This determinist model of control itself seems 
questionable if we begin to consider how, after Darwin and Bergson, the organic can be 
understood as contingent, constantly variable, and tending towards complexity’.445 In contrast, 
I propose that there is a link between Loy’s Bergsonian commitment to viewing life as a 
contingent, variable, and complex process and her commitment to normative ideas of 
‘improving’ the life of the human species. As Claire Colebrook aptly suggests, ‘Loy’s futurism 
[…] seems torn between radical in-humanism […] and seemingly parochial humanism’.446 In 
the next section of this chapter, I propose that Loy’s ‘parochial humanism’ asserts itself in her 
depictions of the immobility of the nonstandard body. 
 
Loy, Eugenics and the Impaired Body in Modernism 
Loy’s vitalism emerged as part of the interwoven group of modernist discourses about ‘life’ 
that included the eugenicist ideologies circulating around 1910. Loy’s most explicit eugenicist 
statement appears in her ‘Feminist Manifesto’, written in 1914 but unpublished during her 
lifetime. ‘Each woman of superior intelligence,’ Loy argues, ‘should realize her race-
responsibility, in producing children in adequate proportion to the unfit or degenerate members 
of her sex’.447 With the examples of Loy’s affirmations of ‘Life’ in mind we can read these 
statements as confirming Claire Colebrook’s concerns about ‘the underlying sexual (and racial) 
normativity that any privileging of life would entail’.448  According to Paul Peppis, Loy’s 
manifesto is a document of ‘insurgent and eugenic feminism’.449 Peppis has demonstrated the 
extent to which Loy’s adoption of the vocabulary of racial science, particularly in the context 
of a feminist manifesto, is typical of the rhetoric deployed in the pioneering work of pre-war 
progressives. Indeed, some of the most prominent and radical feminists of the period were 
public supporters of racial science. Rachel Carroll explains that ‘leading female proponents of 
birth control and planned parenthood, such as Margaret Sanger and Marie Stopes, were […] 
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advocates of eugenics’.450 For Michael Davidson, Loy’s eugenicist proclivities of the 1910s are 
related to the ‘unholy alliance between a progressive woman’s movement and retrograde 
racialist theories [that] troubled the utopian promises of social and cultural innovation during 
the first decades of the twentieth century’.451 As we will see, Loy’s depictions of non-normative 
embodiment vitiate her subversive sexual politics. 
Like many of her radical feminist contemporaries Loy enlists eugenicist ideas in the 
service of political reform; this accounts for the fact that her depictions of non-normate bodies 
are imbricated with her ‘anarcho-maternalist’ polemics. 452 In the poem ‘Babies in Hospital’ 
(1916), for instance, Loy figures the politics of the so-called ‘sex-war’ through disability; here, 
the poem’s truncated lines reflect the truncated limbs of a disabled child: 
Small Elena 
Of shrunken limbs 




Woman-smile of your mother 
Scatter it on the unseen 
Tuberculous453  
Loy artfully manipulates bodily and poetic scale in order to generate the poem’s central political 
conceit: the inverse proportions of Elena’s ‘shrunken limbs’ and ‘ample sex’ creates a 
juxtaposition of disability and femininity. This is also the case with the interplay between 
visible femininity (‘Woman-smile’) and invisible disease (‘unseen/Tuberculous’). The poem’s 
sardonic conflation of congenital impairment with the visible signs of womanhood points to the 
oblique relationship between Loy’s work of the 1910s and the rhetorical strategies of 
progressive era feminism. Loy’s poem uses tropes of disability to satirise what she elsewhere 
labels the ‘fashions in lechery’ of the male avant-garde.454 She lampoons relations between the 
genders when the congenitally disabled Elena becomes an object of desire for an infant male 
with ‘only a broken leg’.455 With our tongues firmly in our cheeks, we might choose to view 
this male child as a miniature Marinetti: 
 Already gallant 
You smooth the mackintosh 
For Elena to sit beside you’.456  
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Here, Loy’s use of disability to satirise gender relations indicates how interwoven her critique 
of masculine modernism is with her depiction of non-normative bodies. 
Since the child born of the ‘anarcho-maternalist’ mother in ‘Parturition’ is absent from 
the poem, it is striking that infant figures in Loy’s early verse are frequently diseased, disabled, 
and even monstrous.457 In song IV of her signature poem “Songs to Joannes” (1917), a 
‘dysgenic’ family are presented as monstrous amalgamations of human and animal: 
Once in a mezzanine 
The starry ceiling 
Vaulted an unimaginable family 
Bird-like abortions 
With human throats458  
The human-animal hybridity of these figures is suggestive of the pre-Enlightenment conception 
of monstrosity as ‘the mixture of two species’.459 This would seem to suggest something like 
the carnivalesque overturning of the natural order that is promised by Loy’s invocation of ‘Pig 
Cupid’ in the poems opening lines.460 However, the anomalous boundary-crossing forms of this 
‘unimaginable family’ cannot be dissociated from intimations of their ‘dysgenic’ heredity. 
From this perspective, the monstrous family in song IV are not a subversive articulation of 
species hybridity, nor are they figurations of a carnivalesque inversion of the great chain of 
being; instead, as Peppis has argued, they are a troubling example of Loy’s eugenic 
modernism.461 Peppis contends that the family’s ‘freakish’ bodies are evidence of Loy’s 
‘lingering investments in the eugenic feminism and free-loving maternalism championed in 
“Feminist Manifesto” and “Parturition”’.462 As we will see, images of ‘dysgenic’ parturition 
appear frequently in Loy’s poems of the period. 
In her 1917 poem ‘Human Cylinders’, Loy enquires into the intersection of 
mechanization, sexual intercourse and ‘dysgenic’ procreation. The poem’s satiric dramatization 
of the passionless, monotonous coupling of sexless automatons has little in common with the 
triumphalist zeal of Marinetti’s male birth scenes. These machine-like figures are ‘simplified’ 
beings, mere ‘human cylinders/ Revolving in the enervating dust’; and their insentient 
intercourse is depicted as sheer automatism—nothing more than ‘the lucid rush-together of 
automatons’.463 If ‘[t]he fear of “becoming automaton” haunts Bergson’s thought from 
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beginning to end’,464 then Loy stiches together Bergson’s disdain for the mechanization of life 
with the eugenicist language of atavism and biological inefficiency. In stark contrast to the 
‘prosthetic gods’ that are the product of the futurist myth of autogenesis, the child produced by 
techno-maternity in ‘Human Cylinders’ is an atavistic creature from way down the Darwinian 
evolutionary scale:  
One little whining beast 
Whose longing 
Is to slink back to the antediluvian burrow.465  
While we might expect that the union of the marionette-like ‘human cylinders’ would produce 
a similarly mechanical offspring, Loy subverts the expectations of her avant-garde readership 
by connecting technological-maternity to the narrative of atavistic regression. Loy’s ‘dysgenic’ 
child—much like the ‘rough beast’ in W.B. Yeats’s ‘The Second Coming’—presages both an 
atavistic return to a primordial past and the dismal prospect of a degenerate future. In relating 
the mechanical and bestial, the posthuman and the primeval, Loy satirises the futurist faith in 
the technological transcendence of the frailties of the human body. However, she articulates her 
critique of Marinetti’s prosthetic modernism in eugenicist terms not unlike those employed in 
the Futurist’s own explosive texts. Though Loy’s carnal poetics rebuts the rigid Futurist body 
in favour of a form of corporeality with permeable boundaries, she depicts the arrested 
development of the regressive ‘beast’ child as a static form of being which falls short of her 
Bergsonian commitment to the fluidity of life as creative evolution. 
‘Human Cylinders’ defies Futurist biopolitics insofar as it disconnects technology from 
the vitalizing function it performs in Marinetti’s manifesto. In that text, Marinetti imagines 
atavistic life as a transformative and vitalizing force. According to Timothy Campbell, ‘the 
modernism that emerges in the “Founding Manifesto of Futurism” cannot be separated from a 
biologization of and animalization of life that qualifies it as primitive and as originating in an 
earlier period’.466 Loy’s dramatization of the technological birth of the ‘weak’ atavistic child 
mocks Marinetti’s desire ‘to revive a primordial, mythic past in an animalization of the 
Futurist’.467 Unlike Cesare Lombroso and Max Nordau, Marinetti assert that animality belongs 
to the future of the human species, although his proposal for an ‘animalization of the Futurist’ 
does not involve a return to a pre-technological condition but rather a revitalised form of life 
made possible by the machine: ‘technology offers the possibility of vitalizing — by animalizing 
— vast swathes of the population’.468 Campbell argues that ‘the technological sovereign 
evinced in the manifesto creates a milieu, in which life becomes not only more vital, but also 
in which a kind of politicized zoology can be practiced on technologically produced 
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populations’.469 A reactivation of the past, in Marinetti’s vision of rebirth, would initiate a form 
of nonlinear progress incompatible with the unidirectional temporality of liberal modernity. For 
example, Lucia Re notes that ‘Marinetti and other representatives of the Italian futurist avant-
garde consistently invoked barbarism as a distinctive futurist trait’.470 This reframing of 
barbarism as a marker of futurity draws on Nietzsche’s call for a ‘new barbarian’ that would 
act as a regenerative counter-force to European decline.471 In The Gay Science, Nietzsche 
asserts that he ‘prefer[s] to understand the rare human beings of an age as suddenly appearing, 
late ghosts of past cultures and their powers: as atavisms of a people and its mores’.472 In this 
narrative of regeneration-though-atavism Marinetti’s affirmation of the vitalized life of Futurist 
Man contrasts with his ‘indictment of the sick, the infirm, and the dying’.473 
If the distinction between human and nonhuman does not hold in posthumanist thought 
then the same is true of the distinction between life and death. Within a Deleuzean framework, 
death cannot be the opposite of life because ‘the germinality of the most destructive inclinations 
and tendencies’ ensures that death is never the end.474 Those incompatible terms, life and death, 
turn out to be reciprocal forces, so that each affords a stimulus for the other. Life says yes to 
death; death answers life in the same way. As regards Loy, Dancy Mason has argued for a 
posthumanist reading of her poetry based on ‘Loy’s undoing of the life/death boundary and her 
revaluation of feminine identity away from Cartesian binaries’.475 One doubt that emerges in 
this context is that Braidotti’s monistic posthumanism cannot account for the idea that there are 
two kinds of life, and thus two kinds of death. Campbell states, ‘Not only will Marinetti 
counterpoise, therefore, one life to another, the Futurist to the passatista, in whom the power 
of death meets no resistance, and in whom the potential power of life has been weakened by 
dominance of death’.476 What counts here is that Marinetti and Loy subscribe to a dichotomy 
of vital and anti-vital bodies informed by Bergson’s dualistic conception of life and matter. 
In Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (2012), Mel Y. Chen 
explains that ‘matter that is considered insensate, immobile, deathly, or otherwise “wrong” 
animates cultural life in important ways’.477 She further posits that ‘animacy is implicated in 
political questions of power and the recognition of different subjects, as well as ostensible 
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objects’.478 The inanimation of the passatista (‘il moribunde’) in Marinetti’s Futurist Manifesto 
finds echoes in Loy’s poetry of the 1910s and 1920s. Maren Tova Linett argues that ‘modernism 
[…] acts to enforce normalcy. In what might be called its eugenic mode, it associates disability 
with aspects of human being it disdains’.479 Throughout her 1910s poems Loy characterises 
paralysis and bodily impairment as obstacles halting the dynamism of becoming and female 
sexuality. In ‘Italian Pictures’, the Futurist dichotomy between British inertia and Italian 
dynamism maps into the distinction between passive nature and vitalized technology. On one 
side, Loy links British codes of femininity to the motionlessness of vegetal life through the 
juxtaposition of ‘Old lady sitting still’ with ‘Pine trees standing quite still’.480 On the other, her 
Futurist description of the ‘passionate Italian life-traffic/ Throbbing the street’ combines vital 
and affective intensities with technological dynamism.481 Loy’s desire to affirm ‘Life’ is the 
flip-side of her dramatization of the ‘invalid’ body as an inert object — a ‘bronchitis-kettle’.482 
Like the ‘dwellers in Gout and Paralysis’483 mocked in the prologue to Mafarka the Futurist 
— who are frozen in immobility and unreceptive to the vitalizing energies of technology —  
Loy’s ageing woman suffers from a ‘prolonged invalidism’ and ‘Rigor Mortis’, and her ‘hobby 
of collecting death beds’ is an ‘insult’ to ‘Life’.484 The Bergsonian dichotomy of mobile life 
and immobile matter accounts for Loy’s presentation of fertility and dynamism as mutually 
reinforcing categories: movement signals biological futurity; paralysis signals inanimation and 
the infertility of old age and death. In contrast to the ‘hips’ of Italian women which ‘sway/ 
Among the crawling children they produce’, Loy’s emphasis on the immobility of a 
‘consumptive’ with a ‘broken’ wheelchair aligns impairment with stasis.485  
 
Insel and the Limits of Modernist Monstrosity 
Insel is a novel in which the body’s materiality spills into the foreground. The plot centres on 
the relationship between Mrs Jones, the narrator, and Insel, an artist. Insel inhabits an 
ontological limbo in which, relieved from the duty of making sense, he flickers between 
animation and inanimation, the human and the nonhuman. In defiance of the image-
management that sustains the mythos of avant-garde authenticity, Insel flaunts his fakery by re-
enacting the plots of Franz Kafka’s fiction and passing them of as biographical episodes. As we 
shall see, the novel’s modernist technique receives it (de)formative impetus from the 
ungraspable nature of Insel’s body. His inability to manage his corporeal being mainly 
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manifests itself in his constant hunger, which Jones assuages by providing him with food, 
although she also provides him shelter and nurses him when his weakened body succumbs to 
illness. Hence Jones and Insel’s relationship is structured around the caregiver/invalid, 
health/sickness and normal/abnormal dichotomies. Needless to say, Insel’s ‘aberrant’ body 
places him firmly on the ‘abnormal’ side of these binaries. The opening passage relates an 
anecdote about Insel that incorporates madness, hunger, sexual desire, disgust, and bodily 
decay: 
The first I heard of Insel was the story of a madman, more or less a surrealist 
painter, who, although he had nothing to eat, was hoping to sell a picture to buy a 
set of false teeth. He wanted, he said, to go to the bordel but feared to disgust a 
prostitute with a mouthful of roots.486 
Loy’s narrative begins by acknowledging that Insel’s body is lacking certain parts — namely, 
his teeth. There are certain parallels between Insel’s chronic deterioration and the progress (such 
as it is) of the novel’s plot; as the narrative unfolds, the decomposition and decay of Insel’s 
body becomes more pronounced, and vital parts of the starving artist’s anatomy appear to be 
missing. Jones describes how Insel ‘clutched his feeble fist where his stomach should have 
been’: a corporeal absence which hearkens back to Insel’s toothless gums and gestures towards 
further bodily diminishments.487 Throughout, Insel’s body is riddled with absences and gaps, 
forestalling any attempt to imagine his body as a coherent whole. It is as if Insel’s physique is 
constantly involved in the process of its own dissolution, raising the weakness and vulnerability 
of his body to the level of an ontological inconsistency that inheres in the fabric of his being. 
The most remarkable manifestations of Insel’s weakness involve the attenuation of his 
bodily materiality. Loy registers the lessening or deterioration of Insel’s body in two ways: first, 
as I have already noted, through the repeated references to Insel’s starvation and declining 
health; and secondly, through the various descriptions of his body as vanishing. Thus, Insel’s 
corporeal vulnerability is not explicable simply in terms of the ‘pathological’ weakness caused 
by his emaciation; instead, it is inextricably related to his ontological inconsistency, the 
diminishment in being that haunts his movements within the novel. Jones explains at one point 
that Insel ‘had so weakened, become so transparent’, as if his body is on the verge of 
disappearing.488 Throughout the novel in fact, Insel renders the distinction between materiality 
and immateriality whimsically defunct, as Jones explains to him: 
You always give me the impression that you are not there. Sometimes you have 
no inside; sometimes no outside, and never enough of anything to entirely 
materialize. Like a quicksand, when one looks at you whatever one gets a glimpse 
of you immediately rush up from your own depths to snatch. Your way of being 
alive is a sequence of disappearances.489 
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His tendency to vanish, however, only makes him all the more fascinating—and, paradoxically, 
all the more present: ‘The less [Insel] seemed to be “there,” the more he spilled into the 
unknown, the more clearly I apprehended him’.490 At times, Insel’s vanishing body seems 
evacuated of substantiality: a ghost or shadow of living matter. Nonetheless, at other times he 
is presented as a starving ‘degenerate’, his ‘preposterously emaciated’ body wasting away from 
lack of nourishment.491 This dialectic of ghostly de-materialisation and uncontained carnality 
animates Insel’s self-cancelling materializations throughout the text. The question is: how are 
we to understand Insel’s vacillation between phantom disembodiment and monstrous 
materiality? What exactly is at stake—aesthetically, historically, politically—in Loy’s 
depiction of the decorporealisation of this ‘degenerate’ artist? 
Loy’s novelistic engendering of Insel’s body is no mere exercise in modernist 
formalism, nor does it simply rehearse her earlier investments in eugenicist notions of bodily 
improvement. Crucial here is that Loy wrote the novel in the years when the Nazi’s stepped up 
their attacks against so-called ‘degenerate’ artists in the 1930s. I want to suggest that the 
historical situation of exile and oppression experienced by German modernists underlies Loy’s 
presentation of Insel’s monstrosity. It is striking that Insel’s ‘aberrant’ body overlaps with Nazi 
codifications of the ‘degenerate’ body.492 Insel is an ex-convict, a morphine addict, physically 
deformed, emaciated, and possibly insane; he ekes out his rootless existence haunting the 
modern metropolis in the company of prostitutes and other ‘undesirables’. Furthermore, Insel’s 
devotion to the writings of Franz Kafka perhaps aligns him with Jewishness, as Christine Walter 
has suggested.493 Nazi definitions of the ‘degenerate’ included a range of ‘types’ deemed 
inferior to the Aryan ideal of bodily health. Needless to say, the Nazi eugenic programme of 
racial decontamination was premised upon the exclusion and extermination of people with 
physical and cognitive disabilities, as well as Jews, Gypsies, and criminals. Tobin Siebers 
usefully summarises the imbrication of ‘degeneracy’ and aesthetics that began in the fin-de-
siècle and reached a horrifying denouement in Nazi Germany: 
Degeneration was principally a medical term before Max Nordau applied it to art. 
It referred throughout the last half of the nineteenth century to individuals who 
departed from norms of human health because of genetic difference, sexual habits 
deemed excessive, or shattered nerves. The Nazis applied these distinctions as 
standards of aesthetic beauty. Degenerate art deserved its name in their view 
because it included bodily deformities, bloodshot eyes, feebleness, and signs of 
nervous exhaustion—all disabling conditions supposedly brought about by racial 
impurity or the stress of modern life. Jews, homosexuals, and criminals were 
automatically assumed to be biologically inferior, and the Nazis found evidence 
of their assumptions in the physical traits given to people in works of modern art.494 
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A number of the events and characters in Insel are traceable to Loy’s friendship between 1933 
and 1936 with the German painter Richard Oelze, an artist then working on the outskirts of the 
Surrealist avant-garde. Like many German modernists, Oelze left his native land for Paris in 
1933, the year the Nazi party took power.495Not insignificantly, this was also the year that the 
Schreckenskammern der Kunst (Horror Chamber of Art) gave the first exhibition of so-called 
‘degenerate art’ in Germany.496 This was followed by the notorious ‘Degenerate Art’ exhibition 
in 1937, which gathered together thousands of artworks—including classic works of 
Expressionism, Dada, and Surrealism. The exhibition was replete with modernist artworks 
depicting bodies that deviate from the ‘healthy’ neoclassical physiques synonymous with Nazi 
aesthetics.  In the context of the 1930s, then, the ambiguous relation of Insel’s ‘degenerate’ 
body to disappearance and death is highly contentious. After all, the Degenerate Art exhibition 
instituted a violent economy of display and disappearance: the artworks exhibited on the walls 
of the gallery featured precisely the kinds of bodies which the Nazis wanted to make disappear 
from the German Reich. 
Insel grants monstrosity a very different political significance than that which it has in 
Loy’s eugenicist modernism of the 1910s. In spite of his degeneracy, Insel’s body nonetheless 
evades any attempt to pin down the aetiology of his degenerate characteristics. It is the very 
indeterminacy of Insel’s monstrosity that generates its challenge to eugenics and 
degenerationist discourses of heredity. By declining to become fully present, Insel refuses (or 
fails) to comply with those forms of exposure which seek to capture ‘degeneracy’ as a fixed 
biological attribute. Jones tells us that Insel does ‘not give a fig for heredity’, and his refusal of 
biological determinism is also registered at the level of Loy’s narrative form.497 Insel’s 
monstrosity is as much a result of his ungraspable bodily form as it is any of his particular 
attribute. He is variously described as ‘pathetically maimed’;498 as ‘an embryonic mind locked 
in a dilapidated structure’;499 as ‘pretty repulsive’;500 as ‘a skull with ligaments attached’;501 as 
‘so emaciated that from the waist down he looked like a stork on one leg’;502 as a ‘human 
wreck’;503 and as a ‘bloodless carcass’ with hands that are ‘unpleasantly embryonic’. 504 This 
cursory index of Insel’s monstrosity gives a clear indication of the extent to which his body 
deviates from socio-cultural, biological and ontological norms. It is particularly noteworthy that 
he is described in terms of the embryonic and the posthumous—as germinating and as 
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decomposing—mixing the most fundamental categories by which we organise beings into the 
quick and the dead. Indeed, just as Loy combines materiality and immateriality in her depiction 
of Insel’s body, so life and death shade into one another in the novel. It seems that Insel’s body 
refuses to stay on either side of the dichotomy of the animate and inanimate: he is ‘monster 
made from dead flesh’.505 Jones also compares Insel to ‘a dead man who should vomit himself 
back into life’.506 This horrific image of revitalization is paradoxical: vomiting can connote a 
rejection of life insofar as it is a visceral refusal of the nourishment necessary for organic 
survival; more, this undecidable oscillation between death and life recalls Julia Kristeva’s 
definition of the abject as ‘what disturbs identity, system, order, What does not respect 
boundaries, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite’.507 Insel’s 
repulsive anatomy manifests a corresponding disregard for taxonomic boundaries. Consider his 
monstrous hands: 
Insel […] had fearsome hands, narrow, and pallid like his face, with a hard, square 
ossification towards the base of the back, and then so compressed as if driving an 
instrument against some great resistance […] But out of [an] atavistic base his 
hands grew into the new sensibility of a younger generation, in his case excessive; 
his fingers clung together like a kind of pulpoid antennae, seemingly inert in their 
superfine sensibility, being aquiver with such miniscule vibrations they scarcely 
needed to move—fingers almost alarmingly fresh and pink for extremities of that 
bloodless carcass, the idle digits of some pampered daughter […] All the same there 
was something unpleasantly embryonic about them. I had never seen anything that 
gave this impression of the cruel difficulty of coming apart since, in my babyhood, I 
had watched a freak in Barnum’s circus unjoin the ominous limpness of the legs of 
his undeveloped twin.508  
Insel’s hands are atavistically strong and aristocratically refined, male and female, embryonic 
and decadent. They also embody the intersection of monstrosity and artistic production that Loy 
explores in the novel. His hands are both a tool by which he brings his monstrous designs into 
the world and the fleshy embodiment of his own monstrous deterioration. They are 
embryonically unformed but also a means for bringing forth the embryonic forms of his art. 
Insel’s art is composed of a radically inhuman vision of life that exceeds the closure of the 
monadic body. Jones makes it clear that Insel’s ‘elementals’ do not conform to stable, ordered 
conceptions of life. His anomalous body becomes an insect, or a ‘foetid’ tree trunk with 
luminescent bark.509 These metamorphoses are not limited to organic life, but include his 
transformation into air and other intangible atmospheric forces. Insel is composed of ‘mists of 
choas’,510 ‘procreational chaotic vapour,511 ‘electric emissions’,512 and even ‘spectral 
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spermatozoa’.513 He radiates a ‘host of elementals’514 and atmospheric forces ‘carried by the 
air’.515 Becoming a spectral substance or an ‘elemental mist’ involves replacing the bounded 
individual body with fluid materialities that have no conclusive form.516 In contrast to Loy’s 
earlier investment in the eugenic progress of the human species, this ‘vibratory flux’ is resistant 
to anthropocentric ideas of the divinization of the human animal.517 The essence of these visions 
is their atavistic reversal of linear or progressive ideas of evolution, their recurring display of 
primordial forms of life engendered by retrogression. Insel’s lyrical paeans to life forms that 
are germinal, inhuman, and aleatory imply a desire to escape human orders of classification. 
And Jones’s resolve to conceive ‘incipient form’ stirs surreal visions of proliferating life.518 In 
other words, Insel charts out the primordial life that Claire Colebrook and Jami Weinstein 
describe as ‘life before life, pre- or protolife, or a kind of wild, “savage” life before it was reined 
in by the constraints of humanism’.519 To make contact with this ‘protolife’, Jones must ‘forget’ 
existing forms, and even become formless herself. Loss of form is the impetus for the creation 
of form. 
Insel appeals to conflicting paradigms of the living dead. It does not require excessive 
critical acumen to notice Insel’s resemblance to the figures of 1930s cinematic horror. At one 
point Jones even suggests that Insel audition for the part of a monster in a horror film.520  While 
the novel does contains a reference to William Seabrooks’s The Magic Island (1927), which 
introduced the Haitian zombii to international readers, Sarah Hayden has noted that ‘in one 
second-draft (typed) copy of the manuscript, Loy pencilled in the word “zombie.” In so doing, 
she designates him as a being that is alike in every respect to a human that is devoid of 
consciousness’.521 In The Magic Island, Seabrook explains that ‘[t]he zombie, they say, is a 
soulless human corpse, still dead, but taken from the grave and endowed by sorcery with a 
mechanical semblance of life — it is a dead body which is made to walk and act as if it were 
alive’.522 If Insel’s vacillations between the material and the ethereal constitute an anamorphic 
doubling of the monstrous, then he also fuses two different figures of the living dead: the spectre 
and the zombie. As Jeffrey Jerome Cohen explains: ‘Whereas a ghost is a “soul without a body,” 
the zombie (according to Zora Neale Hurston in her seminal account of folklore in Haiti) is a 
body deprived of a soul’.523 By combining the zombie and the spectre, Insel blurs the dichotomy 
                                                 
513 Ibid, p. 150. 
514 Ibid, p. 151. 
515 Ibid, p. 116. 
516 Ibid, p. 122. 
517 Ibid, p. 76. 
518 Ibid, p. 20. 
519 Colebrook and Weinstein, ‘Introduction’, p. 3.  
520 Loy, Insel, p. 57. 
521 Hayden, Curious Disciplines, p. 199.  
522 William Seabrook qtd. in Roger Luckhurst, Zombies: A Cultural History (London: Reaktion 
Books, 2016), p. 32.  
523 Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, ‘Grey: A Zombie Ecology’ in Zombie Theory: A Reader, ed. by Sarah 
Juliet Lauro (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017), 381-394 (p. 383).   
83 
 
between these contrasting ontologies of the undead. Deanimated (or ‘soulless’) bodies co-exist 
alongside spectral (or disembodied) presences. Loy’s conjuring of Insel’s bodily oscillations 
make sure that the material and the immaterial are indistinguishable. The chiasmus between the 
solid matter of soulless flesh and the spectral transmission of nonsolid, ethereal substances finds 
expression in the distance between the ‘fallible pulp’524 of his corpse-body and the ‘electric 
emissions’ of his Strahlen. Loy does not divorce the soulless bodies of the horror genre from 
their ghostly counterparts.525 Instead of positing the zombie and the spectre as opposing figures 
of the living dead, she dramatizes the intermingling of decomposing flesh and ethereal matter 
within a material continuum in a state of continuous flux. This continuum of the undead that 
extends from the zombie to the spectre amalgamates the distinctive monstrosities of the horror 
genre. According to Anna Powell, in horror films ‘[b]odies without souls have non-human life 
of their own, and spirits without their former bodies have become-ethereal’.526 Insel’s 
participation in the realms of the living dead would seem to deny him any access to the germinal 
forces of growth or generation. Yet in Insel, decomposing flesh, fragmented bodies, and 
degenerate artists showcase the creativity of that which we assume to belong outside the context 
of the living. 
In Insel, the co-presence of past, present, and future invites us to imagine various ways 
of tracing the ties between degeneracy, innovation, and the question of (aesthetic and bodily) 
form. Insel belongs to that counter-current in degeneration theory that ‘assumes and valorizes 
the different, the dissimilar, and the abnormal inasmuch as they are innovative and 
transformative aspects of reality’.527 If we regard Insel’s metamorphoses as expressions of a 
generative force that annuls the preservation of (human) form, then his deformity seem to affirm 
the monstrosity of becoming other-than-human. In Insel, degeneration is a generative process: 
for example, Jones tells Insel that his monstrous condition is ‘not pathological — only 
unprecedented’.528  All the discourses which conceive the degenerate body as anti-vital would 
necessarily fail to account for this inhuman agency. Exceeding the human form, degenerating 
life makes possible an inhuman resurgence of the élan vital. At the same time, however, Insel’s 
zombie body seems closer to a form of living death which constrains the emergence of the new. 
Zombies are effigies of improper survival or animation ‘out of place’; the living cadaver is only 
a remainder, or leftover, of the rational subject or person.529 
The spectral tradition that leaves its trace in Insel derives from the Surrealist lineage of 
the ghostly, which, as Katherine Conley has shown, originated in the eighteenth century Gothic 
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literature, and drew inspiration from mesmerism, spiritualism, and psychoanalysis.530 
According to Conley, ‘with their appropriation of spiritualist automatism the young surrealists 
transformed the ghosts that practitioners of spiritualism sought to conjure into ephemeral forces 
within the unconscious mind’.531 Spiritualism was concerned above all with the possibility of 
communication between the living and dead. And yet, the anti-materialist focus of spiritualism 
did not preclude its influence on late nineteenth-century science. Founded in England in 1882, 
the Society for Psychical Research (SPS) 
believed the paranormal must be investigated using scientific methods, and 
demonstrated their commitment by exposing the fraudulent character of table-
rapping, ectoplasm, spirit photography, letters materializing from mysterious 
mahatmas and the like.532  
F.W. Myers, one of the original members of the SPS, composed a study of the paranormal 
entitled Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death (1903), which Loy discussed in a 
letter with her friend Mabel Dodge.533 While he grounded his studies in the aspiration to prove 
the immorality of the human individual, Myers was convinced that ‘the life of the mind mostly 
goes on without conscious awareness’.534 The paradox here is that the human personality lacks 
the unity of individual selfhood even while it is alive, which seems to be incompatible with 
Myers’ hopes for the survival of personhood.535 For Myers, ‘[h]uman personality was itself a 
kind of ghost, as systematically elusive as the apparitions that were the objects of Myers’ many 
years of work in psychical research’.536 The ‘subliminal self’, that hidden kernel of the person, 
remains opaque to the individual, despite being the fundamental core of human identity: 
The idea of a threshold (limen, Schwelle) of consciousness; — of a level above which 
sensation or thought must rise before it can enter into our conscious life;  — is a simply 
and familiar one. The word subliminal — meaning ‘beneath that threshold’ — has 
already been used to define those sensations which are too weak to be individually 
recognized. I propose to extend the meaning of that term, so as to cover all that takes 
place beneath the ordinary threshold, or say, if preferred, outside the ordinary margin 
of consciousness…I feel bound to speak of a subliminal or ultra-marginal 
consciousness, — a consciousness which was shall see, for instance, uttering or 
writing sentences quite as complex and coherent as the supraliminal consciousness 
could make them.537 
While Myers asserted that the obscure workings of the ‘subliminal self’ unlocked ‘abilities not 
normally available to the conscious personality, such as telepathy and clairvoyance’,538 the 
surrealists’  
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embrace of automatism signalled a desire to explore the fundamentally ghostly 
experience of opening oneself up to whatever might be hidden with the psyche, 
intentionally putting oneself into a trance state in order to access otherwise 
repressed thoughts, words, and images buried in the unconscious mind.539  
Surrealism’s attraction to the latent ghostliness of the psyche gave rise to ‘the double nature of 
surrealist perception’.540 Conley explains that ‘anamorphosis functions well as a visual 
paradigm for this doubleness because of the way Surrealism purports to harness both our 
conscious and unconscious minds’.541 Anamorphosis entails doubling. It not only involves 
seeing an image, an object, a body, or a landscape twice, but seeing it one way the first time, 
and then another way the second time.542 This visual ‘double take’, Conley shows us, was at 
the heart of what she calls ‘Surrealist ghostliness’: 
Surrealist anamorphosis varies a great deal, from actual anamorphic paintings by 
Dalí, in which two concurrent images overlap, to much more subtle examples 
where there are only hints of a double image embedded in the work, such as in 
Miller’s Egyptian landscapes. Anamorphosis is widely present in surrealist art and 
represents the strongest evidence of Surrealist ghostliness as a unifying 
phenomenon throughout the movement.543 
While Conley implies that the doubleness of anamorphosis always refers to the human psyche, 
I want to extend her remarks beyond the mental realm to include nonhuman life. 
Insel partakes of the Surrealist fascination with anamorphosis to produce a doubling of the 
monstrous. The first type of monstrosity is composed of static, misshapen, decayed, inert, and 
pathological life that seems to be destined for dissolution. This breed of the monstrous lacks 
vitality and signifies absence of form. It was, furthermore, this version of monstrosity that 
provoked cultural anxieties about the formlessness and inertia of the degenerate body. While 
Nazi aesthetics favoured enclosed bodies and organic form, in Hitler’s Germany the modernist 
fascination with fractured and unfinished form became synonymous with death and the 
destruction of organic wholeness.544 In line with this eugenicist understanding of the anomalous 
body, Insel appears to be a mishmash of dead appendages that fail to cohere. For example, we 
not only learn that his ‘pate [is] too loosely attached’, but also ‘that the gutter of his upper lip 
was interrupted by a seam’.545  In contrast, the second type of monstrosity has a more positive 
valence in that it generates an excess of life and continual metamorphosis. The emphasis on the 
generation of new forms in this second strain of monstrosity aligns it with a Romantic 
conception of the monstrous rooted in philosophical vitalism. According to Denise Gigante: 
[T]he aesthetic category of monstrosity intersected with natural philosophy 
around the turn of the nineteenth century, transforming the idea of the monster as 
a static deformity or collection of poorly assembled parts into a distinctly 
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Romantic, vitalist conception of monstrosity as too much life. Linked to process 
rather than product, to formative power rather than malformation, the objectified 
monster gave way to a monstrous vitality that was frightening in its assertion of 
unbounded purpose.546 
Insel’s metamorphoses transmute the static human form to merge with animals, machines, and 
monsters in a relentless process of transformation. Monstrosity generates new and unforeseen 
forms of life, often by melding together human and non-mammalian bodies. For example, Loy 
describes Insel as a bird ‘growing feathers’,547 as ‘insectile’,548 and even ‘a creature of the deep 
sea’.549 In addition, Insel’s propensity to ‘gnaw’ on bones with ‘bestial satisfaction’550 
contribute to the impression that he is ‘no longer human’.551  As well as inhabiting an interstitial 
zone between the human and the animal, Insel vacillates between movement and stasis, animacy 
and inanimacy, generation and degeneration. But his oscillation between ‘arrested 
development’552 and ‘unusual liveliness’ does not mean that the animate and the inanimate are 
stable categories in the novel553 If Jones sees Insel’s decomposing body as an ‘animate cadaver’, 
then this nod to the living dead erodes the divide between animate and inanimate matter.554 
Insel is posthumous. Lifeless. Decomposing. Yet, in spite of his status as a figure shrouded in 
death, he is nonetheless a medium who (like cinematic medium) ‘animates the inanimate’.555 
As Deleuze writes of Expressionist horror in Cinema 1, 
automata, robots and puppets are no longer mechanisms […] but somnambulists, 
zombies or golems who express the intensity of […] non-organic life: not simply 
Wegener’s The Golem, but also the Gothic horror film of around 1930, for 
example Whale’s Frankenstein and The Bride of Frankenstein and Halperin’s 
White Zombie.556   
In addition to being a living corpse, Insel imbues his visions of unformed life with an anomalous 
vitality. Eugene Thacker’s claim that ‘the living dead are driven by an ambiguous vitalism’ 
captures this strange coalescence of the life and nonlife.557 Indeed, for Jones these images of 
primordial life give access to ‘the procreational chaotic vapour in which all things may begin 
to grow’.558 The association between Insel’s decay and the recurrent tropes of emergent life 
reveal a prodigious entanglement of vitality and death. Life and nonlife do not exist as mutually 
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exclusive states of matter. Rather, they blend and intermingle in material flows of generation 
and degeneration. Insel’s living body becomes inanimate, whilst his corpse displays an ability 
to vitalize images of ‘germinal life’.559 
Insel enquires into Surrealism’s abiding fascination with the monstrous. It was 
Lautréamont’s Les Chants de Maldoror (1868) that encouraged Surrealist attempts to marry 
occultism with aesthetic monstrosity.560 Eugene Thacker posits that Malodoror manifests ‘a 
focus on the form-giving and form-generating process in life-forms, taken to its extreme in 
many cases of monstrous metamorphoses’.561 He sketches out two aesthetic styles of 
metamorphosis — anamorphosis and ‘amorphosis’ (or formlessness) — undergone by the 
novel’s monstrous parade of human and animal bodies.562 Thacker sketches out the various 
meanings of anamorphosis: 
Although the term anamorphosis has a double meaning — in art history to 
describe a visual illusion, and in biology to describe the development of 
embryonic life forms — I am using the term to describe a breaking-down of form 
and the forming capacity. Thus ana - morphosis is, in this sense, a literal layering 
of negative form (ana — “back,” “reversion,” “again”) on top of existing form 
(morphē, “shape,” “form”).563 
Taken together, these definitions provide an entry point into Loy’s evident fascination with 
ideas of turning backwards (or reversion), embryonic life, and the undoing of form. As we have 
seen in Insel, Loy links atavism or evolutionary regression to the Surrealist trope of 
anamorphosis or the blurring of representational forms. If we turn from Insel to her earlier poem 
sequence ‘Songs to Joannes’, we find the juxtaposition of ‘dorsal vertebrae’ with the lines  
turning 
To the antipodean 
and Form     a blurr.564 
In this fragment, backwardness (‘dorsal vertebrae’) implies the distorting of living form by 
turning evolution in the diametrically opposed direction (‘turning/ To the antipodean’). As in 
Insel, Loy’s imagines poetic making in ‘Songs to Joannes’ as a creative turn towards new forms 
that is also a return or reversion; and the idea of ‘turning’ connotes, in this context, a trope 
(Greek treipein, ‘to turn’) or poetic figure, which invites us to read Loy’s language as a poetics 
of anamorphosis or, in Thacker’s phrase, ‘a breaking-down of form’.565 While the blank space 
between ‘Form’ and ‘a blurr’ provides a visual analogy for the negation of poetic form, the 
hybrid creatures in ‘Songs to Joannes’ suggest a blurring of the distinction between the animals, 
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humans, and gods. For example, her invocation of the monstrous ‘Pig Cupid’ turns animality 
into divinity, the ideal into the abject, spirit into matter. This hybridization of different bodies 
erodes ontological hierarchies, and topples the masterful human subject from its privileged 
perch, at least insofar as this privilege rests on the idea of ‘Man’ as the sole possessor of 
language and signification. Loy’s speaker not only invokes animalised deities, but also calls on 
the impersonal forces of evolution to deprive the human of language: 
Unnatural selection 
Breed such sons and daughters 
As shall jibber at each other 
Unintepretable cryptonyms.566  
The phrase ‘Unnatural selection’, which negates the Darwinian natural order with intimations 
of the monstrous, is the addressee of the speaker’s request for a posterity without language. We 
can read this entreaty to evolutionary forces as a call to annihilate human voice and 
signification:  
Give them some way of braying brassily 
For a caressive calling 
Or to homophonous hiccoughs.567 
 Here, Loy implies a yearning for the ascendency of animal noise (‘braying’) over human 
speech. This self-cancelling plea for the silencing of human language is the flip-side of the 
speaker’s sardonic anti-humanism: ‘Proto-plasm was raving mad/ Evolving us’.568 
While we have seen that Insel’s body is anamorphic in the aesthetic sense of that term, 
I want to suggest that the embryonic forms that he projects from his body showcase 
anamorphous specimens of biological life. Changes in perspective produce the morphing of his 
species identity, such that he becomes ‘hauntingly animal, even insectile’ when ‘cut into 
profile’.569 Meanwhile, his fusion of the atavistic and embryonic suggests that he has not 
developed into an enclosed organism: he is ‘made of the first quivering jelly under the sun’.570 
Both in aesthetic and in biological terms, Loy often characterises Insel’s anamorphic body as 
self-differentiating and unfinished. Her fascination with the idea of inconclusive form accounts 
for her focus on questions of life, generation, mobility, and unfinished form in her 
interpretations of the work her modernist peers. Indeed, if we keep in our minds the various 
meanings of the term charted by Thacker, I propose that Loy construed modernist aesthetics as 
fundamentally anamorphic in their aesthetic orientation. She explains that modern artists 
deform the ‘coherence of our customary vision’ in order to ‘liberate art from […] a final 
pictorial conclusion’.571 For Loy, the ‘elemental form’ of Constantin Brancusi’s sculpture 
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suggests ‘form arrested at its very inception — a certain élan of primary embodiment’.572 Loy’s 
sense of the implication of the embryonic and the elemental articulates a turning away from 
completed form back towards the more primordial forces that shape matter. 
Is Insel a vitalist text? There are good reasons for answering this question affirmatively. 
First, Jones makes it plain she disapproves of Insel’s penchant for automatism — and (if we 
discount the biographical fallacy for a moment) this antipathy to automatism dovetails with 
Loy’s Bergsonism and her ensuing disdain for mechanized life.  Needless to say, automatism 
was the formative device in the Surrealist agon with the conscious will and agency of the 
rational mind. The act of artistic creation becomes machine-like, reduced to an automatic reflex, 
which means in turn that the agency of the creative ‘genius’ becomes unnecessary to artistic 
production, so that intentional artistry can be relinquished altogether (or held at bay by inducing 
altered states of consciousness).573 Second, to read Insel is to find oneself absorbed in a 
hallucinatory realm of continual metamorphosis characterised by an abundance of different 
forms of life. For this reason, Loy’s lyrical images of pre-human (or even pre-organic) life 
forms links with Thacker’s notion of a ‘metaphysics of generosity and prodigality, a vitalist 
ontology of fecund forms that constantly proliferate, generate, and change’.574 Thacker aligns 
this vitalist ontology of the monstrous with Gaston Bachelard’s remarks about the ‘bliss of 
metamorphosis’ in his 1939 study Lautréamont. Thacker explains that Bachelard avows the 
creativity, the unceasing novelty, of living forms; more, his reading implies that the ‘bliss of 
metamorphosis […] is ultimately recognized to be as spiritual as it is animal’.575 But if Jones 
wants to ‘forget all form’ in order to ‘draw forth incipient form’, then this production of form 
involves a nullification of existing forms.576 Jones’s desire to bring forth ‘incipient form’, which 
springs from a Bergsonian investment in ‘germinal life’, implies that creativity resides in a kind 
of aesthetic amnesia rather than active creation. 
There is no reason to doubt that Loy’s vitalist disdain for the mechanical motivates her 
dramatization of Insel’s automatisms. But is her engagement with media technologies 
compatible with a Bergsonian critique of the machine in general and cinema in particular? My 
proposal is that Loy’s sensitivity to the nonhuman perceptual worlds of new broadcast media 
has implications for our enquiry into her backward-facing posthumanism. Jussi Parikka 
explains that ‘the broadcasting era since the 1910s and 1920s envisioned the dead, the absent 
and the alien on the wires, or the oceanic waves of wireless transmission’.577 As Parikka further 
suggests: 
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[R]emove the supposedly fantastic or otherworldly, and see what is revealed: a 
world of social relations, networks of communication, and new worlds of media 
technologies which are non-human in the deep scientific sense of reaching out to 
non-phenomenological worlds of electricity, electromagnetic fields and, a bit later 
for example, quantum physics.578 
 
In Insel, Loy imagines media technologies as machines that give humans access to inhuman 
perceptions. In contrast to Bergson’s anti-cinematic prejudice in Creative Evolution, Loy 
invites us to participate in the durations showcased by Insel’s ‘conjurative power of projecting 
images’.579 When Insel becomes a medium transmitting images of atavistic life that open up 
durations beyond the human, Jones commends these cinematic projections; they enable her to 
feel ‘the profound relief of the acute celerity rhythm that perpetually disintegrated me as I got 
out of watching a film in slow motion’.580 Film conveys rhythmic intensities that ‘disintegrate’ 
the enclosed body by exposing it to inhuman speeds and slownesses. Insel showcases the 
transformational and monstrous potentialities that reside in the body-as-medium. To this end, 
Loy conceives the ‘soft machine’ as a living, changing thing by demonstrating its ability to 
animate primordial forms of life as they begin to take shape.581 Insel is a medium in that his 
machine body enables Jones to perceive flickering, insubstantial images of elemental life. The 
‘vibratory flux’ of this embryonic growth eludes definitive form .582 It precedes individuation. 
With respect to broadcast technologies, Jones does not distinguish human 
communication (between herself and Insel) from nonhuman transmissions (between media 
technologies). As Andrew Gaedtke puts it: ‘Jones experiences a magnetic pull towards Insel, a 
strange attraction that is coded in the discourses of modern mechanization and new media’.583 
Thus, she describes her intimate relationship with Insel in terms of the ‘telepathic, televisionary 
machinery of our reciprocity’.584 This identification of human bodies with media technologies 
is most evident in descriptions of Insel as a dead medium: ‘It was remarkable that he should 
succeed in speaking — his body no longer showed much signs of life. He might be using this 
body […] as a medium, from a distance to which his fluctuant spirit had been temporarily 
released’.585 Insel’s nonliving body receives signals automatically like a machine, not a human 
mind.  As Gaedtke notes, ‘Myers’ work offers a likely source for the notion that the delusional 
experiences of Insel and Jones might not simply be pathological breakdowns, but signal new 
forms of sensitivity to questions of being and time’.586  As John Durham Peters observes, ‘The 
spiritualist quest for communiqués from distant minds sent together with the shrinkage of the 
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notion of communication to mean intentional sendings among humans’.587 Insel, in his role as 
medium, then, does not fulfil the nineteenth-century spiritualist conception of the medium as a 
‘person communicating meanings that were distinctly human — that is, located in minds 
(whether incarnate or not’).588 The important distinction here is that between an anthropocentric 
idea of the medium as a living human receiving messages dead humans on the one hand and a 
non-anthropocentric idea of medium as ‘an element, environment, or vehicle in the middle of 
things’ on the other.589 While the spiritualist medium reanimated the human voices of the dead, 
Insel is akin to a non-anthropocentric medium that relays elemental forces from the inhuman 
environment. 
Since the monstrous body is often attributed with qualities of both weakness and 
recalcitrance—such as vulnerability and disobedience to the disciplinary measures that enforce 
the norms of the modern body—it therefore deviates from the masculinist ideal of 
Enlightenment subjectivity. Monstrosity is in this sense the repressed double of modernity’s 
fantasies of the autonomous subject. Yet this repressed body returns in Loy’s grotesque 
modernism; not as an unassimilable ‘other’ to be derided or venerated but as an integral (though 
anxiety-producing) component of the self which demands recognition. Towards the end of 
Insel, Jones comes precariously close to relinquishing her separate and bounded identity, taking 
on several of Insel’s anomalous characteristics. Her increasing fragility mirrors the monstrous 
incongruities of Insel’s body, as if her very being has become contaminated by his troubling 
ambiguity. For instance, Jones feels that she has become ‘unnatural’ and that her body is 
fragmenting: ‘my confines broke down’, she explains, ‘I lost contour’. 590  In surrendering her 
self-identical form, Jones becomes a doppelgänger of her monstrous companion. She describes 
how the day after having ‘unexpectedly disintegrated’ her face ‘looked “destroyed” like 
Insel’s’.591 Here, Jones’s transformation into the monstrous other becomes explicit: the 
caregiver/invalid and normal/abnormal binaries that have thus far structured their relationship 
have completely broken down. In this way, Loy acknowledges the fragility of the boundary 
between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ embodiment. Ultimately, Jones decides to break off her 
relationship with Insel in order to halt her own physical and mental deterioration. Insel’s 
arrested artistic development — as well as his inability to manage his own body — symbolise 
the stasis and inertia that Jones must repudiate in order to move forward with her own artistic 
production. Finally then, Jones rejects Insel’s aesthetics of monstrosity; yet I would suggest that 
an aesthetics of monstrosity is partly recuperated in Loy’s novelistic form. After all, Insel’s 
oscillations between different aesthetic registers — sublime transcendence and abject 
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materiality, fascination and repulsion, creativity and stasis — certainly parallels the instability 
of Insel’s monstrous body. 
 
The Monster in the Mirror: ‘Chiffon Velours’ and ‘An Aged Woman’ 
In a similar way to Insel, some of Loy’s late poems explore the possibility that the 
normal/abnormal division is destabilised by the vulnerability of all bodily existence. Her 1947 
poem ‘Chiffon Velours’, for instance, describes the diminishing physique of an ageing woman 
in terms that echo Insel’s disappearing body: The site of vanished breasts/ Is marked by a safety 
pin.592 If breasts are a synecdoche for the fecundity of the female reproductive body, the pins 
described in Loy’s poem mark the absence of the bodily generativity celebrated in ‘Parturition’; 
indeed, the past tense of ‘vanished’ suggests an indelible disappearance of the maternal body’s 
productivity. It is as if absence defines the body of the woman described in the poem. Like 
Insel, the vanishing body depicted in ‘Chiffon Velours’ belongs to a figure considered abject 
by normative culture; ageing and socially disqualified, she exists beyond the limits of the 
acceptable body as defined by the consumerist culture she is marginalised by (but which she 
nonetheless precariously inhabits). Moreover, her precarious hold on life — or proximity to 
death — compounds her abjection. Loy describes her as ‘sere’, which suggests both wrinkled 
skin and the withering of organic matter. Strikingly, however, the poem suggests that the 
speaker may not be as different from this abject figure as we might expect: 
Trimmed with one sudden burst 
of flowery cotton 
half her black skirt glows as a soiled mirror; 
reflects the gutter— 
a yard of chiffon velours593  
Of the phrase ‘soiled mirror’, Amy Morris astutely observes that ‘the speaker recognise[s] 
herself in the woman’ described in the poem.594 As in Insel, the non-normate body becomes an 
object of scopophilic fascination because of its abjection, yet there is a moment of reversal in 
which the abject body is nonetheless revealed as a reflection of the self; in this way, the 
abnormal/normal boundary is shown to designate fluid states of embodiment rather than fixed 
eugenicist divisions between fit and degenerate types. Similarly, in ‘An Aged Woman’, a 
mirrored image unsettles the distinction between self and other, normal and abnormal: 
Does you mirror Bedevil you 
or is the impossible 
possible to senility 
enabling the erstwhile agile 
narrow silhouette of self 
to hold in huge reserve 
                                                 
592 Mina Loy, ‘Chiffon Velours’ in The Lost Lunar Baedeker, ed. by Roger Conover (Carcanet: 
Manchester. 1997), 119 (p. 119). 
593 Ibid.  
594 Amy Morris, ‘“You should have disappeared years ago”— the poetics of cultural disappearance 
in Mina Loy’s late poems’, Critical Quarterly, 55.2 (July 2013), 81-104 (p. 88).  
93 
 
this excessive incognito 
of a Bulbous stranger 
only to be exorcised by death595 
Here, a series of verbal oppositions—‘impossible/possible’, ‘ex’-cessive/ ‘in’-cognito—speak 
to the tension between self and otherness, inside and outside, which the ‘aged woman’ of the 
poem experiences when viewing her mirrored image. By addressing herself in the second 
person, the poem’s speaker enacts the de-familiarisation of individual selfhood that the 
‘Bulbous stranger’ in the mirror so graphically represents. Becoming her own monstrous 
double, the speaker addresses her reflection as if it were another; yet the strange double can 
‘only be exorcised by death’, which suggests in turn that the gap between self and abject other 
has completely closed. 
Loy’s articulation of the vulnerable body repudiates the ‘technologically hardened’ 
body of Italian futurism and, furthermore, challenges the normal/abnormal divide that enables 
modern biopolitics. The relationship between atavism and creativity in Loy’s writing implies 
an ambivalent relationship to the anti-normative body. In her later writing, Loy moves away 
from the eugenicist commitment to corporeal improvement that underwrites her ‘maternalist’ 
bodily poetics of the 1910s. Her late poems about ageing women acknowledge that the 
normal/abnormal dichotomy is not fixed; hence rigid categories such as ‘degenerate’ that Loy 
uses in her eugenicist statements lose their validity as stable markers of identity in her later 
writing. Just as Jones becomes a doppelgänger of the monstrous Insel, the non-normative 
bodies that the speakers of ‘Chiffon Velours’ and ‘An Aged Woman’ see in the mirror suggest 
that the ‘aberrant’ body does not always belong to the other. Nonetheless, it is not an 
exaggeration to say that in these later works the vulnerable body often undergoes a process of 
aesthetic sublimation. ‘Casting nonnormative embodiment as a degraded state’, Maren Linett 
writes, ‘many twentieth century artworks nevertheless suggest that this degradation can be 
transcended through the superiority of modernist art’.596 To some extent, Loy finds value in the 
weak and vulnerable body only to the extent that, as Julia Kristeva puts it, ‘The abject is edged 
with the sublime’.597 To be sure, Loy’s commitment to artistic sublimation does not involve a 
straightforward repudiation of the impaired body’s recalcitrant materiality and contingency; 
yet, in the end, Loy places limits on the value of non-normate bodies to the extent that they 
feature in her later work as abject foils to aesthetic sublimation. They are the abject stuff that is 
sublated by the alchemical transmutation of profane matter into sublime art. I have also argued 
that, in Insel, Loy’s thematic interest in non-normate bodies is paralleled by her modernist 
experiments with novelistic form. Yet this relationship cannot be construed as an entirely 
enabling one: there is a sense in which Loy’s shuttling between the registers of sublime 
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abstraction and abject materiality is predicated on imputing a profane ‘negativity’ to 
nonstandard embodiment. The ‘negative’ ground of the non-normate body—whether in the 
form of monstrosity, homelessness, addiction or disability—is the abject matter that Loy’s art 
transmutes into modernist form. Thus, for Loy the value of corporeal vulnerability resides in 
the artist’s creation of ‘new aesthetic domains out of the encounter with non-normative 
bodies’598. In Insel, Jones —and the narrative itself— rejects the hyperbolic monstrosity of 
Insel’s body. It is as if Jones’s repudiation of Insel’s physical inconsistency is the necessary 
condition for her production of the novel: Jones refuses to submit to corporeal disintegration 
because it stalls the possibility of aesthetic creation. In order to mature as an artist, Jones must 
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CHAPTER THREE: ‘NO HUMAN SHAPE’: UNFORMED LIFE 
IN SAMUEL BECKETT 
 
Introduction: Texts Against Life 
Given that the ‘turn to life’ in the humanities has begun to provoke counterblasts from scholars 
in fields as diverse as queer theory and ecological studies, Beckett’s anti-vitalist modernism 
may be timelier than ever. In the introduction to their 2016 collection Against Life, Alastair 
Hunt and Stephanie Youngblood write that [t]he negative critique of life’ that inspired their 
volume could be traced back to the ‘queer-inflected thought’ of Leo Bersani and Lee 
Edelman.599 This well-established current of ‘queer misanthropy’, which has been retroactively 
associated with the ‘anti-social turn’ in queer theory, has not gone unremarked in Beckett 
Studies.600 Conceptions of ‘queer-inflected’ anti-natalism drawn from Edelman’s No Future 
(2004) have generated new perspectives on Beckett’s animus against life.601 From the 
standpoint of Edelman’s fierce assault on ‘reproductive futurism’, disclaiming ‘life’ is 
consistent with a queer resistance to the sacred imperatives of heteronormative culture.602 Life’s 
value is dependent on its arrival in futurity, yet this arrival will occur in any present to come, 
not just because the future never arrives, but because the compulsory deferral of life’s value is 
the driving force of ‘reproductive futurism’. Accordingly, Edelman situates his anti-natalist 
polemic in opposition to ‘the conservative politics that compel us to respect life, to preserve it, 
and perpetuate it’.603 Beckett gives an indirect demonstration of his own counter-vital 
credentials in Mercier and Camier, where we encounter Watt (in a cameo appearance) getting 
himself thrown out of a pub after, first, yelling ‘Bugger life’604, and then upping the ante with 
the more succinct locution: ‘Fuck life’.605 As the phrase ‘bugger life’ implies, there is a certain 
‘queer negativity’ behind the Beckettian injunction to take sides against the living. Crucially, 
this stubborn refusal to identify with the vital pulse of life as the final guarantee of meaning and 
value links with his counter-vitalist aesthetic. After all, the invective against ‘life’ that spices 
his texts joins with his depictions of ailing and exhausted bodies in a mutually reinforcing 
negation of the vitalist ethos. In biographical terms, of course, Beckett’s fascination with the 
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counter-vital is traceable to his childhood obsession with collecting stones. According to James 
Knowlson, ‘[l]ater in life, he came to rationalise this concern as the manifestation of an early 
fascination with the mineral, with things dying and decaying, with petrification. He linked this 
interest with Sigmund Freud’s view that human beings have a prebirth nostalgia to return to the 
mineral state’.606 On this biographical level, Beckett’s refusal of the imperative to affirm life 
seems to be nothing more than a psychological idiosyncrasy. And yet as Andrew Gibson 
reminds us in his discussion of Beckett’s anti-life sentiments: ‘There have been many life-
haters. But since they have known life only in and as particular historical occasions, they have 
always hated particular historical versions of life, even when they have asserted the opposite’.607 
‘As Foucault above all instructed us’, Gibson writes, ‘the bios is always historical’.608 The 
rejection of life in Beckett’s fiction goes hand in hand with the insistent anti-normative tone of 
his writing, endowing his contestation of the historical norms of life with a wilful and 
unyielding perversity. This perversity finds expression not only in his refusal of normalizing 
discourses of wholeness and reproduction but also in his work’s incompatibility with 
affirmative or progressive political projects. In the first section of this chapter, I argue that 
Beckett’s self-identification with the ‘counter-vital’ trajectory of the death drive informs his 
engagement with decadent aesthetics and the medical discourse of degeneration and eugenics. 
After a brief discussion of atavism and posture in Molloy I situate Beckett’s post-war fiction in 
relation to Nationalist Socialist theories of art and eugenics, arguing that his incorporation of 
deformity into his writing contests the biopolitical paradigm in which aesthetic form gives value 
to life. 
To appreciate the significance of Beckett’s animosity towards life, we must first 
understand the modernist attempt to rethink the life/death binary. Erin E. Edwards, in her 
brilliant study, The Modernist Corpse: Posthumanism and the Posthumous (2018), revivifies 
our understanding of the boundary between life and death in literary modernism by shining the 
scholar’s lamp on the posthumous agencies of the modernist corpse. As Edwards puts it: ‘Far 
from signifying the mortal limits of the human, the corpse in modernism functions 
“autopoietically” as a generative site from which to rewrite the living body and its relation to 
putatively dead or lifeless things’.609 Her genealogy of the modernist corpse takes its theoretical 
bearings from Rosi Braidotti’s materialist posthumanism: 
Braidotti’s call for a vitalist reconceptualization of death reorients [Giorgio] 
Agamben’s emphasis on the foundational role of “bare life,” which inevitably 
locates the biological continuum of zoë “on the horizon of death, or the liminal 
state of non-life.” […] For Braidotti, this conception of bare life precludes other 
engagements with zoë and has generated in recent social and theoretical discourse 
a “forensic turn” that defined the subject solely through the “horizon of death” — 
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through its finitude rather than its becoming. Braidotti’s reconceptualization of 
death instead theorizes the posthuman through its embedded relations with zoë, 
shifting political discourse away from an almost singular emphasis on “wound 
and loss”’.610 
The modernist corpse is an anticipatory figure in that its posthumous vitalities prefigure the 
breakdown of the dichotomy of life and nonlife in contemporary posthumanist thought. 
Posthumanist recalibrations of death insist on unbinding the ties between death and negativity. 
As Braidotti suggests, ‘We need to re-think death, the ultimate subtraction, as another phase in 
the generative process’.611 Such a rethinking of death, then, questions the rhetoric of finitude 
and affirms a neovitalist concept of impersonal life. Unbounded life exceeds the limited vitality 
of the individualised body, which, for Braidotti, means that the death of the monadic individual 
contributes to the intensification of zoe. Before the advent of work in posthumanist literary 
studies such as The Modernist Corpse, critics had acknowledged that canonical modernist texts 
take a step in this direction. Harry Staten, for example, writes of ‘the will to live-die’ in James 
Joyce’s Ulysses: ‘the individual life ceases, and yet the process of “(de)composition” goes on 
(this is Bloom’s vision in Hades). The decomposition of the individual body and its 
incorporation into the transindividual organic cycle mark the limit of what the Western 
philosophical tradition can understand and assimilate’.612 The vitalist dimension of this 
posthumanist attempt to think beyond death as an unsurpassable limit or negation of life implies 
what Eugene Thacker calls a ‘metaphysics of generosity, a commitment to a first principle of 
generation, fecundity, and affirmation’.613 
The undoing of the life/death binary in posthumanist thought maps onto a reading of 
degeneration as a generative process which introduces alterity and becoming into forms of life 
that have become static because of the enforcement of fixed norms. As Roberto Esposito 
suggests, ‘degeneration […] isn’t only negative […] but rather assumes and valorizes the 
different, the dissimilar and the abnormal inasmuch as they are innovative and transformative 
powers of reality’.614 While the decomposition of organic matter fosters the continuation of the 
life cycle, degeneration is not a sickness unto death but a vital process that generates unforeseen 
forms. This dual insight runs like a leitmotif through the Joycean corpus, in which, as Staten 
puts it (referring to Ulysses in particular), the ‘degradation of the logos’ and the ‘becoming-
feces of the human body’ provide ‘the ground of a profligate generation of new forms’.615 
Beckett acknowledges this feature of Joyce’s Viconian aesthetic in his essay ‘Dante…Bruno, 
Vico…Joyce’: ‘The maximum of corruption and the minimum of generation are identical: in 
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principle, corruption is generation’.616 Joyce’s affirmation of the agency of decomposing matter 
parallels his hostility to the eugenicist idea that nonstandard bodies represent immobility, 
passivity anti-futurity, or even mortality itself. The degenerate life of the non-normative body, 
as this was understood in Nazi eugenics, represented ‘an existence without life’.617 As a 
harbinger of sterility and death, the degenerate body is reduced to formless waste matter that 
has no future. Joyce inverts this formula: as Marion Quirici has pointed out, ‘Joyce 
demonstrates the potential for disability aesthetics to assert the generativity of deviant 
bodies’.618 Maren Tova Linett echoes and extends this point: ‘In the “Shem the Penman” 
chapter of Finnegans Wake (1939), Joyce takes his literary experimentation to a new extreme, 
revaluing the deformed body as the body of the modernist text’.619 She explains that in this 
chapter the ‘dysgenic body’ becomes a source of artistic creation and animating vitality: 
In book 1, chapter 7, “Shem the Penman,” and to some degree in book 3, chapter 
1, “Shaun the Post,” Joyce depicts the writer as disabled, degenerate, and 
dysgenic. But as the writer of Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, he also functions as 
a creator, a life-giver. Indeed, “Shem the Penman” ends by asserting that Shem 
“lifts the lifewand and the dumb speak”. In Finnegans Wake, therefore, the 
devaluation of disability is overturned, the strong Aryan body of Shaun is seen as 
brutish and oppressive, and the racialized, disabled, dysgenic body of Shem is 
celebrated as the source of art and life.620 
While Joyce ‘overturns’ the hierarchy of ‘dysgenic’ and ‘eugenics’ bodies, Beckett negates the 
normative valuation of life that governs this distinction in the first place. Unlike the life-giving 
and form-giving body of Shem, Beckett’s degenerates do not contribute to a ‘celebration of 
deformity as modernism’ that affirms the anti-normative body as an excess or abundance of 
life.621 . Rather, he focuses on the degenerate body insofar as it signifies the connection between 
the anti-vital and the temporality of backwardness. 
 
Beckett, Decadence and Degeneration 
In Modernism and the Reinvention of Decadence (2016), Vincent Sherry argues that Edelman’s 
analysis of queerness as a refusal of ‘the modern ideology of progressive time’ aligns queer 
anti-futurity with ‘the temporal imaginary of decadence’.622 For Sherry, ‘there is a fundamental 
connection between queerness, which has been assigned to decadence as its most vivid interest 
(its most livid identity), and the denial of futurity, that is, with the imaginary circumstance of 
aftermath’.623 Sherry invokes ‘lateness’ and the worn-out time of ‘aftermath’ as the genii loci 
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of the ‘temporal imaginary of decadence’ — and he includes Beckett among his cast of 
modernists who write in the key of decadence.624 But the intersection of aesthetic decadence 
with the Freudian death drive is not restricted to questions of temporality. For example, Peter 
Nicholls argues that Paul Bourget’s well-known definition of decadent form ‘confirms our 
understanding of the death-drive within decadent style’.625 ‘A decadent style’, Bourget writes 
in his famous 1881 essay on Baudelaire,  
is one in which the unity of the book decomposes to leave room for the 
independence of the page, the page decomposes to leave room for the 
independence of the phrase, and the phrase to leave room for the independence of 
the word’.626  
Decomposing wholes into parts with no unifying principle to hold them together, the degenerate 
artist paradoxically creates aesthetic form by misshaping and distorting it. In this way, 
Bourget’s analysis of stylistic decomposition reveals that aesthetic decadence is a kind of 
‘creative destruction’. Decadent form aspires to an exquisite undoing of form. It is form in the 
process of decomposing — but without thereby becoming formless. It thus represents a kind of 
negative morphology, whereby formation and deformation are not so much two distinct 
processes as they are a singular activity of aesthetic de-composition. This paradoxical 
conception of generating form through its degeneration proposes that decadent form unfolds in 
time. And this in turn means that the temporality of decadence, rather being extraneous to the 
question of form, has a defining significance in the process of its decomposition, so that the 
reciprocity of time and form should be the heart of any analysis of aesthetic decadence. 
Decadent form is, then, not (necessarily) fixed or petrified, for, according to Bourget’s 
definition, it shifts from a condition of greater unity towards a condition of greater 
fragmentation. But the question is: how might we articulate the temporality of this decomposing 
form? It would not be possible to trace this decomposition in a linear fashion as a progressive 
loss of form: after all, decadent form is by no means formless. According to any of the canonical 
definitions it is excessively stylised and highly wrought. This means that the undoing of form 
suggested by Bourget’s term ‘decomposition’ is in fact a way of talking about composing more 
complex varieties of form. These preliminary reflections on artistic decadence as formative 
deformation invite us to think about aesthetic decomposition otherwise than as an absence of 
form. And they invite us to think, too, of an art of deformation in ways which would not be 
compatible with, say, readings of modernism that take their cue from George Bataille’s well-
worn conception of the ‘formless’.627 
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To further explore this defining paradox of decadent decomposition I want to address 
Dana Seitler’s elegant work on the temporal paradoxes of atavism. In her study Atavistic 
Tendencies (2008), Dana Seitler Seitler demonstrates that atavism is a particularly complex 
idea: it suggests both human-animal hybridity and the relinquishing of human identity 
altogether, both the undoing of linear time and evolutionary throwbacks obstructing to the 
irresistible march of progress. She argues that the idea of atavism ‘disallows the modern 
construction of time as a unity that can be distinguished from a stable, archaic past’.628  
Contrariwise, atavism ‘offers up a notion of time as multidirectional and of the body as 
polytemporal’.629 At face value, atavism contests any simple idea of time moving in a straight 
line from past to present, primitive to civilized, animal to human. As Seitler has shown, Max 
Nordau’s account of the atavistic traces of pre-human animality that remain lodged in the 
degenerate body suggests a polychronic relation between past, present, and future.630 When 
these discrepant temporalities tangle and collide in unpredictable ways they likewise misshape 
our conceptions of time. One result of this chronological entanglement is to undermine the 
notion of form as a self-sufficient unity located in a homogeneous temporal continuum. This is 
why the fin-de-siècle discourse of degeneration viewed atavism as a threat to ‘reproductive 
futurism’ and the progressive time of modernity: ‘Male and female reproductive bodies were 
seem as a function of time: the healthy body of the future, the unhealthy body of the past’.631 
Furthermore, the regressive form of the atavistic body was seen as ‘a rupture of the “master 
narratives” of the modern that dictate a more complete separation of temporal spheres’.632 The 
decomposition of decadent form likewise relies on the deforming irruption of the past in the 
present. In his Lateness and Modern European Literature (2016), Ben Hutchinson takes the 
measure of this polychronic dimension of decadence when he writes: ‘Decadent lateness is 
trapped […] in the hermeneutic regime of the past — even if that entrapment become, in turn, 
its own regime—and is defined by its inability to imagine new orders, rather than simply 
pushing existing categories ever further’.633 Faced with the impossibility of breaking with the 
past the decadent writer ‘pushes existing categories even further’. It is as if the absence of 
futurity provokes the decadent artist to obsessively revise and disintegrate the forms of the past. 
How does the anti-futurity of the atavistic body relate to queer temporality of the death 
drive? Edelman claims that ‘the death drive is what the queer, in the order of the social, is called 
forth to figure: the negativity opposed to every form of social viability’.634 In late nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century Europe, however, homosexuality was included within the broader 
category of ‘degeneracy’. In his ponderous tome Degeneration (1892), Nordau assigns the 
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negativity of the death drive to the ‘atavistic’ body of the degenerate individual. Nordau’s 
diagnostic gaze seizes on individuals and populations considered anathema to narratives of 
social and biological viability. By pretending to decode the so-called ‘stigmata’ of the 
degenerate body, he interprets biological ‘abnormality’ as a sign of evolutionary regression and 
thus as a visible marker of ‘anti-futurity’. The Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso devised 
the notorious principle of biological ‘atavism’ to explain the evolutionary backwardness of the 
degenerate individual.635 And it is for this reason that Esposito refers to atavism as a ‘biological 
anachronism’: it snips the thread of evolutionary history, reverses its direction of travel, or ties 
it in recursive loops.636 ‘Biological anachronism’ is also an apt description of Samuel Beckett’s 
degenerating narrators. Devolving as they often do to ‘lowly’ or bestialised figures, Beckett’s 
narrator-protagonists return, or appear as if they are returning, to pre-human forms of life. Given 
the polychronic time-scales of Beckett’s post-war novels, it is possible to read the texts of the 
Trilogy as elaborations of the nonlinear temporality of atavistic decline. This reading would 
view his depictions of atavistic bodies as fleshing out the Seitler’s intricate analyses of the 
polytemporal intersection of the animal past and the human present. However, I want to expand 
the idea of atavism to embrace its potential for a critique of affirmative posthumanisms of 
generative life. 
This chapter examines Beckett’s creative refashioning of some key aspects of Max 
Nordau’s degeneration theory, focussing in particular on how Beckett’s depictions of atavistic 
regression contest the redemptive temporality of affirmative posthumanisms and eugenics. For 
Nordau, degeneracy and atavism are mutually reinforcing conditions embedded in the 
pathological body of the ‘abnormal’ individual: ‘Every one of [the degenerate’s] qualities is 
atavistic, and we know, moreover, that atavism is one of the most constant marks of 
degeneracy’.637 The circular logic elaborated here reveals the fundamental reciprocity of 
atavism and degeneration: ‘The disease of degeneracy’, Nordau claims, ‘consists precisely in 
the fact that the degenerate organism has not the power to mount to the height of evolution 
already attained by the species, but stops on the way at an earlier point’.638 Degeneration is a 
complex and ambiguous term, informed by a raft of cultural anxieties, discussed in various 
national and political contexts, accumulating new shades of meaning in different times and 
places. It is often associated with modernist ‘revitalization movements’, which elaborated 
apocalyptic forecasts of racial decline to bolster their utopian visions of regeneration, and 
promoted mythic ideas of ‘palingenesis’ or the renewal of national or racial communities. For 
Roger Griffin, ‘palingenesis’ connotes ‘an organic process by which degeneration is the prelude 
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to a regeneration in which the old is subsumed in a new form’.639 Convinced that modernity 
had taken a decadent turn, fin-de-siècle eugenicists calling for palingenetic renewal anticipated 
the coming of a more vital future purged of decadence and degeneration: a time of blank slates, 
fresh hopes, and healthy bodies. This drive for a redemptive break with the dysgenic past 
suggests a progressivist view of history compatible with the linear temporality of modernity. 
As Seitler has put it: ‘In its own attempts to establish the modern world as something modern, 
as something progressive and progressing, eugenics sought to manage human life at its 
reproductive core’.640 
A number of critics have argued that Beckett’s hostility to ‘reproductive futurism’ 
demonstrates his political resistance to the eugenicist discourse prevalent in the early twentieth 
century. For Seán Kennedy, Beckett’s story ‘First Love’ ‘stubbornly refus[es] the logic of any 
collective future that [the Child] may be held to signify’.641 Contrasting Beckett’s anti-natalism 
with the ban on contraception in the Irish Free State and eugenicist politics of W.B. Yeats, 
Kennedy claims that ‘the Child in Beckett signifies Edelman’s coercive future and is rejected 
accordingly’.642 For Paul Stewart, Becket’s ‘misopaedia’ and ‘horror of reproduction’ convey 
an ethical commitment to the reduction of human suffering: beginning from Schopenhauer’s 
conflation of suffering and life, Beckett reaches a counterintuitive ethical standpoint in which 
the horror of life and birth reinforces an all-embracing compassion towards living beings.643 In 
lockstep with Edelman’s queer opposition to ‘reproductive futurism’, this influential current in 
recent Beckett scholarship insists on ‘the ethico-political value of resisting life’.644 Conversely, 
Lloyd Houston finds evidence of Anglo-Irish prejudice and ‘anti-democratic animus’ in 
Beckett’s fiercely anti-natalist stance.645 ‘Beckett’s position does not reject but in fact reflects 
and participates in precisely the noxious logic and implicit and explicit prejudices of the 
European and Irish eugenicism against which his work has traditionally been aligned’.646 Not 
only is this an incisive challenge to previous accounts of Beckett’s resistance to pro-natalism, 
but Houston’s revisionist account is the first to contest the received wisdom that Beckett’s 
politics are beyond reproach. Addressing Beckett’s anxiety about the ‘hyper-fertile Catholic 
horde’ — an anxiety indicated by his vision of Ireland overrun by ‘decorticated multiparas’ in 
his essay ‘Censorship in the Saorstat’ (written in 1934 and revised in 1936) — Houston takes 
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issue with the scholarly consensus that Beckett’s work is unswervingly critical of the eugenicist 
attitudes put in practice by European nation-states in the early twentieth century.647 
These historically oriented accounts of Beckett’s resistance to (and potential 
complicity with) eugenicism and biopower are persuasive. However, critics have not considered 
the possibility that the biopolitical contexts Beckett encountered were a defining influence on 
his reinvention of the novel form and his experiments with narrative time. Indeed, while 
Kennedy and Houston reach very different conclusions about Beckett’s relation to eugenicism, 
they both limit the scope of their analyses to the following question: how did the context of 
post-Civil War Ireland shape Beckett’s ‘horror of reproduction’? To gauge the nonlinear 
temporalities elaborated in Beckett’s engagement with ideas of degeneration I will expand the 
parameters of the debate by switching our focus from Beckett’s anti-natalist stance to his 
creative refashioning of the concept of atavism. Atavistic regression is everywhere in his 
fiction. Belacqua is ‘border-creature’ who wants to ‘troglodyse’ himself.648 Molloy winds up 
‘crawling on his belly, like a reptile’.649 And the Unnamable assumes the identity of a 
vermiform creature known only as Worm. For Seitler, the atavistic plot ‘regresses as it 
progresses; or, rather, it progresses by way of its regression’.650 Similarly, Beckett’s bestial 
transformations suggest that his treatment of time and narrative combines anti-futurity (bodily 
regression) with futurity (narrative progression). The recent focus on ‘reproductive futurism’ 
and anti-futurity in Beckett Studies doesn’t do justice to Beckett’s formal experiments with the 
polytemporal time of atavism.651 To insist on this claim is in part to remind ourselves that 
futurity (not ‘reproductive futurism’) is never completely absent from the horizon in the Beckett 
Country. It is not that Beckett’s ‘creatures’ occupy a temporal horizon in which any flicker of 
futurity is eclipsed, but rather that for them the time to come contracts to a futural minimum, 
whereby the chronological opening towards the not-yet (‘I’ll go on’) is interwoven with its own 
radical impossibility (‘I can’t go on’). Beckettian anti-futurity thus contains paradoxical 
splinters of future time that both work against the refusal of the time to come and confirm the 
denial of historical and narrative temporalities founded on the redemptive time of ‘reproductive 
futurism’. What emerges from this constitutive tension is a mundane time that presses onwards 
without the theological or secular trappings of a redemptive futurity converting the time to come 
into the site of hope and possibility, since this mundane version of future time (‘I’ll go on’) 
reiterates its own failure and ending (‘I can’t go on’). As excluded figures barred from 
modernity’s projects of temporalized redemption, Beckett’s degenerate creatures embody the 
passing of a mundane time shot through with a sense of catastrophic loss and exposed to a future 
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of the ‘[m]ere-most minimum’.652 This is a future which refuses to occupy the consummated 
time of Christian redemption or the secular palliative of a progressive history dictated by the 
linear time of ‘reproductive futurism’. It may be a ‘decadent futurity’ fixated on a past of 
destitution and historical ruin that resists narrative articulation in the present. But it is still a 
future that goes on. 
Modernity’s progressive time rolls towards its perpetually deferred consummation. It 
keeps history on the right road and departs from the benighted past with ever-increasing 
velocity. Civilization surges ahead, leaving barbarism in the dust. It is this confidence in the 
forward propulsion of linear time that atavism puts so violently out of joint. But atavism is far 
from being a subversive panacea untainted by the toxic tendencies of political modernity. True, 
we can say that the nonprogressive time of atavism is an affront to what Beckett calls ‘our 
pernicious and incurable optimism’.653 At the same time, however, we find the anachronistic 
logic of atavistic regression at the heart of degeneration theory and modernist-era eugenicism, 
both of which condemn atavism to obsolescence and death in order to defend the linear 
temporality of progressive modernity. Just as ‘atavism operated in part as a policing mechanism 
that fixed the human body within readable signs of aberrance’, it also operated as a sign of the 
pathogenic elements in the body politic which eugenicists wanted to expel.654 Indeed, it is 
crucial for our purposes here that late nineteenth-century degeneration theorists presented the 
‘abnormal’ body as an obstacle to the unfolding of modernity’s promise. Nordau’s folly was to 
envision a future purged of bodily and mental ‘defects’, which meant that those ‘outside’ the 
norm, the so-called ‘degenerates’, were consigned to the past as figures of anti-life and anti-
futurity. For Nordau, the tainted hereditary line ‘does not continually subsist and propagate 
itself, but, fortunately, is soon rendered sterile, and after a few generations often dies out before 
it reaches the lowest grade of organic degradation’.655 This grim prognosis pins down a 
connection between organic decomposition and the sterile exhaustion of the hereditary line. For 
Nordau, then, the ‘degradation’ of healthy organic form results in a self-annihilating drift 
towards death and the erasure of futurity. In this way degeneration theory brings the regression 
of the species and the termination of futurity into a fatal alignment sealed by a double logic of 
self-destruction. Atavism is the master trope of this deathly configuration: it is the misalliance 
that occurs when the deep past, the modern present, and the endangered future cleave together 
in the flesh of bodies which disturb the linear time of modernity. According to Gülru Çakmak, 
‘[t]he unidirectional movement from a primitive, uncivilized state to an evolved one attained 
the status of the norm’.656 Thus, although we usually think of norms in spatial terms (i.e. 
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whether we are toeing the line or deviating from it), conceptions of linear time and the 
progressive movement of evolution and history often intersect with notions of bodily normalcy. 
Echo’s Bones is a phantasmagoric tale of sexual perversion and degeneracy set in the spectral 
realm of the dead. It recounts the curious afterlife of Belacqua Shuah (the main protagonist of 
More Pricks than Kicks), who finds himself reanimated in mysterious circumstances and 
compelled to atone for a life spent in narcissistic indolence. Thus at the outset our ‘dead and 
buried’ hero finds himself (unhappily) back among the quick: the unwelcome fact that he is 
‘restored for a time by a lousy fate […] to the low stature of animation’ belying the sense of an 
ending properly befitting his posthumous condition.657 If anything, the insistent presence of the 
phrases ‘back’,658 ‘revisit’,659 ‘return’,660 ‘reversion’,661 and ‘restored’ suggest that his death is 
an echo or reiteration of his life.662 A kind of peculiar anti-climax, then, Belacqua’s death and 
posthumous survival are emblematic of the logic of anachronism and lateness which is the 
signature temporality of decadence. As if to underline this sense of lost time, Belacqua cries 
out that he is ‘[t]oo late!’ because his ‘life is over’.663 Indeed, given that the story takes place 
after Belacqua’s end, Beckett in a sense radicalises and the temporality of lateness infusing the 
art of decadence. 
Echoes of Augustine and Dante provide the story’s atmosphere of sin, guilt, and 
punishment (no redemption here!). But Beckett’s engagement with the theme of the afterlife 
also resonates with a chorus of less distant literary voices. T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land famously 
presents London as a city of the dead; Ezra Pound begins his Cantos with a Homeric journey 
to the underworld; Wyndham Lewis’s The Childermass envisions an afterlife populated by men 
killed in World War I; and Joyce’s debt to The Divine Comedy is a leitmotif running from 
Dubliners to Finnegans Wake. How does Beckett’s story relate to the purgatorial visions of the 
so-called ‘Men of 1914’? Given this fairly extensive archive of high modernist works concerned 
with the deadness of modernity and the ‘afterlife’ of the European tradition, we might ask 
ourselves if Beckett’s story reflects on its own relative lateness within the micro-tradition of 
the modernist afterlife narrative. According to Claire Colebrook, the modernist impulse to visit 
the realm of the dead is in one sense a gesture of ‘revitalization’: ‘modernism sought to inject 
life into a desiccated tradition by giving blood to the voices of the past. Descending into Hades 
where all the voices of history and becoming had been reduced to so much noise, the modernist 
artist would once again experience the opening or genesis of culture, retrieving life’s original, 
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animating and fertile voice’.664 ‘[A]t the same time’, she continues, ‘modernism could only take 
hold not by producing more literary life but by deadening the textual corpus’.665 Like this 
‘counter-vital modernism of the dead letter’, Beckett treats the archive as a crypt of lifeless 
fragments shorn of any trace of an ‘animating and fertile voice’.666 Colebrook argues that this 
‘counter-vital modernism’ opposes the arrogation of the feminine in ‘anti-Cartesian’ 
modernisms which assert a vitalist affirmation of fluidity against ‘an affectless, lifeless, 
disembodied Cartesian prison’.667 These anti-Cartesian modernisms would be the aesthetic 
forerunners of the contemporary posthumanist philosophies that valorise the productive futurity 
of material flows and decentralized agencies. It is safe to imagine that Beckett would have little 
to offer resurgent vitalisms of the contemporary scene. If anything, Beckett’s extensive use of 
quotation suggests a ‘devitalization’ of the word reminiscent of an anti-vital decadent 
aesthetics. And if Beckett figures his relation to the canonical achievements of literary 
modernism as a kind of belatedness, the apotheosis of lateness in his work may suggest an 
extraordinary awareness on his part that to come after modernism is precisely to register the 
persistence of the backward-facing disposition of decadence. Sherry’s version of ‘temporal 
imaginary of decadence’, which resists the mandatory optimism of progressive time and the 
promise of futurity, stubbornly refuses to participate in modernity’s cult of newness. Similarly, 
the excess of allusion stitched into the warp and woof of Beckett’s text suggests an antiquarian 
fascination with the archive as the repository of arcane learning and dead languages, thereby 
aligning the text with ‘the decadent cult of the “rare word”’.668 
Beckett knowingly embraces a raft of decadent tropes and themes: the last scion, 
infertility, prostitution, sadomasochism, narcissism, aristocratic decay, venereal disease, 
youthful death, the corrosion of sexual morality, and so on. In Beckett’s story the theme of 
perversion is no simple echo of the Sadean literature of transgression, which gets its kicks by 
flouting social norms and moral proscriptions, and, through its depictions of sexual rebellion, 
seeks to scramble the prevailing codes of moral conduct. This form of transgression is 
invariably a prisoner of the norms it attempts to demolish: it converts the moral Law into the 
hypostasized origin of excessive pleasures. For Beckett, perversion is at once a ‘decadent’ trope 
and a site of political conflict; it has no political use-value in itself, but it is significant as a 
crossing-point between aesthetic decadence and the medical discourse of degeneration. Thus, 
one of the uses of perversion in Echo’s Bones is to draw attention to the link between sexual 
conduct and projections of racial and national futurity. Indeed, we might think of degeneration 
theory and aesthetic decadence as distinct yet related ‘hermeneutic regimes’ (to use 
Hutchinson’s phrase again). Both figure prominently in Echo’s Bones and together hold the 
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interpretive key to unlock many of the text’s obscure allusions to sadomasochism, degeneracy, 
prostitution, and venereal disease. It is furthermore possible to relate these two ‘hermeneutic 
regimes’ to two texts that Beckett read and took notes from the early 1930s.669 The first is 
Nordau’s Degeneration, which, as we have seen, diagnosed aesthetic decadence and the entire 
fin-de-siècle sensibility as a symptom of degeneracy. The second text is Mario Praz’s The 
Romantic Agony (1930) — a comprehensive analysis of the ‘morbid’ turn taken by the 
European sensibility in the nineteenth century. 
The simultaneous conflict and consonance between the tropology of decadence and the 
medical discourse of degeneration finds expression in the first section of the narrative, where a 
syphilitic prostitute named Zaborovna Privet interrupts Belacqua’s masturbatory self-
absorption. There are numerous allusions to the literature of decadence during their 
conversation, including to Baudelaire’s poem ‘Les Deux Bonnes Soeurs’. When a ramshackle 
procession of figures pass before Belacqua and Zaborovna, among them are the two ‘good 
sisters’, ‘Debauch and Death’, from Baudelaire’s poem.670 There is an elective affinity between 
‘Les Deux Bonnes Soeurs’ and Echo’s Bones: both texts ironically praise the fertility of 
prostitutes; both associate prostitution with venereal disease and death; and both link sexual 
corruption to anti-futurity. Baudelaire’s allegory of prostitution suggests not only that sexual 
perversity (‘Debauchery’) is the sibling of self-destruction (‘Death’), but also that their 
incestuous union eclipses the accursed poet’s access to futurity, as implied by the fusion of the 
‘gruesome rose’ (‘Debauchery’) with funeral ‘cypress’ (‘Death’) in poem’s closing lines. As 
Matthew Potolsky notes, ‘the poem reads like a traditional paradoxical encomium […] 
prais[ing] what is loathsome and fearful, addressing Debauchery and Death as “good sisters”, 
and lauding their amiability, health, fertility, and charms’.671 In the poem’s final lines, however, 
‘Debauchery and Death’ offer an ecstatic death to the poet as an ‘alternative to productive 
life’.672 Death and anti-futurity are likewise key to the figuration of the prostitute in the medico-
psychiatric discourse of fin-de-siècle degeneration theory. Needless to say, in this pseudo-
scientific context venereal disease and prostitution have none of the fatal glamour found in ‘Les 
Deux Bonnes Soeurs’. While Baudelaire’s poetic immoralist is more than half in love with 
disease and death, Lombroso and Nordau connect sexual debauchery to the danger of social 
anomie and the atavistic regression of the species. For proponents of eugenics around the turn 
of the twentieth century, sexual debauchery was a lethal threat to the health of populations and 
the future of the nation. As Michel Foucault explains, beginning in the late nineteenth-century 
doctors increasingly perceived that: 
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debauched, perverted sexuality has effects at the level of the population, as anyone 
who has been sexually debauched is assumed to have a heredity. Their descendent 
will also be affected for generations…This is the theory of degeneracy; given that 
sexuality is the source of individual diseases and that it is the nucleus of 
degeneracy.673 
The degenerative threat of venereal disease is not disclosed when Beckett first introduces 
Zaborovna in the narrative. By contrast, the narrator offers ironic praise to her fertility: ‘There 
was nothing at all of the grave widow or anile virgin about her, nothing in the least barren in 
her appearance. She would be, if she were not already, the fruitful mother of children of joys’.674 
This ironic praise of female reproductivity suggests is perhaps a parody of the modernist 
misappropriation of the feminine among male writers who used the female body a vessel for 
fantasies of renewal and overcoming decadence.  If this is the case, however, Beckett’s 
resistance to the anti-Cartesian, vitalist strain of modernism examined by Colebrook draws on 
a different misogynist tradition in modern letters: Baudelaire and the decadents. In a further 
echo of ‘Les Deux Bonnes Soeurs’, this paradoxical encomium to Zobarovna’s fertility and 
maternal qualities crystallizes the biological threat that her sexuality poses to familial values 
and reproductive health. In a reversal of tone reminiscent of Baudelaire’s final apostrophe, 
Beckett reprises the outworn decadent trope of ‘the enchantress turned hag’.675 The delayed 
revelation of Zaborovna’s ‘wrinkled gums and […] Hutchinson fangs’ implies that the 
procreative threat of her concealed venereal disease is intensified by the fatal attraction of her 
‘feminine’ artifice.676 This is a familiar misogynist paradox: Zaborovna is as at once too 
artificial and too natural, and she employs the ruse of beauty to lure Belacqua into sexual 
reproduction. Once we recognise that the phrase ‘Hutchinson fangs’ conflates syphilis with 
canine animality it becomes difficult to deny that Zaborovna’s Ovidian transformation is 
presented as an atavistic regression; so in this case — in contrast to Edelman’s account of 
‘reproductive futurism’ — heterosexual reproduction does not represent ‘the Child’ and futurity 
but instead becomes a harbinger of atavistic heredity. This means that her atavistic 
transformation is both a regression to the bestial and a procreative threat to future generations. 
Kennedy and McNaughton have read the story’s preoccupation with the themes of childbirth 
and degeneration as representative of Beckett’s dismissal of the eugenicist discourse of 
heredity. Kennedy regards the story’s depiction of degeneracy as symptomatic of Beckett’s 
political hostility to the eugenicist politics that bolster W.B. Yeats’s nostalgia for Irish Big 
House tradition.677 Similarly, McNaughton argues that ‘Belacqua’s atonement — reproductive 
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sex that helps to maintain a patriarchal political order — cannot be separated from what 
apparently resists it: so-called deviant sexual impulses, masturbation homosexuality, oral sex, 
and so on’.678 While McNaughton acknowledges the pervasive iconography of sexual deviance 
in Echo’s Bones, he ignores Beckett’s engagement with literary decadence, and his suggestion 
that the story resists patriarchy glosses over the misogynistic aspects of the text. As we have 
seen, Beckett’s use of decadent tropes of voracious female sexuality parallels his fascination 
with infertility and non-productive sex. According to Marja Härmänmaa and Christopher 
Nissen, the misogyny that infuses fin-de-siècle decadence  
has been interpreted as a consequence of the exaltation of the artificial on the part 
of some Decadents, as well as their hostility to nature; but it may also reveal their 
tendency toward a kind of hatred of life that regarded woman, the one who gives 
birth, as its central symbol.679  
At first glance, the ‘horror of life’ that Beckett shares with this aspect of decadence seems to 
conform to Edelman’s critique of the cultural narratives surrounding heterosexual reproduction. 
For Edelman, as we have seen, the culture of ‘reproductive futurism’ regards the Child as a 
figure securing futurity and the progress of linear time. Since Kennedy aligned Beckett with 
Edelman’s queer anti-natalism, there has been has considerable agreement that ‘the Child in 
Beckett signifies Edelman’s coercive future and is rejected accordingly’.680 By contrast, I have 
argued that the text’s treatment of female atavism and degenerate maternity recasts heterosexual 
reproduction as a deathly transmission of hereditary disease and evolutionary regression. As 
Penelope Deutscher has pointed out, Edelman’s account of the tyranny of ‘reproductive 
futurism’ needs to be revised and expanded if we are to make sense of the biopolitical scenarios 
in which reproduction becomes ‘a principle of death and its protagonists those of antilife’.681 
Contra Edelman, Beckett’s story presents heterosexual reproduction as figuring the negativity 
of the death drive and the gestation of nonviable life.  
 
Atavistic Desires 
The Trilogy is the culmination of Beckett’s creative refashioning of degeneration theory. As 
Alysia E. Garrison has put it, ‘Beckett […] made something like the degenerate body the 
protagonist of his Three Novels’.682 It is surely likewise uncontroversial to claim that Molloy, 
Malone Dies, and The Unnamable are ‘degeneration narratives’, which is to say texts that 
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‘dramatize the decline of an atavistic body’.683 After all: each of the three novels depicts figures 
undergoing the atavistic process of shedding the skin of the rational, humanist subject, as if 
regaining proximity with the distant pre-history of the species. If these narratives of regression 
deny the futurist drive behind the progressivist time of modernity, the temporality of decline 
they articulate primarily takes shape through Beckett’s misshaping of bodily form. The various 
expressions of this negative morphology suggest that the breakdown of formal unity does not 
proceed in a linear progression from the past to the future. Instead, vestiges of time past survive 
as atavistic remainders, which, as we will see, deform the present through a process of 
evolutionary retrogression. Beckett’s elaboration of polychronic temporalities is central to his 
post-war aesthetic of decomposition. It is for instance the defining temporal disposition of 
Molloy’s progressive decline towards reptilian animality.  
When Molloy tells us that he has ‘abandoned the erect motion, that of man’,684 he 
acknowledges his departure from the normative image of the human. That Molloy nonetheless 
remains aware of this normative conception of the human body can be seen when he describes 
his abandonment of the vertical axis as a transgression: ‘flat on my face by way of rest, in 
defiance of the rules, I suddenly cried, striking by brow, Christ, there’s crawling, I never thought 
of that’ ( my italics).685 Time and again, the creatures in the Trilogy fail to conform to the rules 
and regulations that are imposed on them. Not only do Beckett’s creatures abandon uprightness, 
and decline the virtues of rectitude and righteousness, but they are themselves beings in terminal 
and interminable decline. To track the various ways that Beckett undermines rules and 
regularity in Molloy it is instructive to consider the bent, slantwise geometry that characterises 
Molloy’s singular way of inhabiting the world. Take the example of his ‘hypotenusal posture’686 
when leaning precariously against a wall, or his description of being ‘bent double over a heap 
of muck’.687 Or take his ability to adopt a posture that conforms to neither the vertical nor the 
horizontal axis, as when he describes himself ‘half-standing half-lying’.688 Beckett also draws 
various parallels between deviations from verticality and deviant behaviour. Thus, it is Molloy’s 
inability to conform to the erect posture that instigates his altercation with a policeman and 
ultimately leads to his arrest. As Molloy explains: ‘my way of resting, my attitude when at rest, 
astride my bicycle, my arms on the handlebars, my head on my arms, was a violation of I don’t 
know what, public order, public decency’.689 Following his arrest, Molloy acknowledges his 
fault and delivers an ironic disquisition on the virtues of uprightness: ‘It is indeed a deplorable 
sight, a deplorable example, for the people, who so need to be encouraged, in their bitter toil, 
                                                 
683 Seitler, p. 27. 
684 Beckett, Molloy, p. 90 
685 Ibid. 
686 Ibid, p. 60. 
687 Ibid, p. 50. 
688 Ibid, p. 61. 
689 Ibid, p. 17. 
111 
 
and to have before their eyes manifestations of strength only, of courage and of joy, without 
which they might collapse and roll on the ground’.690 
In Beckett’s writing, the animal past that civilization insists it has forgotten re-emerges 
from behind the tattered veil of humanity’s hubristic self-conceptions. In Molloy, for example, 
Beckett establishes a chiastic relationship between the origins and the telos of the species body. 
If Molloy’s return to the animal prehistory of the human enacts something like a return to the 
phylogenetic origins of the species, his search for the abject ‘matter’ of his mother signifies a 
return to ontogenetic origins of the individual organism. The dual logic of recapitulation and 
reversal at work here brings animality and the maternal body into alignment. But although 
Molloy’s despeciation involves an uncanny reunion with his mother’s flesh, this does not take 
the form an actual meeting between them. Rather, this (non)encounter is enacted in Molloy’s 
excessive bodily decomposition, in the extravagant ruination of the proper, enclosed body. In 
both cases there is an emphasis on the biological beginnings of human life, and the narrative 
itself seems propelled towards a renewed contact with these ‘lowly’ origins. Accordingly, 
Molloy suggests that the best way of discovering the meaning of his life narrative would be to 
plunge his nose inside his mother’s flesh: ‘And if I’m ever reduced to looking for a meaning to 
my life, you never can tell, it’s in that old mess I’ll stick my nose to begin with, the mess of that 
poor old uniparous whore and myself the last of my foul brook, neither man nor beast’.691 It is 
significant that Molloy’s failed attempt to find his mother raises questions about the status of 
knowledge in the novel, and that he cannot remember her name or how to navigate his way 
towards her. Crucially, his memories of his mother are suggestive of the return to animality that 
Beckett explores throughout the Trilogy. For example, it is telling that Molloy’s (blind) mother 
recognises her son by smell rather than sight, since in Beckett’s work smell frequently signals 
a closing of the gap between humans and other animals: ‘She knew it was me’, says Molloy, 
‘by my smell’.692 In this parody of the archetypical recognition scene, Beckett reverses the 
traditional hierarchy separating the ‘higher’ senses (seeing, hearing) from the ‘lower’ senses 
(smell, taste, touch); and by privileging smell over sight he challenges the pre-eminence of 
vision as a means of knowing the world. Noting the importance of smell in the Beckettian 
sensorium, Ulrika Maude argues that ‘it is doubtful whether vision is the primary sense in 
Beckett’s writing’693 When Molloy tells us that his mother was ‘happy to smell [him]’, for 
instance, the punning substitution of sight for smell indicates a displacement of vision by 
olfaction. It may be that Molloy accords primacy to smell because of its association with 
humanity’s animal prehistory, holding out the possibility of closing the circle of self-knowledge 
by returning to these origins. 
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There are various potential sources for Beckett’s tendency to connect the primacy of 
olfaction with the evolutionary descent of the human species. Esposito explains that  
To say that the degenerate is abnormal means pushing him towards a zone of 
indistinction that it’s completely included in the category of the human. Or 
perhaps better, it means enlarging the latter category so as to include its own 
negation: the non-man in man and therefore the man-animal [uomo-bestia]. It is 
the Lombrosian category of “atavism” […] that performs the function of the 
excluding inclusion’.694  
In certain respects, the pseudo-medical understanding of degeneration that informs Nordau’s 
infamous account of fin-de-siècle culture resembles Beckett’s notion of ‘loss of species’. We 
should not be surprised, then, that Beckett’s creatures display a variety of the symptoms that 
Nordau attributes to degeneracy, including a heightened sensitivity to olfactory stimulation. In 
Nordau’s view, privileging the ‘primitive’ sense of smell above the ‘rational’ sense of vision is 
evidence of degeneration, and thus signifies a regression to an earlier stage of evolution: 
‘Smellers among degenerates represent an atavism going back, not only to the primeval period 
of man, but infinitely more remote still, to an epoch anterior to man’.695 The olfactory sense, 
Nordau claims, ‘has scarcely any share in man’s knowledge. He obtains his impression of the 
external world no longer by the nose, but principally by the eye and ear’.696 Accordingly, 
Nordau speculates that degenerate ‘smellers’ have regressed to the status of ‘animals amongst 
whom sexual activity was directly excited by odiferous substances’.697 He goes on to suggest 
that ‘smellers’ are ‘like dogs’ because they acquire ‘their knowledge of the world by the action 
of their noses’.698 If Nordau argues that dogs occupy a lowly position on the evolutionary 
continuum because they privilege olfactory knowledge, Beckett’s creatures often have recourse 
to this canine epistemology. By excavating the pre-rational, sensory substrate of knowledge, 
Beckett explores ways of knowing that exceed the rationalist epistemology which distinguishes 
the sovereign, upright human subject. And just as Nordau’s degenerates relinquish the noble 
deportment of civilized humanity and derive sexual gratification in the same fashion as dogs, 
so Beckett’s creatures relinquish the erect posture and imitate the attitudes of canine sexuality. 
Noting that ‘no animal’s presence is more pervasive [in Molloy] than that of the dog’,699 Philip 
Solomon argues that Moran’s interest in the genitals of his neighbour’s dog Zulu may imply 
‘an association between human sexuality and the indiscriminate sexuality of the dog’.700  When 
Molloy describes his intercourse with Ruth/Edith, for instance, he relates how his lover ‘bent 
over the couch, because of her rheumatism, and I went in behind’.701 ‘It seemed alright to me’, 
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Molloy continues, ‘for I had seen dogs, and I was astonished when she confided that you could 
go about it differently’.702 Molloy’s dog-inspired sexual habits encapsulates the idea that being 
behind the human involves a refusal of sexual reproductivity. In the next section, I want to 
suggest that the call of the anti-vital and degeneracy are central to Beckett’s engagement with 
Nazi biopolitics and artistic censorship. 
‘no human shape’: Beckett, Degeneration, Nazism 
What, then, is the value of ‘life’ in Beckett’s fiction? As we have seen, the anti-vital — and its 
ironic offspring: the anti-natal — is an especially fecund theme in Beckett’s work, endlessly 
reiterated in paradoxes and oxymora. The final section of this chapter enquires into the ways in 
which Beckett’s encounters with the Nazi politics of life informed his presentation of the 
‘misshapen’ body. While Hitler wanted to impose classical form on the German people by 
surgically removing degenerate flesh from the ‘Aryan’ body, Beckett distorts aesthetic form by 
incorporating disfigured flesh into his late modernist writing. 
Beckett was arguably literary modernism’s consummate maestro in the art of 
degeneration. The reasons why degeneration is a pervasive feature of his work are multiple and 
complex, yet it is possible to trace his fascination with the subject back to his close scrutiny of 
a single text.  As John Pilling’s edition of the ‘Dream Notebook’ shows, Beckett studied Max 
Nordau’s Degeneration (1892) in the early 1930s. In this diatribe against symbolism and 
aesthetic decadence, Nordau claimed that the cultural forms of fin-de-siècle Europe were 
symptomatic of an epidemic of physical and mental disorder which had its source in the 
biological decline of the species. Siobhan Purcell has explored the formative influence of 
Nordau’s ideas on Beckett’s representation of disability in his early fiction. According to 
Purcell, while ‘Nordau lamented the perceived decline of physical and aesthetic form, Beckett 
privileges […] impaired states, even manifesting them at the level of form’.703 Further, she 
argues that Beckett’s ‘concern with the conflated representation of aesthetic and physical form’ 
testifies to his ‘fascination with the nature of corporeal difference and a concomitant mission to 
deform his own work’.704 While I agree with Purcell’s fruitful claim that Beckett’s aesthetic 
investment in notions of bodily deformity is key to his remaking of the novel form, her essay 
does not take into account the ways in which the presence of disability and deformity in 
Beckett’s work involves a negotiation with the biopolitical imperatives of early twentieth-
century Europe. According to Joseph Valente, ‘[t]he image of disability in modernist literature 
is a highly mediated effect of the development of the regime of biopower over the course of the 
nineteenth century’.705 My reading of The Unnamable suggests that Beckett’s experiments with 
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ideas of bodily and aesthetic deformity constitute a significant chapter in the history of the 
antagonism between modernism and biopolitics. 
It is no coincidence that Nazism enlisted ‘the aesthetics of human disqualification’ in its 
drive to craft the eugenic ‘Aryan’ body of the German people. ‘Eugenics has been of signal 
importance to oppression’, Siebers writes, ‘because eugenics weds medical science to a disgust 
with mental and physical variation’.706 The expression of disgust towards nonstandard bodies 
in Nazi propaganda discloses the way in which the ‘aesthetics of human disqualification’ — 
combined with the biopolitical paradigm of the Third Reich — worked to exclude ‘degeneracy’ 
from the collective body of the German nation. As Siebers has put it, Hitler ‘embraced health 
and racial homogeneity as the measures of quality human beings. Disease and disability where 
his principle disqualifiers’.707 The Nazi regime’s commitment to bodily perfection consisted in 
a lethal programme of racial regeneration which combined aesthetic censorship with eugenicist 
policies in a dual assault on ‘dysgenic’ form. Nazism thus extended the reach of aesthetic 
judgement beyond its traditional sphere of authority and used it as the basis for excluding bodies 
encoded as ‘defective’.708 Crucially, the interweaving of ‘degeneracy’ and aesthetics that began 
with Nordau reached its conclusion in the Third Reich: 
Degeneration was principally a medical term before Max Nordau applied it to art. 
It referred throughout the last half of the nineteenth century to individuals who 
departed from norms of human health because of genetic difference, sexual habits 
deemed excessive, or shattered nerves. The Nazis applied these distinctions as 
standards of aesthetic beauty. Degenerate art deserved its name in their view 
because it included bodily deformities, bloodshot eyes, feebleness, and signs of 
nervous exhaustion—all disabling conditions supposedly brought about by racial 
impurity or the stress of modern life. Jews, homosexuals, and criminals were 
automatically assumed to be biologically inferior, and the Nazis found evidence 
of their assumptions in the physical traits given to people in works of modern 
art.709 
Just as Nordau locates the visible signs of degeneracy in ‘deformities’, ‘stunted growths’, and 
physical ‘asymmetry’, so the National Socialists represented the ‘abnormal’ type as a body 
without ‘proper’ form.710 In his Third Person (2012), Roberto Esposito argues that Nazi 
biopolitics conceived of degenerate life as ‘a counter type, defined by its original deformation 
or by the absence of form, which reduced it to simple living material’.711 Like Giorgio Agamben 
in his influential Homo Sacer series, Esposito locates the ‘thanatopolitical’ core of Nazism in 
the extermination of ‘bare life’. What distinguishes Esposito’s account of Nazi biopolitics is his 
claim that the regime substantiated its acts of genocide by reducing the ‘degenerate’, ‘non-
Aryan’ body to ‘dead life or death that lives, a flesh without a body’.712 Here Esposito’s crucial 
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distinction between the body and the flesh comes into view. If Nazism conceived of the racial 
body as a self-enclosed and purified form, it imagined that degenerate ‘life inhabited by death 
is simply flesh, an existence without life’.713 It was National Socialism’s fanatical attachment 
to the organicist idea of the body, along with its quest to translate ‘Jew’ and ‘abnormal’ into 
synonyms for ‘life unworthy of life’, which resulted in the genocidal violence of the camps and, 
ultimately, the self-destruction of the Third Reich: ‘the life unworthy of life is existence 
deprived of life — a life reduced to bare [nuda] existence’.714 As Esposito puts it, ‘Nazism 
treated the German people as an organic body that needed a radical cure, which consisted in the 
violent removal of a part that was already considered spiritually dead’.715 Deformation was thus 
the danger from which the ‘Aryan’ body had to free itself in order to attain spiritual perfection: 
The supreme spiritual value for a race is to achieve the perfect form of its somatic 
features, because this shape is nothing other than the expression of the realization 
of the truth of the idea, of the type, of the soul of the people.716  
As a result, the spiritualization of Germany’s formed body contrasted absolutely with the de-
spiritualization of ‘non-Aryan’ flesh. 
What is crucial for our purposes here is that the obsession with the spiritualization of 
bodily shape or form that defines the Nazi politics of life directly correlates with their notorious 
campaign against ‘degenerate art’.717 The Nazi preference for classical aesthetic form mirrored 
a revulsion with the fractured surfaces of avant-garde painting and sculpture. Many Nazi 
ideologues expressed hostility towards modernist form, because they viewed it ‘as the wrong 
kind of representation of the wrong kind of bodies; a racial, eugenic, and biopolitical notion 
that takes us directly from the expropriation and destruction of paintings and sculptures deemed 
degenerate to the elimination of life deemed unfit to live’.718 In a declaration on the future of 
German Kultur, Hitler insisted that ‘[w]e want only the celebration of the healthy body in art’.719 
Within this racialized vision of Kultur, Jewish or ‘Non-Aryan’ art is in essence defined as a 
celebration of crime, weakness, and pathology: ‘It practices the glorification of all vices and 
monstrosities’, Joseph Goebbels argued, ‘rais[ing] to the level of an artistic ideal whatever is 
nonheroic, ugly, sick, and decomposed’.720 Eric Michaud claims that the notion of life imitating 
art underwrites the Nazis’ approval of classical aesthetics and their campaign against 
‘degenerate art’: ‘just as the ideal of Greek art ought to necessarily to be embodied in [Hitler’s] 
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people, so too it was at all costs necessary to prevent degenerate art from engendering 
monsters’.721 As such, Nazi ideologues established a mimetic relation between art and the body 
politic of the Third Reich, whereby artistic form actively produces rather than merely re-
presents the ideal form of the healthy ‘Aryan’ body. 
When Beckett visited Germany in 1936-7, he wrote in his diaries about the restrictions 
which the Nazi regime imposed on the public exhibition of modernist art. Although the 
censorship of ‘non-Aryan’ painting and sculpture limited his access to particular works, he was 
nevertheless able to view a number of modernist paintings in galleries which did not comply 
with the official policy.722 More importantly, Beckett directly encountered the Nazis’ attempts 
to strip modernist art of its cultural value during his trip, for, while he left Germany several 
months before the notorious ‘Degenerate Art’ exhibition in Munich, he visited the 
‘“Schreckenskammer des Entarten” (Chamber of Horrors of Degenerate Art) in the Moritzburg 
in Halle in January 1937’.723  ‘Chambers of Horrors of Art’ ‘were special shows where the 
respective inventory of modern art, regardless of its style, was presented in order to defame 
it’.724 With this demotion of modernism to the non-status of abjection, the Nazis placed non-
mimetic art beyond the bounds of cultural decency. Those who promoted the rejection of 
modernism presented the censorship of ‘degenerate art’ as a reassertion of traditional norms of 
respectability and decorum after the cultural and social decadence of the Weimer Republic. As 
the name ‘Chamber of Horrors’ signifies, the propaganda against modernist art worked by 
arousing negative emotional responses among the German public: ‘The most significant aspects 
of ‘Entartete Kunst’, if we listen the Nazis who toured it, were the feelings of revulsion that the 
artworks were supposed to excite in beholders. These works were revolting, of course, because 
they used disability to prove the degeneracy of modern existence’.725 Because ‘Dada and 
Expressionism deform the bodies rendered by them, seeming to portray disabled people’, the 
Nazis presented these avant-garde movements as monstrous aberrations intent on overthrowing 
the norms of the purified Reich.726 
Mark Nixon’s research on the ‘German Diaries’ has revealed that Beckett was 
impressed with the Expressionist works he viewed during his melancholy artistic pilgrimage in 
Nazi Germany.727 According to Nixon, ‘Beckett’s interest in German Expressionism was not 
limited to paintings, but extended to the plastic work of Ernst Barlach, whom he appears to 
have particularly admired’.728 By the mid-1930s, when Beckett was searching for modernist 
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artworks in defiance of the censors, Barlach was one of the many artists under attack from the 
National Socialists. In the words of the Nazi scholar Alfred Rosenberg, ‘Barlach […] masters 
his material like a virtuoso, and no one will deny the monumentality of his carving. But what 
he designs in the way of human beings, that is alien, entirely alien: […] small, half-idiotically 
gazing mixed variations of indefinable human types’.729 This reading encodes Barlach’s figures 
as subhuman degenerates, since they violate the Nazi imperative to give a conclusive (i.e. 
‘Aryan’) shape to the human species, while their lack of resemblance to the Nazi-approved type 
gives rise to anxieties about the dysgenic effects of racial mixing. What is most striking about 
Rosenberg’s negative appraisal of Barlach’s sculpture is his palpable sense of disgust in the 
face of the artist’s human figures. Unlike many of the Expressionist artworks which repelled 
Nazi ideologues, Barlach’s figures are not explicitly grotesque or obscene. As Andrew Mitchel 
explains, ‘[t]he degeneracy of Barlach’s sculpture lies in the formlessness that literally informs 
his work. The well-defined faces and hands of these sculptures emerge from the 
incomprehensible and unexplored masses at their heart’.730 As the Nazis strived to genetically 
sculpt ‘Aryan’ bodies with chiselled outlines, so they rejected sculptures which expose the 
unshaped materiality of embodied life: 
The National Socialist objection to the earthen nature of Barlach’s work is an 
objection to its unformed massiveness. The earth stands for material that has yet 
to be taken up and spiritualized. This spiritualization is an assumption of meaning 
on the unformed and the meaningless. Making is marking, forming, and the 
bestowal of meaning is life itself. The healthy life is one that grows ever more 
definite and meaningful in a meaningful world, growing into the full realization 
of its purpose.731 
For Mitchell, Barlach’s ‘work is an act of resistance against the National Socialist drive to form 
— not, however, by simply asserting the opposite and championing a vague formlessness, but 
by revealing the limits of form as a contour of reciprocity with the raw matter that lies beyond 
it’.732 In this way, Barlach’s artistic ‘negotiation between the formed and the unformed’ defies 
the fear of shapelessness which underpins Nazi biopolitics.733 
Like Barlach’s plastic art, Beckett’s fiction exposes the human form to the ‘raw matter’ 
that exists both within and beyond the limits of the body. But what distinguishes Beckett’s 
negotiation between form and formlessness is his inclusion of the abject materiality of corporeal 
existence in his fiction. The presence of decomposing flesh and bodily effluvia in his work 
resists the Nazi imperative to exclude disgust-inducing matter from the sphere of cultural 
production. The ‘unformed’ — matter without an assigned meaning or purpose, in Mitchell’s 
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terms — resists the Nazis’ homicidal will-to-form by refusing the answer their call to 
spiritualize and fix the body. As Purcell suggests, it is also possible to read Beckett’s post-war 
work as ‘degenerate art’ because he creates literary form by including misshaping and distorting 
it.734 To reiterate, degenerate form is always an undoing of form. It thus represents a kind of 
negative morphology, whereby formation and deformation are not so much two distinct 
processes as they are a singular activity of aesthetic de-composition. This aspect of Beckett’s 
aesthetic practice aligns his work with one of the prevailing tendencies of European modernism. 
As Maren Linett puts it, ‘[t]he notion of deforming the contours of what has come before serves 
as another way to express modernist efforts to “make it new”’.735 Yet if the paradox of literary 
texts which generate form through its degeneration is that the new emerges amidst the 
breakdown and decay of the old, the modernist affirmation of aesthetic deformity also encodes 
paradoxical attitudes towards the disabled body. ‘Casting nonnormative embodiment as a 
degraded state’, Linett writes, ‘many twentieth century artworks nevertheless suggest that this 
degradation can be transcended through the superiority of modernist art’.736 By contrast, 
Beckett strives to overturn the idea of art’s transcendence of the physical body by making 
‘degraded’ and unformed materiality the primary substance of his post-war fiction. It is this 
insistence on the base matter of the body which separates Beckett from those modernist artists 
whose work implies that ‘representations of deformity and disability […] are only acceptable 
to the degree that they have been transformed into and transcended by art’.737 Contrariwise, 
bodily deformity in Beckett’s fiction reminds us of matter’s resistance to transcendent ideas of 
form, shattering the modernist ambition to transmute disability into the ‘superior’ realm of the 
aesthetic. 
Beckett’s refusal of aesthetic sublimation exposes the unadorned materiality of the 
body. In his 1984 lectures The Courage of Truth,  Michel Foucault includes Beckett in a 
tradition of modern painters and writers whose work ‘establish[ed] a relation to reality which 
is no longer one of ornamentation, or imitation, but one of laying bare, exposure, stripping, 
excavation, and violent reduction of existence to its basics’.738 According to Foucault,  
there is an anti-Platonism of modern art which was the great scandal of Manet and 
which, I think, without characterizing all art possible today, has been the profound 
tendency which is found from Manet to Francis Bacon, from Baudelaire to Samuel 
Beckett or Burroughs. Anti-Platonism: art as the site of the irruption of the basic, 
stripping existence bare.739  
Foucault’s description of anti-Platonic modern art, I want to suggest, sheds light on Beckett’s 
aesthetic of deformity in his post-war trilogy of novels. For Benjamin Noys, Foucault’s account 
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of modern art provides a more compelling model for art’s resistance to biopower than the 
vitalist affirmations of life’s radical excess that characterise much of contemporary theory.740 
Noys argues that Foucault’s remarks gesture towards ‘a counter-form of art developed around 
the exposure of life’, which would involve not only ‘a stripping bare of existence, but also a 
stripping bare of language or visual expression. What Barthes called a ‘writing degree zero’ 
[…] converges with life degree zero, or ‘bare life’, to use Agamben’s formulation’.741 This 
conflation of ‘bare life’ with stripped-down literary form opens up a number of questions. What 
would an aesthetics of bare life look like? How might we begin to work through the paradox of 
a masterful aesthetic form that is capable of expressing formless life? 
Before answering these questions it is worth noting that the modernist artists and 
writers who Foucault refers to — Manet, Bacon, Baudelaire, Burroughs, and, of course, Beckett 
himself — all made the flesh a central concern of their work. These modernist pioneers who 
helped dismantle ‘social norms, values, and aesthetics canons’were also engaged in deforming 
the normative image of the human body, which aligns Foucault’s ‘counter-tradition’ of art with 
the modernist aesthetics of disability.742 So before Agamben developed his philosophy of ‘bare 
life’ and his magisterial account of modern biopolitics, Foucault had already adumbrated an 
aesthetics of bare flesh — electing Beckett as one of its patron saints.  The acts of stripping 
away and laying bare are crucial to Beckett’s portrayals of counter-normative embodiment. 
Beckett’s bodies lose their functionality, lose their form, and thereby lose their taxonomic 
classifications. Nevertheless, the various acts of subtraction that Beckett performs on his 
fictional creatures leave a surplus of unclassifiable life: a formless remainder which is, so to 
speak, unnameable. Over the years critics have given different labels to the carnal remainder 
which is the Beckettian body — the monstrous, the posthuman, the creature743 My contention 
is that the reduction of bodies to the ‘formlessness’ of ‘bare life’ in Beckett’s writing requires 
us to rethink the idea of form in the The Unnamable in terms of an aesthetic practice of 
decomposition, an ongoing effort to ‘lay bare’ excluded life through an art of misshaping. If, as 
Noys has put it, Foucault’s ‘counter-art’ of exposed life ‘does not so much rest on the supposed 
plenitude of life overflowing the text, but a baring or voiding of life as value’, then Beckett’s 
stripping away of bodily form can be seen as an accommodation of denuded life in the wake of 
World War II.744 In light of these remarks I want to suggest that articulating a Beckettian 
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resistance to biopolitics would not consist in an affirmation of life liberated from the norm; on 
the contrary, it would involve tracing how his aesthetic of deformity exposes readers to life 
stripped of value. 
No aspect of the The Unnamable signifies the stripping away of art’s transcendent 
aspirations more than the anarchic, uncontainable flesh of Beckett’s creatures. Just as these 
distorted beings do not fit the mould of the ‘human type’, so their unruly flesh continually 
exceeds the perimeters of the sealed-off body. The Unnamable draws our terrified attention the 
malleability of the flesh, rearranging body parts in ways which diverge extravagantly from the 
image of the human as an enclosed, unified being. Beckett’s stripping apart of the ‘carnal 
envelope’ explodes the anthropomorphic image of the completed human form, as does the 
severing of the Unnamable’s nose, eyes, mouth, genitals, arms, hair, and legs from the trunk of 
its body.745 We thus encounter flesh beyond the boundaries of the skin, and a series of body 
parts that do not on any occasion add up to an organic body. Rotting flesh and other putrescent 
substances offer a further source of unshaped matter, which infuses the text with ‘the stench of 
decomposition’.746 And if the Unnamable’s tormentors describe it as having ‘no human shape’, 
this is because they are surrogates for Beckett’s own stripping away of fleshy material.747 It has 
been argued that the Unnamable’s loss of human identity and exposure to unthinkable acts of 
torture closely parallel Agamben’s account of the ‘bare life’ of the ‘Muselmann’ in the Nazi 
concentration camps.748 Thus, David Houston Jones claims that in The Unnamable ‘humanity 
is no longer distinct from animal life (or “bare life”, in Agamben’s terms)’.749 While this reading 
takes account of the stripping away of life’s value in the context of post-Holocaust Europe, 
Beckett’s reduction of the flesh to a stripped down condition of unformed matter in many ways 
exceeds the figure of animalisation— hence, for example, the description of Worm as ‘being 
less than a beast’.750 
Rather than approaching the subject of ‘bare life’ in terms of the human/animal 
distinction, I argue that Esposito’s configuration of ‘bare life’ as ‘flesh without a body’ 
illuminates Beckett’s assault on human form. The Unnamable presents the monstrous body as 
both a scandalous distortion of the human and an unformed mass of matter. Beckett thus 
conceives of ‘bare life’ as stripped-raw lumps of flesh without a conclusive bodily form. While 
I agree with Alysia Garrison’s observation that ‘[l]ife throughout the Three Novels gets 
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successively more bare’, I find the claim that The Unnamable puts forward ‘an ethical critique 
of the conditions that gave rise to the Holocaust’ to some extent less persuasive.751 Indeed, I 
would argue that Beckett’s stripping away of the flesh implicates his art in violence rather than 
removing it to a transcendent standpoint of ethical purity.  In many ways, National Socialism’s 
broadsides against degenerate art prefigure Beckett’s post-war vision of misshapen flesh. 
Consider, for example, Adolf Hitler’s statement that it ‘is not the mission of art…to wallow in 
filth for filth’s sake, to paint the human being only in a state of putrefaction, […] or to present 
deformed idiots as representatives of manly strength’.752 There is a teeming mass of liquefied 
flesh, putrefaction, and monstrous embodiment running throughout Beckett’s novel. He thus 
aggressively defies the Nazi conception that aesthetic form is what gives value to life. Instead, 
he implicates the process of aesthetic formation in the stripping away of life’s value. Beckett 
seeks to fashion a text in which form emerges from deformity, where the narrator is a misshapen 
‘artist’ who in turn misshapes other creatures. It is therefore possible to view The Unnamable 
not just as a degenerate body but also as a degenerate artist.753 As the Unnamable is a deformed 
creature, so its ‘artistic’ creations cannot be assimilated within the contours of the ‘normal’ 
body: ‘before executing [Mahood’s] portrait, full length on his surviving leg, let me note that 
my next vice-exister will be a billy in the bowl, that’s final, with his bowl on his head and his 
arse in the dust’.754 This shift from a portrait of Mahood’s one-legged body to an allusion to the 
legless Dublin beggar known as ‘billy in the bowl’ suggests a tendency towards an ever greater 
fragmentation of the flesh.755 The process of de-creation continues with the appearance of 
Worm, who provides the novel’s most radical example of a being defined by its lack of form, 
since this enigmatic being is described as ‘shapeless heap, without a face’,756 and even as a ‘tiny 
blur’.757 Beckett’s characters appear as monstrous beings, as figures of excess and deficiency, 
losing limbs or sprouting fleshy protuberances: ‘A head has grown out of his ear, the better to 
enrage him, that must be it. The head is there, glued to the ear, and in it nothing but rage, that’s 
all that matters, for the time being’.758 The Unnamable has meanwhile ‘lost all [it’s] 
members’759 and describes itself as ‘human to be sure, but not exaggeratedly’.760 Paradoxically, 
the ever-shifting flesh on display in the novel provides a sense of continuity and discontinuity: 
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‘the one-armed one-legged wayfarer of a moment ago and the wedge-headed trunk in which I 
am now marooned are simply two phases of the same carnal envelope’.761 Just as the misshapen 
narrator repeatedly changes form and yet remains the same, so the narrative shifts and digresses 
without losing its relentless momentum, which sets up the deformed body as an analogy for the 
consistent inconsistency of the narrative. 
The more distorted and indistinct the flesh becomes, the more it resists 
conceptualisation and asserts its bare materiality. Even so, Beckett confounds this drive towards 
shapelessness by repeatedly invoking the notion of artistic formation. The tension between the 
formed and the formless expresses itself in the image of fashioning a human-shaped figure from 
base matter — ‘I’m like dust, they want to make a man from dust’ — which recalls the Jewish 
myth of the Golem, and, indeed, throughout the text the relation between material and textual 
deformity expresses itself as a degenerative process of, in Michaud’s terms, ‘engendering 
monsters’.762 Throughout the novel these inconclusive lumps of flesh and matter never finally 
resolve themselves into living forms. Nor do they take shape according to the anthropomorphic 
blueprint of classical aesthetics. The Unnamable envisions the possibility that his tormentors 
will ‘leave [him] lying in a heap, in such a heap that none would ever be found again to try and 
fashion it’.763 Here the Unnamable imagines that shapelessness may bring an end to the 
interminable refashioning of its material being. It is as if amorphous matter both invites and 
interrupts the will-to-form, thereby invoking the limits of the artist’s ability to integrate and 
contain materiality within a meaningful order. In this way artistic agency loses its connotations 
of mastery and appears instead in the guise of incapacity, impairment, or non-productivity, and 
the artist is thus recast in the role of, in Beckett’s words,  ‘a non can-er’.764 As Helen Deutsch 
points out, the second definition of ‘deformity’ in The Oxford English Dictionary  is 
‘misshapen’, which gestures towards the idea of ‘a negative agency, a body created and 
abandoned by its author’.765 While Deutsch invokes the trope of Deus absconditus to parse the 
idea of misshaping, her description of a ‘negative agency’ which produces incomplete bodily 
forms also resonates with Nazi sermons against ‘degenerate’ artists. ‘Negative agency’ is 
precisely what is at stake in the Unnamable’s encounters with its ‘vice-existers’; as artists who 
produce failed and abandoned forms, they ‘don’t know what to do with’ this unshaped matter 
in order to animate it with life and meaning.766 Moreover, the Unnamable’s admission that it 
‘has no technique’ suggests artistic incompetence — like the incompetence which the Nazis 
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blamed for the presence of deformity in modernist art — though it in fact refers to the narrator’s 
physical and mental impairments, including a complete privation of movement and 
understanding.767 If this linkage of disability with a lack of artistic mastery recalls the 
propaganda against degenerate art, it is also in tune with Beckett’s development of an art of 
failure and impotence after the Second World War. 
As Nixon observes, Beckett’s continued to associate aesthetic deformity with the Nazi 
campaign against degenerate art in the post-war period.768 In his 1945 essay ‘La peinture de van 
Velde ou le monde et le pantalon’, Beckett gives an ironic assessment of abstract painting which 
echoes the National Socialist rhetoric of degeneracy: ‘Ne vous approchez pas de l’art abstrait. 
C’est fabriqué pas une bande d’escrocs et d’incapables. Ils ne sauraient faire aure chose. Ils ne 
savent pas dessiner’ [Do not approach abstract art. It is produced by a gang of criminals and 
incapables. They would not know how to do anything else. They do not know how to draw.].769 
It is worth keeping in mind that Beckett’s championing of failure and impotence in his post-
war work closely parallels these ventriloquized statements. As Purcell has intimated, it is 
possible to read his deformation of the novel form in his post-war fiction as, in part, a response 
to the attacks on degenerate art he witnessed in Germany in the mid-1930s.770 It is certainly 
difficult not to hear a sardonic avowal of artistic intent in Beckett’s statement that ‘peinture à 
deformation est la refuge de tous les rates [painting which distorts is the refuge of all 
failures]’.771 Deformation, for the Nazis, was a visible sign of aesthetic failure; for Beckett, in 
contrast, deformity and failure were essential components of an art that refused to find value in 
achievement and mastery. If the National Socialists conceived of aesthetic distortion as a 
symptom of artistic failure, Beckett embraced incapacity and ‘failed form’ as the defining mode 
of his art.772 As he told Israel Shenker in 1956, ‘I’m not the master of my material’.773 
Contrasting his own work with that of Franz Kafka, Beckett wrote: ‘The Kafka hero has a 
coherence of purpose. He’s lost but he’s not spiritually precarious, he’s not falling to bits. My 
people seem to be falling to bits’.774 Bodily disintegration is, in Beckett’s terms, an analogy for 
his art of non-achievement, an art which derives its form, or better, anti-form, from an 
‘exploit[ation]’ of ‘impotence’ and ‘ignorance’.775 If Nazi violence constitutes one of the 
definitive contexts for Beckett’s arrival at an aesthetic of deformity and stripped-bare flesh, his 
rejection of the ‘aesthetic axiom that expression is achievement’ may itself be an act of political 
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resistance.776 In Mein Kampf (1925), Hitler defines a vision of Kultur as ‘the realized form in 
which a race preserved itself’.777 We know that in 1941 Beckett owned a ‘heavily underlined’ 
copy of Mein Kampf, which verifies his close scrutiny of Hitler’s propaganda.778 It is thus 
conceivable that Beckett’s insistence on lowness, debasement, deformity, and unachieved form 
emerged as an assault on the Nazi politics of art. 
Let us return to Foucault’s remarks about the anti-Platonism of modern art, from Manet 
and Baudelaire to Beckett, Bacon, and Burroughs. For Foucault, this lineage of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century art ‘established a polemical relationship of reduction, refusal, and aggression 
to culture, social norms, values, and aesthetic canons’.779 It therefore amounts to (to use Noys’ 
term) a ‘counter-form of art’ which eschews ornament and mimesis to perform a ‘violent 
reduction of existence to its basics’.780 As we have seen, Beckett’s work contains striking 
examples of this process of distorting, dismantling, and laying bare. We have also seen that 
ideas of degeneracy and deformity were central to Beckett’s exposure of denuded life.  On the 
canvases and in the texts of ‘anti-Platonic’ modernism, the form of human body, which has 
fallen from the transcendent apex it occupied in classical aesthetics, immerses itself in the 
messy stuff of material being. The body’s reduction to unformed flesh, and the loss of its 
idealised Platonic outline, shatters the normative aesthetics of human form. This is in part what 
Foucault finds so powerful about the stripped-bare flesh of European modernism, since it 
consists in nothing less than a violent refusal of the terms of beauty, respectability, decorum, 
and cultural value. 
But it is also possible to take Foucault’s remarks about Beckett’s ‘anti-Platonism’ in a 
biopolitical direction. I have argued that Beckett’s deformed modernism exemplifies what Noys 
calls ‘a counter-form of art developed around the exposure of life’.781 The de-creation of 
aesthetic and bodily form in The Unnamable offers an example of an art of resistance that 
emerged in opposition to the normalisation of life.  But I have also suggested that Beckett was 
engaged in presenting the body as fleshy material stripped of value. This linking of the 
devaluation of life to the degeneration of bodily form problematizes the notion that Beckett’s 
writing offers an affirmation of life, even life which is outside the norm. Yet what would happen 
if, in conclusion, we were to read the ‘exposure of life’ in Beckett’s fiction alongside another 
one of Foucault’s modernist ‘anti-Platonists’ — Francis Bacon? The striking points of 
resemblance between Beckett’s and Bacon’s work when it comes to their disfiguring of the 
flesh have not gone unnoticed. According to Peter Fifield, in both Bacon and Beckett’s work 
‘there is an emphasis not on the fixed form of the whole as constituted by its individual parts 
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— limbs, hands, feet, and so on — but on its underlying fleshiness; the essential meat of the 
matter’.782 ‘For both Bacon and Beckett’, Fifield tells us, ‘the medical exception often provides 
the physiological exemplar; the distortion stresses the everyday condition of being clothed in 
tissue’.783 I would add that the deformed appearance of the flesh in their work emerged as an 
indirect (i.e. non-representational) response to the devaluation of life exposed to biopolitical 
violence. For one thing, Beckett’s relentless dismantling of the organicist idea of the body in 
The Unnamable closely parallels Esposito’s reading of the politics of flesh in Bacon’s painting. 
From Esposito’s standpoint, ‘the flight of flesh from the body, both barely sustained and 
strained to the point of spasms by the structure of the bones, constitute the center itself of the 
paintings of Francis Bacon’.784 Bacon’s paintings of deformed flesh are, according to Esposito, 
the closest thing we possess to an accurate portrait of ‘the biopolitical practice of the 
animalization of man carried out to its lethal conclusion’.785 Yet Bacon’s exposure of flesh 
stripped of value points towards another way of thinking life which would leave behind the idea 
of the self-enclosed body, whether individual or collective: ‘Flesh is the body that doesn’t 
coincide with itself (as Nazism wanted […]), that isn’t unified beforehand in an organic form, 
and that is not led by a head […] No. Flesh is constitutively plural, multiple, and deformed. It 
is also from this point of view that one can begin to imagine an affirmative biopolitics’.786 It 
may be that the exposure of deformed flesh in Beckett’s fiction likewise points us beyond the 
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This dissertation has proposed that the atavistic bodies that appear in texts by Lewis, Loy, and 
Beckett comprise an ambivalent strain of modernist posthumanism. To that end, I have enquired 
into forms of the monstrous or anti-normative body that are marked by an orientation towards 
the past. As I have argued throughout the preceding chapters, the atavistic bodies fashioned by 
Lewis, Loy and Beckett revert to a past whose reappearance deforms and reconfigures the 
human. This thesis has expanded the idea of atavism beyond its usual association with 
devolution and animality. My consideration of atavistic automata, for example, has enlarged 
the idea of regression to include technological bodies and the animation of inorganic things in 
early cinema and twentieth-century philosophies of immanence. By extending the idea of 
atavism beyond its usual scope, I have sketched out a mode of modernist posthumanism that is 
more oriented towards the past than the future. From germinal life and elemental forces to 
insects and worms, the atavistic forms we encounter in the works of Lewis, Loy, and Beckett 
chart out an unmaking of species identities that far exceeds the bestial humans of the fin-de-
siècle imagination. The idea that what comes after the human will involve a return of savage 
ancestral forces is a thread that runs through many of the texts I have considered.  However, the 
backward-facing version of posthumanism I have sketched out is not expressive of a unified 
political attitude or aesthetic mode. In Lewis’s satire, the reappearance of the archaic is 
symptomatic of the erosion of the privileged masculine subject in technological modernity; in 
Loy’s poetry and prose, the atavistic body melds with the protoplasmic body, unmaking the 
distinction between finished and unfinished form; and in Beckett’s fiction, bodies declining 
towards monstrous animality become nonproductive larval forms which fail to generate a 
liveable future.  While the expanded conception of atavism I have traced in Lewis, Loy, and 
Beckett differs from the fin-de-siècle theories of Cesare Lombroso and Max Nordau, I have 
argued that the biopolitical discourses of degeneration and eugenics intersect with the modernist 
fascination with regressive monstrosity. Populations deemed ‘backward’ in the normative 
culture of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century became the subject of biopolitical 
management.788 It should not be a surprise, then, that nonprogressive, anti-normative bodies 
yield a modernist posthumanism that turns away from the future. Reading the atavistic body as 
a palimpsest of the inhuman has enabled me to trace the divergent, distant, and often ‘barbarous’ 
ancestries of modernist monstrosity. 
Is the future the definitive tense of posthumanism? Donna Haraway’s announcement of 
the posthuman birth of the cyborg captures her feminist investment in future-oriented 
monstrosity. In ‘The Promise of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others’, 
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she situates ‘[herself] and [her] readers’ […] within the womb of a pregnant monster’,789 and 
calls for ‘a reproductive technology that might issue in something other than the sacred image 
of the same, something inappropriate, unfitting, and so, maybe, inappropriated’.790 It thus 
seems, then, that monstrosity’s promise inheres in its gestation of an alternative future that 
would deviate from the repetition compulsion enforcing the norms of ‘Man’. More recently, 
Karen Barad has argued that ‘[m]onstrosity […] cuts both ways. It can serve to demonize, 
dehumanize, and demoralize. It can also be a source of political agency. It can empower and 
radicalize’.791 These affirmations of the monstrous exemplify how monstrosity, agency, and 
futurity have become bedfellows in posthumanist thought. By contrast, the retrogressive 
posthumanism I have studied in texts by Lewis, Loy, and Beckett is oriented towards a past that 
has not passed away because it continues to determine the shape of life in the present. This 
enquiry into atavism is a timely intervention to posthumanist studies because atavism resists 
the idea of superseding the human (and the animal) or founding a clear-cut break with 
anthropocentrism. Taking issue with the ‘“strong” versions of posthumanism that impatiently 
declare the human’s decentring in the present’ (including object-oriented ontology and 
speculative realism), Christopher Peterson argues that ‘even among more mainstream 
posthumanist theories, those that acknowledge the difficulties of moving “beyond” the human, 
the decentring of the human is understood as an achievable end’.792 As a result, linearity has 
become a feature of posthumanist theorizations that construe the overcoming of ontological 
hierarchies as an attainable political objective. The anti-progressive posthumanism I have traced 
in Lewis, Loy, and Beckett does not yield a redemptive vision of life ‘beyond’ the human. 
Returning to ancestral forms of life following the erasure of ontological distinctions entails 
nonlinear exchanges between the afterlife of the human and the distant pasts before human 
knowledge and perception. Indeed, for these modernists, there is an insistent, anti-futural 
momentum that attends the waning dominance of the liberal subject. 
Stefan Herbrechter has argued that ‘[t]echnology and future […] could be named as the 
key words, and arguably even the transcendental signifieds of most posthumanisms’.793 But 
techno-futurist visions of leaving the human behind often seem to rehearse theological 
structures of thought. Indeed, in posthumanisms which combine a zealous faith in technology 
with fantasies of escaping the embodied constraints of animal being, the connection in the 
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modern imaginary between machines and futurity rekindles the ancient yearning to transcend 
the flesh. Transhumanists, for example, imagine that sovereign humanity occupies a present 
that is currently tainted by the animal past, but which gestures towards a postbiological future 
enhanced by technics. I have argued that Lewis inverts the normative temporal framing of an 
animal past, a human present, and a technological future. While Lewis remains invested in a 
masculinist conception of transcendent human subject, his sense of the atavistic logic behind 
the assault on ‘Western Man’ finds expression in his anxieties about technological regression 
and the reappearance of ‘superseded’ categories of thought like animism. In Lewis, 
animalization becomes a side-effect of the revolutionary upheavals of industrialized modernity, 
whilst technology connotes backwardness and the primordial. What I have argued is that 
Lewis’s animus against the demise of the transcendent subject is grounded in his sense that 
modernity involves regress rather than progress.  Indeed, Lewis’s rhetoric of technological 
regression in antithetical not only the modern link between machines and futurity but also the 
teleological posthumanist vision of achieving ‘human enhancement and progressive evolution’ 
via technological advance.794 This uncoupling of progress and technology speaks to a 
quintessentially modernist take on the erosion of historical improvement. Moreover, Lewis’s 
assertions about the coalescence of machines and animality prefigure one of the fundamental 
paradoxes in posthumanist accounts of technology. As Paul Sheehan has pointed out, recent 
theorizations of technological posthumanism never wholly efface the atavistic remnants of 
animal embodiment. He explains that: 
[E]ven the lures of technology cannot escape the shadow of atavistic 
posthumanism. Katherine Hayles, for example, acknowledges the pre-eminence 
of neural plasticity, or the human brain’s adaptability to changing environments 
that are not of its making. However, she also regards a human being as primarily 
a form of embodied being’.795 
Sheehan cites Hayles’s claim that [t]he body is the net result of thousands of years of 
sedimented evolutionary history, and it is naïve to think that this history does not affect human 
behaviours at every level of thought and action’.796  For Hayles, the persistence of these 
‘thousands of years of evolutionary history’ within all possible technological futures confounds 
the fantasy of a streamlined posthuman subject liberated from animal finitude. Because the 
tissue of human embodiment remains entangled with evolutionary history, ‘[t]he posthuman 
body’s atavistic reflexes thus constitute a boundary of sorts for human cybernetic 
integration’.797 The stronger claim of Lewis’s work is that human retrogression receives its 
impetus from the mechanization of life. 
Similarly, Loy’s treatment of the technological body as a figure of regression in 
‘Human Cylinders’ goes against the grain of Futurism and technological posthumanism. But 
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this antipathy to mechanical regression does not exhaust Loy’s engagement with the 
connections between atavism and modern technology. Unlike the regressive automaton, the 
body-as-medium we encounter in Insel projects images of germinal life forms that antedate 
human and animal organisms. In making pre-human life reappear, the body-as-medium yields 
an atavistic unmaking of the forms that determine the present. However, the direction of the 
regressive posthumanism that Loy imagines in Insel implies a rejection of redemptive narratives 
that chart a progressive movement beyond the human. While Loy’s vitalist manifestoes of the 
1910s promote progressive projects of human improvement, her novel Insel dramatizes a 
narrative logic of retrogression and postponed futurity. But Loy’s most remarkable contribution 
to the regressive posthumanism studied here is her reimagining of atavism as a mode of 
forgetting: while Seitler suggests that ‘atavism can be said to open up liberal notions of the 
subject to the genealogical record’, Loy imagines regression as an insistent return to unfinished 
forms that are too incomplete to leave a definitive archival trace.798 Loy’s modernism helps us 
to imagine an atavistic creativity based on forgetting the finished, ossified forms of the human 
present. Eschewing Loy’s Bergsonian investment in germinal life, Lewis’s and Beckett’s 
animus against vitalism offers a striking counterpoint to the various affirmations of life 
currently animating posthumanist thought.  As Benjamin Noys has recently suggested: ‘Not 
since the late 19th and early 20th century pairing of Nietzsche-Bergson, triangulated in the 
political by Sorel, have we seen such a theoretical dominance of vitalism’.799 Vitalist 
attachments in recent posthumanist enquiries into literary modernism have mimicked the 
modernist tendency to treat ‘life’ as a redemptive political category. Erin Edwards’s Deleuzian 
reflections on the ‘modernist corpse’ affirm ‘a vitalist approach to the corpse in order to 
challenge the liberal humanist subject who has traditionally defined itself against a world of 
inertly reified matter but who, in doing so, risks being conceptualized as “bare life” itself’.800  
By contrast, Lewis, Loy, and Beckett’s depictions of anti-vital bodies do not accord with the 
current political investment in the creativity and agency of life itself. 
My intervention in these debates has been to demonstrate that any affirmative reading of 
modernist posthumanism will necessarily be incomplete, since the critics who read 
modernism’s negation of the human as politically enabling do not account for the anti-
redemptive nature of many of the modernist texts examined in this dissertation. That said, I do 
not intend my contribution to be any kind of challenge to the posthumanist critique of the 
autonomous human subject. Readings of modernist texts informed by posthumanist thought 
have produced stunning insights into literary works that contest human sovereignty and affirm 
the decentralized agencies of the nonhuman. Here one could point to Derek Ryan’s musings on 
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Woolf’s engagement with the nonhuman in Virginia Woolf and the Materiality of Theory 
(2013), or Jeff Wallace’s posthumanist reappraisal of Lawrence in D.H. Lawrence, Science, 
and the Posthuman (2005). ‘The danger’, however, ‘is in the neatness of identifications’.801 
Beckett’s aphorism could stand as a warning to critics who read modernist texts as illustrating 
the propositions of contemporary posthumanist thought. In bringing to light a panorama of 
atavistic bodies from modernist texts, this study has offered a revised account of the relationship 
between modernism and posthumanism. The majority of contemporary posthumanisms have 
valued movement, agency, life, becoming, and the creation of new forms.802 In marked contrast, 
the strain of modernist posthumanism I have examined engages with inertia, impotence, death, 
immobility, and the loss of form. Modernism’s atavistic bodies, as they appear in the work of 
Lewis, Loy and Beckett, lack the animating force of agency (political or otherwise), and the 
creative potential of posthumanism’s future-oriented figures. While this de-emphasising of the 
future does not provide a blueprint for political action, the negativity of this formulation has the 
merit of critically alerting us to the persistence of progressive models of history in many 
contemporary posthumanisms. The idea that ‘posthumanity is a desirable thing that has the 
power to liberate us from the chains of the Enlightenment’ inadvertently reintroduces the 
conception of a linear march of progress from humanist barbarism to posthumanist 
civilisation.803 To reiterate: the singularity of the regressive posthumanism studied in this 
dissertation arises from its refusal to participate in the future-directed orientation of progressive 
posthumanisms. I have argued that the specific tone of this refusal is quintessentially modernist, 
since, as Vincent Sherry has shown, one of the defining temporal dispositions of literary 
modernism is ‘an expressive disenchantment with the cultural construction of forwardness’.804 
In other words, for literary modernists, innovation in the realm of aesthetics was a backward-
facing proposition. As Heather Love has expressed it: ‘Even when the modernists are making 
it new, they are inevitably grappling with the old: backwardness is a feature of even the most 
forward-looking modernist literature’.805 The ‘regressive’ posthumanism I have been 
considering has reciprocal relations with the ‘temporal splitting’ Love identifies as the 
formative paradox of aesthetic modernism.806 The association in literary modernism between 
what came before and what is in the process of emerging contributed to a sense that challenging 
prevailing social, political, and aesthetic norms required intellectual commerce with the past. 
By the same token, the modernists I have reflected on register the breakdown of humanist 
orthodoxies and norms of life by acknowledging the persistence of the past before the 
ascendency of the humanist subject. Modernist posthumanism is a pre-humanism. 
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My central claim has been that regression was the formative temporal signature of the 
strain of modernist posthumanism studied in this dissertation. As the recent focus on 
backwardness in modernist studies has emerged most forcefully from the work of queer 
theorists, more work needs to be done on the significance of queerness for the regressive 
posthumanism that has been the focus of this study. On one level, queering the monstrous 
bodies of modernism would enrich my reflections on the links between, in Lee Edelman’s 
terms, ‘anti-futurity’ and the inhuman. On another level, the negative disposition of the 
modernist posthumanism I have discussed would be a fruitful resource for queer theorists who 
want to challenge the association between affirmation and monstrosity in recent work on ‘queer 
inhumanism’.  In ‘Acts Against Nature’ (2018), Elizabeth Wilson argues that ‘the toxicity of 
the term [inhuman] has been more or less neutralized’ in recent conversations about ‘queer 
inhumanism’. For Wilson, ‘too often, it seems, the politics of the queer inhuman are oriented 
towards affectively defanged, anti-sodomitical ends — clarity, identity, and the transformation-
affirmation of the world, law and nature’.807 This is most apparent in the affirmative readings 
of queer inhumanism that eschew the negative, so that the monstrous undoing of the human 
‘seems to cut only one way’.808 To think about the queerness of the inhuman in modernism is 
to encounter the disruptive negative force of the monstrous. The connection between the queer 
and the inhuman in Beckett’s fiction, for example, is neither ‘affectively defanged’ nor oriented 
towards clarity and political affirmation. In addition to the panoply of queer sex in Beckett’s 
Trilogy and How It Is, his allusion to the ‘eternally larval’809 condition of his characters could 
be read as an inhumanist rewriting of the homophobic charge that to be queer is to be immature, 
undeveloped, not-yet-formed.810 
My focus on the importance of the past in modernist posthumanism is indebted to 
Elizabeth Grosz’s pioneering studies of time in Darwin, Bergson, and Nietzsche. Grosz 
interprets these thinkers as capturing the ‘untimely’ negotiation between past and present, 
‘becoming’ and ‘unbecoming’, animating the emergence of new modes of life.811 Unlike the 
modernists studied in this dissertation, however, Grosz affirms the potential for ‘the 
inexhaustible resources of the past, of that realm of the past still untouched by the present, to 
bring about a critical response to the present and ideally to replace it with what is better in the 
future’.812 The deep past that persists in the work of Lewis, Loy, and Beckett is less a generative 
site of creative potential than the location of suspended futurity: in Lewis’s Childermass, the 
posthumous Satters is a figure of failed development who experiences returns to infancy and 
‘pre-historic’ animality; in Loy’s Insel, the degenerate artist is a figure of ‘germinal life’ and 
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decadent exhaustion; and in Beckett’s Trilogy, the connection between degeneration and larval 
forms reiterates this dynamic of suspended becoming and dissolution. I have characterised these 
bodies not in terms of a posthumanist ‘overcoming’ of the humanist subject but as opening a 
space of uncertainty were becoming and inertia, metamorphosis and stasis, generation and 
degeneration, have become indistinct. My analysis of the work of Lewis, Loy, and Beckett 
suggests that, for these modernists, what follows in the wake of humanism is not a surpassing 
of the Enlightenment subject but a return of vestigial or primordial forces. The atavistic bodies 
fashioned by these modernists, bodies that have been divested of their human qualities, that are 
suspended between the negation of the human and an arrested becoming, do not yield a 
modernist posthumanism amenable to what Claire Colebrook has called ‘the contemporary 
valorization of becoming over being’.813   Many of the bodies I have studied are figures of 
incompletion suspended between becoming and dissolution. Incompletion slides into depletion; 
becoming turns into arrested development. The atavistic forms of modernism are attempts to 
fashion a body in the wake of the collapse of the normative image of ‘Man’. Lewis, Loy, and 
Beckett grasp for a new way of articulating the body after humanism, and find the remains of 
archaic, fossilised life preserved in the monstrous body of a species that can no longer guarantee 
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